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he Faculty of Political Science
Columbia University

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Notice to Members of the Academy

The annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Monday, January 8, 1973, at 4:00 P.M. in Room 1101, 420 West 118th Street, New York City.

Contributors to the December Issue

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Roosevelt and the Brains Trust: An Historiographical Overview*

ELLIOT A. ROSEN
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In American historiography, the New Deal has become something of a dowager. Forty years have passed since Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Brains Trust assessed the wreckage of the Great Depression and reached the decision that "to meet this danger of radicalism by reaction is to court disaster. . . . It is not the pledge of a new deal, it is the reminder of broken promises."[1] The domestic phase of the Roosevelt era has been laid to rest by historians, the synthesis arrived at. According to one, writing in 1967: "The main harvest of New Deal scholarship is at hand. . . . In another ten years most of the largely untouched fields, particularly agency and regional studies will be gleaned."[2] This essay is a dissent.

As long as history remains rooted in the study of documentary evidence, interpretations of past policies are subject to revision

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society and the Rutgers Research Council which financed his research in some sixty collections during the past eight years. Of these, about a dozen were critical to this reinterpretation and they are cited below.

[1] Raymond Moley memorandum, May 19, 1932, Moley Papers. The Moley Papers, now at the Stanford University Library, were consulted when they were in Dr. Moley's possession.

[2] Paul K. Conkin, *The New Deal* (New York, 1967), 107. Copyright © 1967 by Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

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when new sources become available. And nothing could substantiate this observation more convincingly than an historiographical analysis of the New Deal. For it proves once again that the historian not only needs perspective to interpret the recent past, but also the most complete knowledge about the policy makers and their views. Recently opened collections of such key participants in the shaping of the New Deal as Raymond Moley and Felix Frankfurter compel an open-minded revision of the major historical writings on this era. The revelations of the shifting views of Moley and of the civilized and deep intellectual regard for each other which prevailed in the inner circle of Roosevelt's academic advisers, throw an entirely new light on the complexities involved in the formulations Roosevelt attempted to hammer out.

This is no time to close the ledger. It should be reopened. Historians need to begin again at the beginning and offer some new reassessments.

I

During the critical 1932-33 interregnum, the president-elect and Louis D. Brandeis, Boston's celebrated Jewish Brahmin and crusader against corporate bigness, conferred at Washington's Mayflower Hotel. Roosevelt spelled out the broad purposes of the New Deal, and when Brandeis offered his assistance in the formulation of public policy, Roosevelt suggested that the Supreme Court Justice confer with Raymond Moley, at the time Roosevelt's economic adviser. Brandeis conveyed his views to Moley on several occasions in the period of the Hundred Days and the London Economic Conference, and there were few differences between Moley, who served as the president's principal adviser, and Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter on the domestic policies of the new administration.[3]

[3] Felix Frankfurter arranged the meeting in, Frankfurter to Miss Marguerite Le Hand, Nov. 10, 1932, Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 97; the conversation is described in Louis D. Brandeis to Frankfurter, Nov. 24, 1932. The general conclusion is based on the following: Moley Papers; Frankfurter Papers; Herbert Feis Papers and Frankfurter-Feis Correspondence, Library of Congress; Louis D. Brandeis Papers, Louisville Law School Library; and tape-recorded interviews with Raymond Moley, 1st Series, Sept. 1963; 2nd Series, 1968; 3rd Series, June 1969 (in author's possession).

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Later, after the fateful World Monetary and Economic Conference held at London in the summer of 1933, when Moley resigned his position as assistant secretary of state and an apparent rift was in the making between Moley and Roosevelt, Frankfurter intervened with the assistance of Herbert Bayard Swope, former editor of the New York *World*, to restore the Moley-Roosevelt collaboration. For Frankfurter, Brandeis, and Herbert Feis concluded in the winter of 1933-34, as Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau Jr. dabbled with the gold content of the dollar in a vain effort at price recovery, that the Roosevelt administration had lost its bearings. These and other elements of the Moley-Frankfurter relationship seem to contradict the prevailing hypothesis argued by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in *The Age of Roosevelt* that there were two New Deals, the first dominated by the Brains Trust and the second by Frankfurter and Brandeis.[4] This hypothesis for many more substantive reasons needs to be reconsidered as a frame of reference for the period 1933-38.

The belief that there was a first and a second New Deal, that a sharp shift took place in the domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration, rests on the assumption that the idea of an organic economy conceived of by the original Brains Trust at Columbia University, and especially by Rexford Guy Tugwell, was superseded in the mid-1930s by the economic ideas of the "Happy Hot Dog" school, the Harvard Law School protégés of Brandeis and Frankfurter. Schlesinger had in mind especially Thomas G. Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen, who were opposed to the acceptance and regulation of the huge corporate and financial aggregates.

[4] Herbert Bayard Swope to Frankfurter, July 18, 1933; Dec. 19, 1933; Apr. 9, 1934, Frankfurter Papers, Boxes 107, 118. Herbert Feis to Frankfurter, Jan. 29, 1934, *ibid.*, Box 116. Louis D. Brandeis to Frankfurter, May 11, 1934, *ibid.*, Box 115. Big business and big finance, Brandeis believed in mid-1934, were reasserting themselves having been strengthened by Roosevelt's policies. Also, Roosevelt was "no longer unerring in his political sense." Brandeis urged Frankfurter's early return from Oxford where he held the coveted George Eastman visiting professorship in the year 1933-34, so that he might design, "with F.D.'s friends like Moley, Baruch, etc.," a legislative program for 1935. There is no evidence in these years in the Frankfurter-Brandeis correspondence of a profound difference on economic issues between themselves and Moley. For Schlesinger's views see, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt*, Vol. I.: *The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933*; Vol. II: *The Coming of the New Deal*; Vol. III: *The Politics of Upheaval* (Boston, 1957-60).

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"By 1935," Professor Schlesinger points out, "Moley, Johnson, Richberg, and Berle had left Washington. Tugwell remained, but he was shunted to a siding; in 1937 he left too." The departure of the original Brains Trust from the charmed circle suggested to Schlesinger the abandonment of the partnership thesis, of "the original and probing ideas of Berle, Means, and Tugwell," and the substitution of the "free-market clichés of Brandeis and Frankfurter."

Schlesinger assumed that this change in advisers meant a deep and profound shift in direction, since the laws drafted by the original Columbia group were demolished by the Supreme Court "because of loose draftsmanship and emotional advocacy. The laws drawn by the Second New Deal were masterpieces of the lawyer's art; and they survived." The main thrust of the first New Deal, which accepted the concentration of economic power as a main trend of American history and sought to balance it with central planning, was, according to Schlesinger, an attempt "to reshape American institutions according to the philosophy of an organic economy and a coordinated society." The Frankfurter-Brandeis school, on the other hand, attempted the restoration of a "competitive society within the framework of strict social ground rules."[5]

No brief summation can do the two-New Deals hypothesis sufficient justice, for it has dominated the literature of the Age of Roosevelt from the very outset. It relies on the Supreme Court's rejection of some of the key legislation of the first New Deal, on Roosevelt's subsequent struggle with the Court in his effort to avoid judicial strangulation of social and economic change, on the shifting political alignments of 1936, and on the presumed threat from the "Left" represented by Huey Long, Dr. Francis E. Townshend, and Father Charles E. Coughlin. Also there was a growing acceptance of the idea of governmental spending as a means of securing economic survival.[6] Suffice it to say that the two-New Deals thesis had been suggested by Raymond Moley in 1939 in his memoir, *After Seven Years*, as an explanation of his departure from the Roosevelt circle (Moley stressed the shift to a more urban, class-oriented political appeal and to welfare legis-

[5] Schlesinger, *Politics of Upheaval*, chap. 21, esp. pp. 389-98.
[6] *Ibid.*, esp. Parts II and III.

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lation), and then it appeared in Basil Rauch's *The History of the New Deal*, published in 1944, before the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt were opened to scholarly investigation. Schlesinger's seemingly indefatigable research and brilliant, articulate, almost captivating style, gave this hypothesis its highest scholarly and literary expression. The massive legislative accomplishment of the Roosevelt administration had finally, it appeared, surrendered to intelligibility.[7]

At issue, Otis L. Graham observed in a summary article on the New Deal historiography, was whether Basil Rauch was correct in his conclusion that the second New Deal was a progressive shift leftward or whether Schlesinger was correct in his view that the neo-Brandeisians had taken two steps backward. Was the first New Deal of Moley, Berle, and Tugwell truly progressive in its acceptance of business-government partnership and centralization, as they suggested and as Richard Hofstadter agreed or conservative because of its rapprochement with the business community, as Basil Rauch suggested? One might add that the revisionist historians have since stolen the thunder of Frank Freidel and William Leuchtenburg, upon whom Graham placed the burden of a definitive conclusion. Graham, it seems, never thought to challenge the existence of "separate New Deals" and "their distinct and in many ways irreconciliable answers to the crisis of the Thirties." "The wind," he simply concluded, seemed to be blowing "against the Second New Deal," an echo of the Schlesinger view.[8]

Although the two-New Deals thesis does not seem to structure the most widely regarded single-volume treatment of the period, William E. Leuchtenburg's *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, it nevertheless went unchallenged. Leuchtenburg concluded with Schlesinger that the Brandeisians chafed in the Hundred Days while the advocates of NRA dominated the Washington scene. Then, with Brandeis sitting in judgment, the Supreme Court wielded the death blow. Roosevelt turned to Frankfurter who "insisted that the attempt at business-government cooperation had failed, and urged Roosevelt to declare war on business. Once

[7] Basil Rauch, *The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938* (New York, 1944); Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (New York, 1939), chap. 8; Conkin, 23.

[8] Otis L. Graham Jr., "Historians and the New Deals: 1944-1960," *The Social Studies*, LIV (1963), 133-40. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York, 1956).

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the President understood that business was the enemy, he would be free to undertake the Brandeisian program to cut the giants down to size: by dwarfing the power of holding companies, by launching anti-trust suits, and by taxing large corporations more stiffly than small business."[9]

The contents of the recently opened papers of Moley and Frankfurter and Frankfurter's recollection that the Schlesinger hypothesis was faulty, dictate a reexamination of the approach, perhaps its modification, even its abandonment. Much factual data supports the division of the early years of the New Deal into two distinctive periods, but it is, conceivably, an oversimplification of issues and an exaggeration of personality differences, perhaps to the point of melodrama. Schlesinger's greatest gift is a felicitous style; he has produced deeply etched portraits which no historian has been able to emulate. *The Age of Roosevelt* is superb literature; but is it great history? For despite Brandeis's fulminations on the "curse of bigness," which can be amply documented, Moley was a frequent visitor in the period of the so called first New Deal and there is no evidence in the Frankfurter-Brandeis-Moley correspondence in the period 1932-35 of the sort of ideological conflict one would have anticipated. On the contrary, they emerge as collaborators rather than as antagonists. The essential difference between Moley and Frankfurter, admittedly of considerable importance, but one which engendered no bitterness in their collaboration, was in their approach toward foreign policy as Moley shifted late in 1932 to an extremely nationalist position.[10]

The most trenchant challenge to the prevailing view of distinct time periods dividing the domestic New Deal has been offered, thus far, by one of the principals, Felix Frankfurter. At a White House visit in 1963 with Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and President John F. Kennedy, shortly before the latter's death, Frankfurter was strangely evasive when the chit chat got around to *The Age of Roosevelt*, most especially the third volume on *The Politics of Upheaval*. Evasiveness, as Schlesinger knew, was scarcely

[9] William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York, 1963), 149-50.

[10] Moley interview, June 1971.

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a Frankfurter attribute. In short order, Frankfurter explained himself in a letter to the historian:

> After leaving the White House on Monday . . . I reflected on the inadequacies of the answer I made to his [President Kennedy's] question as to why I disagreed with your view on the Roosevelt administration in the 30's, and more particularly that there were two New Deals. I did not tell him my basic reason for disagreement. It is that from your several references to your private interviews with Thomas G. Corcoran I gathered they had a considerable influence on the interpretation you gave in your book about the two New Deals, for Tommy is a very persuasive raconteur. . . .
>
> There are a few more things to be said. I must reject your assumption that there was a real clash of views between Moley-Tugwell and F. F.-Brandeis. This assumes that the respective parties had coherent and systematic views on some of the problems that are involved in Roosevelt's policies.
>
> You are also wrong in assuming that I saw completely eye to eye with Brandeis on socio-economic matters, any more than it is true that I was an echo of his outlook on the law, particularly constitutional law.[11]

We need to go further in a reevaluation of the shaping of the New Deal. There never was an organic economy, as defined by Schlesinger, in the first years of the New Deal (1933-35), except as any economy is essentially organic in nature and made up of interrelated parts. Tugwell's proposal for overhead management, national economic planning by a federal agency, presented to Roosevelt in the summer of 1932 was torpedoed not by Brandeis or Frankfurter, but by Adolf A. Berle Jr. on the grounds that it was a "Herculean job" and impossible of explanation in a politi-

[11] Felix Frankfurter to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., June 18, 1963, Frankfurter Papers, Box 101. This letter was reprinted in Max Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter: Their Correspondence, 1928-1945* (Boston, 1967), 24-26, at Professor Schlesinger's request. As Freedman indicates, p. 26, Moley and Frankfurter had debated the issue decades earlier when Moley was editor of *Today*. But the argument in 1935 was waged in a narrower context, namely whether Frankfurter had followers (including Corcoran and Cohen) in virtually every New Deal agency. Freedman's conclusion that neither Frankfurter nor Brandeis was as doctrinaire as Schlesinger suggests is confirmed by my own reading of their correspondence. Nor was Moley as doctrinaire or as consistent in his views as is suggested by Schlesinger, other historians, or Moley himself in *After Seven Years*.

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cal campaign. Evidently Roosevelt concluded that a highly regimented economy was politically unacceptable. And for all of the antibusiness rhetoric of Roosevelt and Corcoran in the mid-thirties, anticipated by Moley's memoranda in 1932, there is no evidence that proposals made in 1936-38 for heavy taxation of giant corporations and large incomes, regulation of utilities holding companies, and even dissolution of the large aggregates that dominated the U.S. economy had any tangible results then or in the years that followed.

Other factors need to be considered in a reassessment of the artificially structured two-New Deals approach. It does not account for crucial differences in attitudes toward the nation's diplomatic responsibilities as the domestic policies of the New Deal took form, nor for the interrelationship of domestic policies and economic diplomacy. It encourages an artificial compartmentalization of the Roosevelt era into a domestic and subsequently a foreign phase, implicit in the structure of Schlesinger's work as well as that of most other historians. Also, it blurs the reality that much of the basic outline of legislation of both New Deals was synthesized by the Brains Trust, Moley, Berle, and Tugwell, in their discussions and memorandums in 1932.

Although there was a certain chronological priority—both Roosevelt and Moley, for instance, favored fundamental reforms over welfare legislation, which they regarded as a palliative albeit a necessity—the fact remains that the Moley memorandum of May 19, 1932, broached most of the ideas that constitute the New Deal. In that memorandum Moley advocated a rearrangement of business-government relationships; a political reorientation of the Democratic party toward more liberal and humane purposes ("a party of liberal thought, of planned action, of enlightened international outlook, of real democratic principles") and toward a lower-class constituency ("our economic infantry"); the institution of large-scale public works and of welfare measures; the separation of the national budget into a normal budget and an emergency budget, in reality a euphemism for an unbalanced budget; taxation of undistributed surplus corporate income; regulation of utilities holding companies (broached in the St. Paul address); banking and securities exchange reforms; even recognition of the

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Soviet Union as a stimulus to United States commerce and business.[12]

In this early period, the year extending from March 1932 to March 1933, the shape of the New Deal was determined, with profound implications for U.S. diplomacy. It was in the Hundred Days, under Moley's guidance, and in the legislative surge of 1935, with his collaboration, that much of the New Deal was legislated. Even the Wagner Act (1935), though unsupported by the administration as it wended its way through the Congress, the Social Security Act (1935), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (1937) fall well within the conceptual frame developed by the Brains Trust in 1932. The demise of the Brains Trust as a functioning mechanism in March 1933 becomes quite comprehensible in this light. Intellectually, it had spent itself in Roosevelt's cause. Subsequently Moley was required to deal with legislators, rather than Berle and Tugwell, for congressional support was needed to enact into law the broad concepts involved.

II

Evaluation of Raymond Moley's role in the shaping of the New Deal era has been beclouded by several circumstances, some of his own making and some a reflection of memoirists' and historians' attitudes toward him. He was unpopular at the very outset with many of his Washington colleagues, particularly in the State Department. "Cookie pushers," he called them, and he regarded them, because of their internationalist orientation, as potential saboteurs of the New Deal's domestic priorities.[13] Not only did he fare badly with the memoirists who originally had little affection for him and his brusque ways and subsequently regarded him as a traitor for abandoning and opposing the very cause he

[12] Moley's assertion in *After Seven Years*, 310, that he opposed the corporate-surplus tax on the basis of Adolf Berle's researches is contradicted by Rexford G. Tugwell to author, Nov. 4, 1971: "Berle was not opposed, as I recall, and I thought it a very good idea because it would allow capital to be distributed according to public need, not according to corporate estimates of their fancied need to care for a rainy day or to enlarge their capacities beyond need. At that time there were many concerns operating at less than half their capacity."

[13] Raymond Moley to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nov. 30, 1935, quoted in *After Seven Years*, 323, and interviews with Moley and Herbert Feis.

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created and nurtured; but more important, he was unpopular with many of the liberal-consensus historians who recreated the Roosevelt era at a time when Moley openly supported in *Newsweek* the Taft-Bricker wing of the Republican party. Remarkably, neither Arthur Schlesinger Jr. nor William Leuchtenburg made use of the Moley papers, the richest source on the origins of the New Deal, in their presumably definitive works.[14] Also, Moley terminated his formal association with the Roosevelt administration following the London Economic Conference in the summer of 1933 under circumstances which gave the appearance that Cordell Hull's internationalist low-tariff philosophy had emerged triumphant. Actually the Moley-Roosevelt relationship, admittedly strained, was muted for a few months and was then resumed for two and one-half years, and tariff reciprocity never attained tangible results in the 1930s.

Moley's own disenchantment with Roosevelt and the New Deal, his deepening attachment to conservative business interests and the Republican party's conservative wing, added another dimension to the New Deal's misshapen historiography. For while he keenly desired a more accurate appraisal of his personal relationship with Roosevelt and his role at London vis-à-vis Cordell Hull, who charged him with perfidy, Moley also wanted, when the time came to set down the record, to be dissociated from much of the New Deal's theology. Liberal—even radical for the time in his convictions—and internationalist in his views in 1932, he stressed in his recollections only the conservative facets of his contribution suggesting a consistency of thought that never existed. Consciously, in all likelihood, he allowed the historical void to be filled by Rexford Guy Tugwell, and historians have more than obliged. There was a certain ideological purity about Tugwell which appealed to academicians rather than politicians, and Moley instead stressed a continuity with Herbert Hoover and Ogden Mills, whereas in reality there had been a sharp departure.

[14] Leuchtenburg, 349. Schlesinger sent Moley a manuscript copy of his second volume, *The Coming of the New Deal*, shortly before its publication, and Moley responded with a memorandum, which he believed had little impact on Schlesinger's views. The result was Moley's decision to publish *The First New Deal* (New York, 1966).

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From Arthur Schlesinger's massive *Age of Roosevelt* to Paul Conkin's brief and probing essay on the subject, Tugwell's more consistently doctrinaire views filled the need for a generation of historians who wished for a more radical break with the past. This is not to minimize Tugwell's stimulating impact on Roosevelt's and Moley's thought, but it is to question the stress placed on Tugwell's quest for a managed economy as if it were ever seriously considered and as if he were a powerful insider, when in reality he was a powerless outsider. It is to question, moreover the historians' curious use of Moley as a figure of significance only in 1936, when he broke with Roosevelt and his views had changed, rather than as the most influential single force, other than Roosevelt, in shaping the New Deal.

According to Paul Conkin, to Moley, explaining their break in 1936, Roosevelt "*had* sounded like Cleveland" in 1932. And to Barton Bernstein the New Deal "conserved and protected corporate capitalism" and consequently "was profoundly conservative and continuous with the 1920's." Several sets of needs are thus served: Moley's need to explain his break with Roosevelt in 1936 in terms other than his own shifting convictions; Arthur Schlesinger's need to lament the end of planning in our economy, as if it had really existed to the extent that he has inferred; and most recently, the needs of a younger generation of more radical historians who conceive of the interregnum and Hundred Days of 1932 and early 1933 as a lost moment in American history when presumably, according to Bernstein, "Marxism or even . . . native American radicalisms that offered structural critiques and structural solutions" might have been introduced. Yet strangely Moley's proposals made in 1932 are never considered, nor do the revisionists trifle with any of the realities of American political life. It is as if the history of the New Deal era has become something of a shell game.[15]

Another factor, much less significant today but important a decade or two ago when much of the definitive treatments were written, complicates an evaluation of the Moley-Roosevelt relation-

[15] Conkin, 37 ff., 43-44, 67, 78, 86, 102, and *passim*; Barton J. Bernstein, "The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform," in Bernstein, ed., *Towards A New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (New York, 1969), 264-65.

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ship and Moley's role in molding New Deal policies. Many an old colleague at Columbia, possibly out of personal pique, while willing to concede Moley's gift as a literary craftsman, but no more than that, was convinced that he was "a mediocre man who had made no mark in the academic world by original contribution to thought."[16] While aware of these views, Moley never challenged them. To the extent that his role in the shaping of the New Deal was minimized, he remained content. But the result has been to distort the New Deal. And American history suffers.

A reexamination of the origins of the New Deal affords an opportunity to modify as well the customary conceptual frame of reference for the period following Versailles. The 1920s were hardly a mildly progressive interlude between the reforms of Wilson and the second Roosevelt. There were Progressives extant to be sure and there were remnants of Progressive thought, ranging from Felix Frankfurter at the Harvard Law School and Fiorello La Guardia of New York to the dedicated and obscure Judson and Bertha King, who fought the power interests through the vehicle of the National Popular Government League, to Harold Ickes, Donald Richberg, and George W. Norris of Nebraska. But few were able to challenge successfully the public complaisance bred by a seemingly limitless prosperity. How lonely these Progressives often felt in their apparently futile efforts at reform and corporate accountability to the public. "I cannot recall any time in my public life," Norris confided to Robert La Follette's widow in 1925, "when I felt as much discouraged as I have during recent months. It did seem to me that there was nothing left for me to do, that my work was finished."[17]

Too frequently historians have used the legislation introduced by the farm bloc as evidence of the strength of the Progressive movement under Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. But this is a

[16] Ernest Lindley, *The Roosevelt Revolution: First Phase* (New York, 1933), 298. This impression was gathered through incidental contacts with Moley's former colleagues at Columbia and in my interview with Adolf A. Berle in 1966. See also, William E. Dodd to Daniel Roper, Nov. 18, 1932, Dodd Papers, Library of Congress, Box 39, in which he questions Moley's qualifications; and Schlesinger, *Crisis of the Old Order*, 399-400. By way of contrast see Felix Frankfurter to Ernest Gruening, editor, *The Nation*, June 21, 1933, Frankfurter Papers, Box 60.

[17] George W. Norris to Mrs. Robert La Follette, Sept. 25, 1925, Norris Papers, Library of Congress, Tray 81, Box 6.

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measure only of the predominantly rural orientation of the national legislature in an increasingly urbanized society. A reading of the paper of Harold Ickes, Donald Richberg, George W. Norris, Felix Frankfurter, Frank Walsh, Thomas J. Walsh, William E. Dodd, and Josephus Daniels, among others, reveals only a deep discouragement in what seemed a struggle against hopeless odds. Mammon held sway in the Decade of Normalcy; it was the capstone of the era in American history described brilliantly by Richard Hofstadter in his *Social Darwinism in American Thought*. It was the last decade of the nineteenth century. John J. Raskob of Du Pont, General Motors, and Christiana Securities; the Van Sweringens of Cleveland with Newton D. Baker on retainer; Samuel Insull; and other industrial and financial nabobs rode high in the saddle for one last moment, beyond criticism by ordinary mortals, judged only in so far as they accumulated money, not how—it was their moment, not that of the diminutive Norris of Nebraska, with his plaintive wails for cheaper electricity for the nation's rural and urban poor.[18]

The New Deal was a liberal, humane outpouring, innovative within the framework of capitalism, lasting some five years, from its conception in 1932 until 1937 or at the very latest until 1938. As such it cannot survive the Marxist test of liberalism which would have required abandonment of efforts at reform for a more fundamental "structural change," a transparent euphemism. That Roosevelt had no Marxist alternative short of po-

[18] Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Philadelphia, 1945). The generalizations are based on a reading in whole or in part of the following: the papers of Newton D. Baker, Josephus Daniels, William E. Dodd, Felix Frankfurter, Charles S. Hamlin Diary, Harold Ickes, Judson King, William G. McAdoo, George Fort Milton, George W. Norris, Key Pittman, Donald Richberg, Huston Thompson, and Thomas J. Walsh, all at the Library of Congress; Carter Glass, University of Virginia, Charlottesville; Hiram Johnson, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; John J. Raskob, The Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Wilmington, Delaware; and Frank P. Walsh, New York Public Library. Arthur Link interprets the twenties in a more optimistic light in "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" *American Historical Review*, LXIV (1959), 833-51. He concludes that despite reversals and failures, "important components of the progressive movement survived in considerable vigor" and not only kept progressivism alive but broadened its horizons. These include, according to Link, farm groups, public power advocates, and various progressive coalitions which controlled Congress.

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litical suicide; that not even a small minority of the American people desired Marxism or "native American radicalisms" does not matter in this sort of history. What matters is that the revisionist historians would have wanted it. And so the New Deal is damned, with no regard for the evidence, as a profoundly conservative continuation of Hoover's policies.[19] History is thus a house of mirrors, the superimposition of one's wishes on the past.

Shaped by Moley and the Brains Trust, the cornerstone of the New Deal was its quest for economic recovery and the prevention of future depressions—a larger degree of economic stability for the nation and the individual in our society. As such it was not a grass-roots social movement. It was a challenge to the passive acceptance of so called economic laws divined by economists since the days of the Enlightenment. As Moley pointed out in language intended for Roosevelt's use in the 1932 campaign:

> And what do people want more than anything else.
>
> To my mind, two things, first work with all the moral and spiritual values that go with it. Idleness is stagnation. Stagnation is disintegration. And disintegration is death.
>
> Second, they want a reasonable measure of security for themselves and for those who depend upon them.
>
> Work and security are the spiritual values toward which our efforts for reconstruction should lead. . . .
>
> It is all very well for those who speak for the present administration to speak of economic laws. But men starve while economic laws work out. And it is a fair question as to whether economic laws exist which cannot be controlled by the laws of men. Our economic system is a human thing built by human beings. I believe that it can likewise be controlled by human beings and for the general good.[20]

Several specific objectives emerged from the discussions and memorandums, which reflected the thinking of the Brain Trust. First, overall, they desired reflation, a rise to the wage and price levels of 1926-29, but they hoped to avoid a restoration of the economic and social imbalances of that period. Accordingly, they assigned priority to a redistribution of income "to be steered toward the lower levels" particularly the farmer. Within the general goal of reflation, more specifically, they sought a better balance

[19] Bernstein, 263-67.

[20] Moley memorandum, May 19, 1932, Moley Papers.

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between farm income and the wages of labor, on the one hand, and corporate income, on the other, than existed during the decade following the First World War. This thinking was a reaction to the farm depression of the postwar period and in part reflected the assumptions of John A. Hobson's underconsumptionist economics. It was first aired publicly in the "Forgotten Man" and St. Paul addresses, the initial Moley-Roosevelt collaborations on national issues.[21]

A simple redistribution of income would remedy an imbalance, but would not necessarily effect recovery. While there was the desire to get business going again and a recognition of a "spiritual" or psychological necessity for work and security as well as the need for a better balance in the economic system, Moley and Roosevelt needed to entertain the possibility that government might be required to provide a substantial economic stimulus in the interim in the form of public spending. This idea, it is generally believed, was rejected by Roosevelt and the Brains Trust and considered seriously only with the beginning of the second New Deal period under the aegis of Marriner Eccles. This is, in fact, another myth of New Deal historiography.[22]

Proposals were bandied about in public print in 1932, particularly by Alfred E. Smith, for as much as $5 billion in public works. Smith was no Keynesian; he was the spokesman for John J. Raskob, Pierre S. du Pont, and the party's most conservative interests. He had nothing more radical in mind than the sale of bonds in small denominations to the public to finance work projects. No federal spending was involved. That

[21] Adolf A. Berle to Raymond Moley, Feb. 3, 1966, copy in author's possesssion; Rexford G. Tugwell interview, Aug. 10, 1968; manuscript drafts of these addresses, in Moley Papers, display a more radical tone and are more specific in their proposals than Roosevelt's public statements. They constituted the basis for the May 19 memorandum. Party liberals were ecstatic. See, e.g., Herman Oliphant to Moley, May 20, 1932, Moley Papers; and Franklin D. Roosevelt to Thomas J. Walsh, Apr. 20, 1932, Walsh Papers, Box 384. Party conservatives were disturbed by what they regarded as Roosevelt's increasing display of radicalism. See, e.g., Edward M. House to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Apr. 14, 1932, House Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.; Memorandum, "Dictated by Mr. Howe," n.d., Moley Papers; and writing on behalf of himself and Cordell Hull, Robert Woolley to Edward M. House, Apr. 9 and 12, 1932, House Papers, House Drawer 46-15.

[22] Conkin, 40-41.

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Smith's proposals could have been realized is highly doubtful, and, if realized, they surely would have drained the smaller banks of their cash reserves.

Moley suggested to Roosevelt the expenditure of $2.5 billion for direct relief and public works, significantly more than the approximately $1 billion in "useful" projects supported in theory by the Hoover administration. The $2.5 billion proposal was broken down into $500 million to be spent for direct relief; $500 million for work relief in small communities, customarily bypassed by such proposals; $1 billion for "self supporting public works" (the Hoover figure); and $500 million for subsidies to housing. Moley also proposed the creation of two federal budgets. One, the regular budget, of principal concern to the conservative business community, which insisted on balanced budgets, could be balanced by taxes on undistributed corporate income and on the high-income brackets. Since the relief and public-works program would last for at least three years, Moley estimated, it would be necessary to create a separate emergency budget, in reality an artifice to avoid the appearance of an imbalanced budget.[23]

According to Moley, by the end of the 1932 campaign, "every important venture from 1932 to the summer of 1935 had been outlined." But in the memorandums, especially Moley's proposals of May 1932, many of the measures and policies of the second New Deal had also been anticipated. Ideas attributed to Eccles and the mid-1930s had been broached. Nor were they rejected. As Adolf Berle recalled, the lower-income groups needed the money and business needed the customers: "We thought business would do it, but were prepared to do this through public sector expenditures if need be—the result, in any event would be mixed."[24]

Attainment of minimal social goals was another objective. Derived from the "social justice" concept of the Progressive era, expressed in Theodore Roosevelt's proposals during the Bull Moose campaign of 1912, the goals had economic implications for the future as well. The Brains Trust wished to forestall the worst vicissitudes of the economic cycles that had dominated the nation's history since it had entered the industrial era. That desire led to

[23] Moley memorandum, May 19, 1932, Moley Papers.

[24] Moley, *After Seven Years*, 63, 173; Berle to Moley, Feb. 3, 1966, copy in author's possession.

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legislative enactment of unemployment insurance (or "reserves"), social security, and guaranteed collective bargaining and to Moley's proposals for relief and public works financed in an emergency budget.

The Brains Trust are customarily credited, in fact almost to the exclusion of the bulk of their thinking, with a desire for the social responsibility of business and its accountability to the federal government. There is no contemporary evidence (the period March 1932 to March 1933) to support the often asserted statement that Moley favored business-government partnership with the implication that business would be the dominant partner. While such a partnership could have been the result of the National Industrial Recovery Act and its administration, there is nothing to suggest that the Brains Trust had come to any clear conclusion other than a rejection of Tugwell's proposal for a highly regimented economy. It was regrettable, as Moley later recalled, that passage of the NIRA was an emergency measure, forced into being by political necessity, rather than carefully thought out in advance. For the Brains Trust, as late as the Commonwealth address in the campaign, had arrived only at some sense of what they wished. They did not conceive a simple legitimization of the trade association practices of the 1920s. NIRA was not their offspring.[25]

The Brains Trust, as opposed to Brandeis, accepted in 1932 the reality of huge economic aggregates as a twentieth-century phenomenon, and they recognized that the functions and modes of

[25] Conkin, 57-58; Schlesinger, *Coming of the New Deal*, 87-89; Raymond Moley, *First New Deal*, chap. 23; and Ellis Hawley, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly* (Princeton, 1966). None of these works discusses in any detail the thinking of the Brains Trust in 1932 on the question of business-government relationships. Tugwell's proposal for a highly regimented economy, to be regulated by a powerful Economic Council, which would determine prices, wages, capital allocations, production of goods, etc., Item 35/1, Moley Papers, was rejected by Berle in his "Memorandum to Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt," Aug. 17, 1932, Moley Papers, folder: Roosevelt and R.M. Correspondence, 1931-early 1932. Berle proposed instead a presidential advisory group on recovery and economic matters of national concern. This was probably the origin of the National Emergency Council. The suggestion that the Commonwealth Speech was not carefully thought through is in Rexford Guy Tugwell to author, Nov. 4, 1971, plus manuscript enclosure, "The Commonwealth Address," originally intended for publication in Tugwell, *The Brains Trust* (New York, 1968) and omitted.

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operation of these aggregates had political and social consequences as well as economic implications. The question they broached, still unresolved for some, was how to retain private ownership of capital and at the same time attain a more substantial social accountability. Further, they wanted a larger role for the central government in the determination of national economic priorities. At the same time, Berle recalled:

> We refused to take advantage of the economic collapse to set up state socialism. . . . We did undertake through democratically adopted measures to redistribute the national income, steering more of it toward the least-favored among the population. We hoped for a better distribution of wealth. We did intend that the federal government should take over the ultimate controls of currency and credit (as it did), and the power, where necessary to allocate capital resources as well.

But they had no specific plans. The partnership thesis was an afterthought. It reflected what happened for a time, not what was intended, "the location of residual power over the economic system in the hands of the democratically elected Congress and the United States government, while maintaining non-statist enterprise as the major method of production."[26]

The final element in the Brains Trust's proposals was what they termed "intranationalism." This is the issue on which Frankfurter quietly, behind the scenes, challenged the Brains Trust during the 1932-33 interregnum and on which Cordell Hull's aspirations for international economic agreements based on tariff reciprocity, leading to freer trade, foundered. During his Columbia years and through much of 1932, Moley was an internationalist in economic matters. He favored cancellation of the debts incurred by U.S. wartime allies, with their own cancellation of German reparations as a *quid pro quo;* he advocated tariff reciprocity; and he acknowledged the interrelationship of international economic questions

[26] This thinking was rooted in the works of Herbert Croly and Charles R. Van Hise's *Concentration and Control: A Solution of the Trust Problem in the United States* (New York, 1914) and expressed in part in Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932). Berle acknowledged his indebtedness to Van Hise in Berle to Moley, Feb. 3, 1966, copy in author's possession. The quotation is from Adolf A. Berle, "Intellectuals and New Deals," *The New Republic,* Mar. 7, 1964, p. 21, a review of Bernard Sternsher's *Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal.* Reprinted by permission of *The New Republic,* © 1964, Harrison-Blaine of New Jersey, Inc.

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with disarmament and other issues that affected international political stability[27]—a view held by internationalists such as Norman Davis, Henry L. Stimson, and Herbert Feis in the State Department; Felix Frankfurter, who served as a link between Stimson and Roosevelt; and by Herbert Hoover and Great Britain's Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald.

The assumed relationship of international economic questions, involving trade restrictions, currency problems, debts, and reparations, to those nationalist tensions that threatened the peace of the post-Versailles period was the rationale behind the Lausanne agreements, reached by U.S. debtors and Germany in June 1932 and the efforts, stemming from Lausanne, which led to the World Monetary and Economic Conference held at London in the summer of 1933. Gradually, in 1932, Moley's views shifted sharply, not principally because of his highly touted conflict with Cordell Hull over tariff policy in the 1932 campaign. That was merely the tip of the iceberg.

The emotionally charged debts issue was, like tariff reciprocity, only one element of the larger decision reached by Moley at the conclusion of the 1932 campaign, that we needed for a time to cut ourselves off from international economic tides. It was Moley's recollection that he never thought much about the subject of war debts before his meeting with Hoover in November 1932: "When I was at Columbia earlier I seem to have accepted the position of the Columbia economists which was quite international." He was influenced by the views of E.R.A. Seligman, and these, he was convinced later on, in turn reflected those of the Seligman firm of international bankers. "There was a Columbia round robin" in 1927, Moley recalled, advocating cancellation of the debts, "and I signed it."

Moley's complete turnabout on the debts question and his very nearly fanatical insistence in the 1932-33 interregnum on the separation of the debts and reparations issues, a position bound to exacerbate the already strained economic and political relations among the former wartime allies, is in part summarized by his quip, "I not only saw the light, I felt the heat." James Byrnes, Key Pittman, and Thomas J. Walsh told him in the course of the

[27] Moley memorandum, May 19, 1932, Moley Papers.

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1932 campaign that Senate Democrats were determined "to maintain a stiff position on the debts." Also, Adolf Berle convinced him on the eve of the Hoover-Roosevelt conference of November 18, 1932 that "the international banking community was for the reduction or cancellation since that would have opened up more business in making loans (private) to various borrowers in Europe." Berle argued further that the debtor countries were quite able to pay something. Finally, Moley became convinced later that the unpaid debts would serve "as a reminder if trouble arose in Europe that we should not be so ready to lend the nations there any more money."[28]

Of basic importance in Moley's conversion to economic nationalism was the growing conviction that recovery, as defined by the Brains Trust, required for a time the insulation of the U.S. economy from outside economic forces. The idea surfaced initially in the form of a brief observation in the memorandum of May 1932 which contradicted the internationalist tone in the balance of that document. It was only a hint of a shifting mood. "What is the Depression," Moley scrawled on one of his yellow legal sheets used for ideas and speech drafts. There followed the observation for his and Roosevelt's future consideration that there were distinct domestic and foreign causes and the conclusion: "foreign trade only 1/10 of the problem."[29]

Moley was convinced in later years that only gradually, after months of deliberation with Berle and Tugwell, did the conclusion emerge shortly after election day in 1932 that intranationalism (a word, incidentally, they later rejected as a New Deal catchword) was essential to economic recovery. "The problem," Moley surmised by late October-early November, was "starvation amid plenty" and the solution was "to get control of the two ends of the equation—but you can't if one end is abroad." The concept was viable, he believed, because Great Britain had utilized it successfully in the form of the Ottawa Agreements for herself and the Commonwealth and had managed thereby to mitigate some of the worst aspects of the Depression. The Ottawa Agreements

[28] Raymond Moley to E.R.A. Seligman, Mar. 29, 1927, Seligman Papers, Columbia University Library, New York. Moley to author, Aug. 21, 1971. Memorandum, Adolf Berle Jr. to Raymond Moley, Nov. 15, 1932, Moley Papers, Item 40/6.

[29] Moley memorandum, May 19, 1932, Moley Papers.

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had made England and the Commonwealth economically independent in the face of vanished markets, and the United States, too, could be largely self-contained "as to necessities." This conclusion, arrived at by Moley and Tugwell, stood at the vortex of the interregnum conflict between the Brains Trust and the internationalists.[30]

The members of the Brains Trust decided by the winter of 1932-33 that the internationalist priorities of Henry L. Stimson and Norman Davis, including cooperation with the League of Nations on the question of Japanese expansion into Manchuria, disarmament, monetary problems, tariff barriers, debts, and reparations, needed to be postponed for a more propitious time. Thus, Tugwell and Moley, in the throes of preparing tangible proposals for a new Congress, fought a rear-guard action against any international commitments that would jeopardize the approach they had conceived in 1932:

> The fact was we had deeper reasons and convictions we were fighting for. We believed recovery would only be possible in a nation shut off temporarily from the influences that would exploit every advance that was made—foreign influences. The debts, the handling of monetary problems, and tariffs, etc., were all involved. We could only carry out a relief and recovery program for our own benefit instead of others if we were thus isolated.
>
> We wanted recovery, we wanted a balanced economy, we wanted to institutionalize the balance and prevent future depressions. We had to shut off interference. . . . We wanted to protect our economy so that we could do something about it, here, without other nations exploiting the recovery as it came.[31]

III

Felix Frankfurter challenged some of these conclusions on the grounds of their implications for American diplomacy. He was anxious for an Anglo-American entente because of Japanese expansion in the Far East and the increasing probability of a renewed conflict between France and Germany in Europe. He was well aware, through Herbert Feis, of France's insistence on political guarantees by the United States in exchange for a softened po-

[30] "Intranationalism," *ibid.*, folder 53.

[31] Rexford G. Tugwell to author, May 5, 1964.

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sition toward Germany on reparations and arms parity. He desired forgiveness of the debts, he wrote Henry L. Stimson, because of the "larger implications for a cooperative spirit between Great Britain and ourselves." What Frankfurter deplored most was the failure of the Hoover administration "to take the nation to school [educate the American people to their international responsibilities] in the past and even now!"[32]

During much of 1932, Frankfurter, while aware of the deliberations of Roosevelt and the Brains Trust, focused much of his attention on Stimson and Feis in the State Department, but with Roosevelt's election, he attempted to educate the president-elect toward what Frankfurter believed were Roosevelt's internationalist responsibilities. Initially, Frankfurter and Stimson were more successful with Roosevelt than they had been with Hoover. "He [Roosevelt] has sound views on international issues and I reinforced those," Frankfurter crowed to Feis, "but alas! the Great Enggineer has not."[33] As Frankfurter soon discovered, Roosevelt was easily capable of altering his views.

It is important to note, as he later cautioned Arthur Schlesinger, that Frankfurter too was no dogmatist; he was quite capable of adjusting to the realities of a situation. There is no evidence that he challenged the domestic program, including the regulation of business and agriculture, projected by the Brains Trust, and Frankfurter and Feis were willing, also, to entertain the possibility of economic self-containment. In May 1932, as the nations of Europe and the United States moved in the direction of economic nationalism—Roosevelt's Albany address and the bitter congressional opposition to the Hoover moratorium reflected the nation's sentiment—Herbert Feis broached the possibility of "An Economically Independent United States" with his old friend and mentor. "The United States," Feis knew as a specialist in international economics, "is unquestionably much less dependent on foreign countries than is Great Britain or Belgium or Japan or Canada, for example. It could withdraw within itself and have practically no relations with the outside world, and still maintain its present pop-

[32] Felix Frankfurter to Henry L. Stimson, Dec. 9, 1932, Frankfurter-Feis Correspondence, Box 2.

[33] Frankfurter to Herbert Feis, Dec. 14, 1932, *ibid.* Feis to Frankfurter, Oct. 13, 1931, Frankfurter Papers, Box 54.

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ulation." When he projected an estimate of the readjustments that would be required in the American economy, the conclusions were somewhat more pessimistic than those reached by Moley and Tugwell.

Exports by the United States in 1929 were $5.1 billion or 10 per cent of the nation's total production. Abandonment of exports, however, would only temporarily lead to a 10 per cent reduction in the standard of living, since a gradual shift could be made internally in the allocation of capital resources and production, and "the new balance could be gradually substituted on the basis of an economically self-sufficient country." The new standard of living, while lower, "would be much less than ten per cent lower."[34]

Frankfurter's concurrence with Feis's analysis of the possibility of a self-contained economy was clearly an acceptance of the realities of international economic relations, just as a year later Frankfurter, Moley, and Feis did not differ substantially on what could or could not be accomplished at London.[35] "I suppose," Frankfurter replied after studying Feis's views, "it is almost too much to hope that those who now guide the destinies of this country [a reference to Hoover and Ogden Mills] will read your memorandum, or, reading it, appreciate its practical relevance to the policies upon which they are embarking." At issue between Frankfurter and the Brains Trust was not the reality, which Frankfurter acknowledged, of nationalism run rampant, but Frankfurter's conviction concerning "the necessarily limited consequences of any merely local national economic program so long as the international situation is untouched."[36] In this respect Frankfurter was much less sanguine than Henry Stimson or Nor-

[34] Herbert Feis to Felix Frankfurter, May 11, 1932, and memorandum, "An Economically Independent United States," Feb. 11, 1932, Frankfurter Papers. Frankfurter to Feis, Wednesday (n.d., probably early 1933), *ibid.*

[35] Moley's recollections of the London Conference in *After Seven Years* and *First New Deal* and those of Feis in *1933: Characters in Crisis* (Boston, 1966) are more sharply drawn than their 1933 correspondence reveals. Feis's aspirations for international cooperation were broader than Moley's, but became more realistic at London and upon his return to Washington. Moley, after all, attempted limited international cooperation on the currency question, in a reversion to his views expressed to Roosevelt in May 1932 only to be undercut by Roosevelt's bombshell messages.

[36] Felix Frankfurter to Herbert Feis, May 27, 1932 and June 10, 1932, Frankfurter Papers, Box 54.

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man Davis concerning the possibilities for international cooperation, but he desired that Roosevelt be exposed to Stimson's weltanschauung and acknowledge, at least privately, the international responsibilities of the United States.

Roosevelt, as Walter Lippmann pointed out in his famous critique on the New York governor's qualifications for the presidency, was adept at private assurances. Frankfurter arranged the meeting during the 1932-33 interregnum between Hoover's secretary of state and the president-elect which resulted, to Tugwell and Moley's dismay, in Roosevelt's endorsement of Stimson's Far Eastern policies. Privately, too, Roosevelt assured Frankfurter of his internationalist convictions.[37] But in his first inaugural address, a collaboration with Moley, Roosevelt, whatever his private convictions, committed himself to intranationalism and abandoned the illogical economic contradictions enunciated a year earlier before the New York State Grange in his Albany address. Upon assuming the presidency, Roosevelt decided that "our international trade relations, though vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first. I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic adjustment, but the emergency at home cannot wait on that accomplishment."[38]

Nationalism held sway. Of this both Frankfurter and Moley were fully apprised as the new administration took office. As Oswald Garrison Villard of *The Nation* reported to Frankfurter, he was delighted with Roosevelt's evident determination to surround himself with progressives. "On the other hand . . . his statement to friends of mine recently that the only thing for the United States to do as far as Europe was concerned was to withdraw into its shell and sit still until we regain our economic power," was in Villard's judgment, "sheer folly."[39] Nevertheless, as the enactment of AAA and NIRA demonstrated, even before the London

[37] Stimson Diary, Jan. 9, 1933, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library; Frankfurter to Feis, Jan. 4, 1933, telegram, Frankfurter-Feis Correspondence, Box 2.

[38] Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1938), II, 14.

[39] Oswald Garrison Villard to Frankfurter, Feb. 14, 1933, Frankfurter Papers, Box 108.

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Conference, this was the course the new president was determined to pursue.

Though they differed on international questions, Frankfurter and Moley, acquainted since the early twenties when Moley headed the Cleveland Foundation, maintained an enormous regard for each other's views, intelligences, and roles in the shaping of the New Deal. Frankfurter wrote Herbert Feis on the eve of Roosevelt's inauguration: "Moley is, of course, a very different temperament from Stimson, a very different kind of person. But of his general right-mindedness and his eagerness for the things you and I care about, I have no doubt." Frankfurter was in the process of convincing Moley to retain Feis as the State Department's economic adviser on the grounds of his extraordinary capacity to analyze international economic questions. Feis stayed on in the new administration, more often frustrated than fulfilled in the thirties. At least he was forewarned: "As in the past, you will from time to time probably eat out your heart, but that's the food, after all, on which all of us these days have to live not a little."[40]

IV

Newly opened collections and documents revealing the thinking of major participants in the Roosevelt era open a fresh set of challenges to historians. Certainly the long-entrenched division into two distinct New Deals is open to question. Moley's memorandum of May 19, 1932, which insisted on a political reorientation of the Democratic party toward more liberal purposes and a lower-class constituency and which limned most of the objectives of the domestic phase of the Roosevelt presidency, shatters the image of sharply demarcated approaches toward domestic reform. It indicates, also, that Moley's role in the shaping of New Deal policies has been misinterpreted. Consciously or unconsciously, he has collaborated with historians who judged him an antagonist of the decade's more radical achievements.

The evidence also seems to bear out Felix Frankfurter's insistence that neither he nor the Brains Trust were notable for intellectual consistency or dogmatism. Nor was he responsible, as he so frequently asserted in his correspondence, for everything that was

[40] Frankfurter to Feis, Feb. 10, 1933, Frankfurter-Feis Correspondence, Box 2.

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later attributed to him. The projection of a stringently regulated, organic economy made by Rexford Guy Tugwell was rejected by Berle and Roosevelt in August 1932. It was never realized, even for a moment, in the New Deal period. It appears, too, that historians have artificially separated domestic and foreign policies in the early Roosevelt years, when in reality they were frequently considered in tandem.

The domestic aims of the Brains Trust outlasted the antibusiness rhetoric of Corcoran, Roosevelt, and the Temporary National Economic Committee. Huge economic aggregates were not dissolved. They coexist still with a more powerful and active central government, which, in less formal fashion than intended by the Brains Trust, seeks through the executive branch (as in the Truman, Kennedy, and Nixon presidencies) to determine national economic priorities. Contemporary U.S. economic ideology, more technical in its specifics, has not gone beyond the quest for a better internal economic balance, the establishment of the social minima, and a willingness to spend to provide an economic stimulus. Pure Keynesianism was never adopted, nor neo-Brandeisism implemented. Even the policies of the Nixon administration are an echo of the thinking of 1932-33.

The legislative outpouring of the thirties was the last innovative period in American history. It was bracketed by the Decade of Normalcy on one side and beginning in 1938 or 1939 to the present by the Age of the Conservative Coalition, with the presidency riveted on foreign affairs and a coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans dominating domestic affairs. In this later context, a younger generation of historians has faulted the policies of the Brains Trust as having been a conservative continuation of the Hoover policies and has caricatured Roosevelt, the hero of an earlier generation of historians, as a fuzzy-minded country squire. The revisionists are both right and wrong: justified in their expectations of a new approach to the problems of the sixties and seventies; unjust in their demand that Roosevelt and his academic advisers in 1932, in reality a conservative period, could have anticipated the complexities of a later era.

As Moley concluded, in an eruption of his old Progressive instincts, when Roosevelt diverted his energies to recriminations against business, the Supreme Court, and the press, " 'The harvest

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is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved.' Vastly important reforms remain to be achieved."[41] The Brains Trust had ventured new ideas in a conservative age, and these ideas became part of our permanent past. This was their lasting contribution.

[41] *After Seven Years*, 400.

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Comments

The Editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* asked Raymond Moley and Rexford G. Tugwell, both notable members of President Roosevelt's Brains Trust, to discuss Professor Rosen's article. Their comments follow.

I

There is a habit of writers, when they are appraising a contemporary figure, institution, or idea, to leave the matter to "the verdict of history." This suggests that at some future moment all differences will end in a consensus of historians which will be respected for all time. The mythology suggested by this expression involves an ominous wraith that bars the way to the future and warns all who approach, saying, "Just leave all that to me."

Perhaps no better answer to the concept of a final historical verdict is immediately available than the thesis presented here by Dr. Rosen. We should not be surprised to read a reappraisal of Franklin D. Roosevelt after only forty years when we also note that historical research only recently has rescued the last of the Plantagenets from four centuries of disrepute.

I have noted with interest and only a minimum of unease the opinions of a succession of historians about the events in which I played some part forty years ago. Providence has mercifully lengthened my life so that I might read these versions, and I am sure even now that I have not heard the last shoe fall.

Meanwhile, I have written two books telling the story as it appeared to me. But as I have labored over the old materials and submitted to innumerable interviews, I have often said to myself that sometimes one spends half of his life making a reputation only to be condemned to spend the other half defending it.

That Roosevelt's course of action and the character of the policies he embraced changed radically in 1935-36 is admitted by

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all. Dr. Schlesinger in his *The Coming of the New Deal* substantially attributes this change to a turn from the planning ideology of the so called Brains Trust to the ideology of the Brandeis-Frankfurter school, which favored the use of antitrust legislation and court action to impose strict regulation of competition and to break up large corporate units. Dr. Rosen dissents, saying in effect that there were not two New Deals and that Brandeis and Frankfurter worked in harmony with at least one of the alleged planners, the author of this comment.

He cites as evidence a letter written by Justice Frankfurter in 1963 to Dr. Schlesinger, substantially denying the Schlesinger thesis of two New Deals and suggesting that the historian had been unduly influenced by Thomas G. Corcoran, "a very persuasive talker and raconteur." I am sure that there will be consternation in academic circles to hear from so eminent a source that history may be what some raconteur has told the historian. I agree completely with Frankfurter because I knew Corcoran's passionate intention to turn the course of national policy in 1936 into an antibusiness crusade.

I also believe Dr. Rosen to be on firm ground when he says that there were not two New Deals in the ideological sense in which Dr. Schlesinger uses the expression. In my book, *The First New Deal*, published in 1966, I carelessly used the expression the "Second New Deal" to describe the Roosevelt strategy in 1936 and after. This I regret. My interpretation of Roosevelt's change attributes it to political expediency rather than ideology. No man was less bound by ideology in approaching national problems.

The strategy he adopted some time in 1935, devised with the collaboration of Edward J. Flynn, was to gather into the Democratic party many minorities, including the labor unions, through policies calculated to win the urban masses, while he held the farmers in line with cash benefits.

The assertion that the New Deal of 1932-35 was dominated by planning is simply not true. I was charged in 1932 with mobilizing personnel and ideas to promote the presidential ambitions of Governor Roosevelt. I welcomed all points of view, planners, trustbusters, and money wizards. I expanded the so called Brains Trust very considerably and maintained contact with a great variety of people from Bernard Baruch to Huey Long. The task was to win an election in an electorate comprising many ideologies, and

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mostly no ideology. The issue was recovery, and the therapy used was a combination of many prescriptions.

I cannot deny that there were differences in the Roosevelt circle in 1932 and 1933 and that some of these conflicts were over ideological convictions, as well as personal animosities and clashing ambitions. Adolf Berle had not been a favorite student of Professor Frankfurter at Harvard. In the Washington climate the old clash of temperaments flared up. Young Harvard lawyers like Corcoran and Cohen believed that economists like Tugwell were enemies of recovery, and Hugh Johnson found it hard to work with most people. But Roosevelt refused to admit the differences that abounded, and with some help from me, a passable appearance of harmony was created.

If further proof is needed to support Dr. Rosen's contention that an era of trustbusting did not follow 1935, I suggest an examination of the reports of the attorney general from 1935 to about 1938. If Roosevelt had really launched the crusade along lines suggested by Dr. Schlesinger, there would have been a great increase of antitrust prosecutions. I have not examined the figures but I feel that there was no marked change. For in 1935, John Dickinson was moved from the Department of Commerce to the antitrust division of the Justice Department and remained two years. Dickinson, whom I knew well and who was originally appointed by Secretary Roper on my recommendation, was as friendly toward business as Roper himself. He left the government to become general counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad.

Thus the shift of policy to an ideological second New Deal was largely in the Schlesinger imagination.

RAYMOND MOLEY
Phoenix, Arizona

II

It is difficult for one who was involved in New Deal proceedings to join in the Rosen excitement over the issues he evidently feels must be considered. Whether there was a first, then a second New Deal is one of those historian's conveniences with a certain validity. No one knew better than those who had the opportunity to watch Roosevelt, and to join occasionally in discussions concerning policy,

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that Roosevelt himself was frequently of two minds and that one was allowed to predominate at one time and another at a later time. Sometimes there was compromise.

This was well illustrated in the differences of those around him about economic policy. Some of us believed the time had come for what C. R. Van Hise had called "concentration and control"; others held to the traditional Progressive position best represented by the Brandeis dictum that bigness is inherently bad and must not be tolerated.

My own view was elaborated in a book called *The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts* (New York, 1933). It was published some months after the campaign of 1932 was over, but its arguments had been presented at some length to Roosevelt during our Albany talks. It does not justify Rosen's conclusion that I favored a "regimented" economy, unless by that is meant an orderly and stable one. This order and stability, I had argued, could be reached by allowing industrial groups to organize and establish legalized relations with each other. It was essential, of course, that the proceedings should be presided over by representatives of the public, but it was an attempt to find a way to maintain pluralism within guiding rules.

This was indeed the heart of the National Recovery Act, and it could better be interpreted as an attempt to escape regimentation than to impose it. Without some public intervention and the adoption of new devices, it could, by then, be assumed that regimentation would be imposed by big business on the whole economic system, a generalization amply substantiated by the well known pioneering work of Berle and Means. NRA did not succeed, as I believe, because it was badly administered—without the necessary public control—and because extraneous issues were allowed to become the center of attention.

This industrial bill was to regularize competition in industry. The Agricultural Adjustment Act was to perform a comparable service for agriculture. The two would bring agriculture and industry into such internal balance and such relationships with each other that we might hope for a national economic plan and peaceable progress.

There is the incontrovertible fact that both NRA and AAA did become law during the early days of Roosevelt's administration.

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There is also the incontrovertible fact that at the same time Frankfurter's people were working on the "reforms" that soon became law. Those interested in the one activity were not involved in the other. It is quite possible that Roosevelt saw both as necessary and not inconsistent with each other. It is also fact that NRA and AAA held the center of attention for some time. This, I suppose, is why this period can be called the first New Deal and the later reform period can be called the second.

That there was never the separation in Roosevelt's mind or his intentions that simplistic interpretations assume is quite true. That it justifies Rosen's objection to Schlesinger's categories, I do not agree.

There is also the difference the two groups had about foreign relations. The Brains Trust group were convinced that foreign interferences with our recovery activities must be prevented. The Frankfurter-Stimson approach was the traditional free trade of the economists together with an active resistance to the Japanese expansion in the Far East. We thought that free trade was inappropriate at the moment and that the Stimson doctrine was very likely to make war more likely in the future.

The difference about trade can be interpreted as a phenomenon of the first months, giving way to the traditional most-favored-nation policy embodied in later legislation. The president did not so much change on this issue either, from one period to another, as try to find a compromise; and, of course, he found it in the policy of reciprocal agreements. About the Stimson doctrines he did not change at all; he maintained a firm opposition to Japanese expansion. This, however, was not an active issue until years later.

All of us who participated to any degree in the various activities of 1932-33 have somewhat differing recollections. We have written about these. In general, we have not differed much about what went on. It is quite evident, however, that historians have more differences than, for instance, do Raymond Moley and myself. I do not share the Rosen assurance that drastic revisionism is called for, nor, I should think, would Moley. In a talk I had with Berle shortly before his death, he deplored the attempts to magnify the contrasts I have spoken of; they were real, but Roosevelt was right to try for compromises.

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What is usually called the Brandeis approach was already hopelessly anachronistic and was certainly not accepted by Roosevelt as a remedial policy. NRA, he agreed, ought to have been reconstituted after the Court's rejection and we discussed ways of doing it. He did not propose it (as was done with AAA) because it had by then become politically difficult if not impossible. So the trustbusters had another chance. It came to nothing in the end, as we had thought it would.

To the extent that the first New Deal was collectivist—that is, believed in organizing a system of countervailing economic organizations under government auspices—it was proved right, as I see it, by the failure of the contrasting policy.

There was indeed a difference between the first year, say, of Roosevelt and the later years. It is not perhaps so distinctive in all phases of policy as is sometimes made out, but it does not deserve obliteration.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of Its Strategic Context*

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The Cuban missile crisis has been analyzed by a variety of authors and from a variety of viewpoints. This study is based on the assumption that no crisis can be understood without considering also the forces and policies which preceded and which flowed from it. Consequently, in addition to analyzing the role of strategic power during the Cuban missile crisis itself, we shall attempt to show in what way the interaction of United States and Soviet strategic policies in the early 1960s served to precipitate the crisis and how the crisis affected in turn the subsequent strategic policies of both sides and ultimately influenced the current strategic balance.

During the 1960 presidential campaign, much was made of the "missile gap." Kennedy administration officials took office in the genuine belief that the U.S. might soon be placed in an unfavor-

* This article is based on a study of U.S. strategic arms policy being conducted under the joint sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Brookings Institution. The interpretations and conclusions presented here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or trustees of The Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment, or the organizations that support their research.

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able strategic position. Even though intelligence estimates had been revised downward steadily during 1960, the new administration found that it could not dismiss the possibility that the Soviet Union had acquired an ICBM force and that it might be in the midst of a substantial missile-production program. This prospect endangered U.S. SAC bombers, then the cornerstone of U.S. strategic power, and, on a political level, threatened to undermine the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.

Thus, President Kennedy immediately acted to rectify the deficiencies as he perceived them of the U.S. deterrent posture. In his initial defense plan, the president accelerated the missile programs—tripling the rate of construction of Polaris submarines and doubling the production capacity of Minuteman rockets. Later, when the missile-gap myth was officially exposed, the administration did not modify its strategic program. Defense Secretary McNamara explained that the U.S. chose to continue its initial plan as a "hedge" against the possibility that the Soviet Union, possessing a significant missile-production capacity, might acquite a large ICBM force in the near future.[1]

Despite Khrushchev's claims, by the early 1960s, the Soviet Union had deployed only a handful of ICBMs and, as a consequence of the Kennedy administration's strategic program, faced a sizeable and growing U.S. strategic missile force. Moreover, with the exposure of the missile gap, the Soviets realized that the U.S. was not only able to count but to locate the Soviet small and "soft" missile force as well as their vulnerable bomber bases. Kremlin leaders began to fear that the U.S. was moving, as it had in the mid-1950s, toward a first-strike doctrine or at least was acquiring a substantial counterforce capability which could endanger the Soviet deterrent.

Public pronouncements of U.S. superiority added to Soviet concerns. Defense Minister Malinowski, reacting to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric's speech in late 1961, accused the U.S. of threatening the Soviets and "preparing a surprise nuclear attack."[2] President Kennedy's statement in early 1962 that "in

[1] Robert S. McNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," Address delivered before United Press International editors and publishers, San Francisco, Sept. 18, 1967, published in Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, LVII (Oct. 9, 1967), 445-46.

[2] Defense Minister Malinowski, cited in Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1966), 93.

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some circumstances we must be prepared to use nuclear weapons at the start" was interpreted by Khruschchev and Malinowski as an effort to intimidate the Soviet Union.[3] When Secretary of Defense McNamara articulated the "no-cities" doctrine in June 1962—which called for attacking only military targets in the event of nuclear war—Soviet fears that the U.S. actually planned to initiate a nuclear strike were further exacerbated.

Aside from real or perceived security risks, the dramatic reversal of the nuclear balance raised serious questions of policy for Moscow. The crisis over Berlin in late 1961 demonstrated to many Soviet officials that it was no longer possible to sustain the myth of Soviet superiority and underscored the futility as well as the danger of attempting to obtain political benefits through "Sputnik diplomacy." Although in the Berlin crisis Kennedy did not play brinksmanship in the style of John Foster Dulles, the stakes in Berlin were apparently thought to be high enough to warrant risking nuclear war. Rather than accede to Khrushchev's demands, President Kennedy did not hesitate to bring the newly found strategic power of the U.S. to bear in an attempt to influence Soviet actions.[4] The Berlin crisis also coincided with official U.S. exposure of the nonexistent missile gap. In fact, one particularly timely and crucial reason for informing the Soviets that we knew their missile claims were false was the unsettled situation in Berlin.[5]

[3] V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy* (Santa Monica, 1963), 166.

[4] The Berlin crisis had brought with it a premature test of the Kennedy administration's defense policy. Although plans had been made to reverse Eisenhower's nuclear-oriented defense posture, U.S. conventional capabilities in 1961 were grossly inadequate. Therefore, President Kennedy had *no choice* but to protect "vital" Western interests by bringing the nuclear dimension into the picture. Although no direct threats were delivered, the president simply reminded Kremlin leaders in his public statement that "an attack upon [Berlin] will be regarded as an attack upon us all"; President Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961 in *Public Papers of the President: 1961*. (Washington, D.C., 1962), 534. There was no need to spell out the implications of this remark, for in his first budget message, President Kennedy had implied that the U.S. would be prepared to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend Western Europe in general and Berlin in particular. Going one step farther, in the midst of his Berlin speech, the president explicitly alluded to the "possibilities of nuclear war" and requested additional funds for civil defense; *ibid.*, 536.

[5] If Khrushchev "were allowed to continue to assume that we still believed in the missile gap," the administration concluded, "he would very probably bring the world dangerously close to war"; Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden

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But the new strategic relationship did more than simply blunt Soviet offensive drives. It placed them on the defensive. With the strategic balance shifted against them, Soviet leaders feared that they might be unable to protect their vital interests in diplomatic dealings with the West and unable to maintain their worldwide image as a power comparable to the U.S. and as leader of the Communist bloc. Planned improvements in U.S. nonnuclear capabilities even threatened to deprive the Soviets of their longstanding superiority in conventional weapons which had been viewed as a partial counterweight to the U.S. nuclear advantage in the 1950s.

Khrushchev clearly appreciated the danger posed by nuclear war and the limited utility of nuclear weapons. He had acknowledged the vital importance of avoiding a major thermonuclear war through "peaceful coexistence," and, since the U-2 incident of 1960, had muted his missile claims and had begun to talk about "sufficiency" rather than "superiority." It is possible, therefore, that the Soviets were prepared to settle for parity.

But, by mid-1962, the prospect of overwhelming U.S. military superiority gave the Soviets a strong political as well as military incentive to redress the balance of intercontinental strategic forces. It was not enough to rely on their large medium-range missile and bomber capacity to threaten Western Europe. Long-range strategic missiles had become the most relevant measure of overall strength. Indeed, during the late 1950s, Khrushchev's Sputnik diplomacy had enhanced the value of these systems as political currency.

To attempt to overtake the U.S. in numbers of intercontinental systems, however, would entail a massive Soviet effort, for the U.S. already had a considerable lead in ICBMs and SLBMs, in addition to its lead in long-range bombers. Furthermore, the existing Soviet technology of large "soft" and slow-reacting missiles would make a crash program especially costly, while yielding marginal security benefits. In any event, Khrushchev remained unwilling to commit his nation to an enormously expensive program which would detract from other needs. He was faced, therefore, with a

City, N.Y., 1967), 163. It also seems reasonable to conjecture that the administration believed that emphasizing U.S. strategic superiority could exert a coercive effect on Moscow, for the October speech by Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric went beyond mere exposure of the missile gap to underscore the U.S. massive retaliation advantage.

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dilemma: how to increase strategic strength rapidly while holding expenditures in check.

Cuba offered a solution. The Soviets had a foothold on this island and had been supplying Castro for some time with arms of all types, including SAMs. Why not use this overseas base to deploy offensive missiles? By installing medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MR/IRBMs) within range of the U.S., the Soviets could gain more quickly and at less cost many of the benefits of a program of ICBM construction. The large-scale deployment of MR/IRBMs against Western Europe suggested that these systems were reliable and could be produced easily. Clearly, the missiles would be vulnerable to nuclear, and even conventional, strikes from the U.S., but their existence would complicate a U.S. attack and thereby strengthen the Soviet deterrent, at least until a survivable intercontinental force became available.

The Missile Crisis

The primary motivation behind Khrushchev's decision to install missiles on Cuba, in our opinion and in the opinion of most other analysts, was the Soviet's desire to rapidly rectify the strategic balance.[6] The Kennedy administration itself, from the initiation of the crisis, perceived this as a possible motive.

From the Soviet standpoint, however, a number of important ancillary objectives would also be served by emplacing missiles in Cuba, and these considerations undoubtedly contributed to Moscow's final decision. For over a decade the Soviet Union had been ringed by U.S. SAC bases and, in the late 1950s, by missiles deployed in Turkey, Italy, and England. The Soviet Union had never before stationed nuclear systems outside its borders. Placing shorter-range nuclear-capable missiles, and bombers, ninety miles from U.S. shores would be a dramatic counter to this threat and would underscore the very real Soviet concern over U.S. bases abroad.[7]

[6] See, for example: Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York, 1967), 231; Hilsman, 201; Horelick and Rush, 141; Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia, 1966), 28.

[7] The very fact that Khrushchev, at the height of the crisis, sent out "feelers" on an informal level regarding a trade-off between the Turkish and Cuban bases, as well as writing a strong letter of insistence to this effect suggests that the Soviets were indeed concerned about American bases in Turkey and elsewhere.

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Kremlin leaders might have believed also that the Cuban action would lay the groundwork for a future move against Berlin. The unfavorable strategic balance had twice before prevented the Soviets from attaining any real degree of success in Berlin. If the Soviets could succeed in Cuba, perhaps they might be able to launch a new and successful offensive against that city. The Kennedy administration itself felt strongly that a weak U.S. response to the Soviet provocation in Cuba would allow the Soviets to move on Berlin. Apparently, President Kennedy felt this to be the most immediate danger raised by the Cuban adventure, if not the dominant reason for Khrushchev's decision to install the missiles. In his speech of October 22, the president made explicit references to possible Soviet moves against Berlin; and during the naval blockade of the island, Kennedy ordered final preparations for the defense of Berlin.

Many analysts argue that the Cuban undertaking can be attributed to politics within the Kremlin.[8] Khrushchev had been severely critized for his international policies and his overambition in exploiting the missile gap. By emplacing missiles in Cuba, thus degrading American strategic power, Khrushchev perhaps hoped to repair his own prestige.

More specifically, establishing a major Soviet offensive nuclear base in the Western Hemisphere might not only cast doubt on the willingness of the U.S. to defend its interests and demonstrate to the world the strength of Soviet military and foreign policy, but it might give the Soviets a greater foothold in Latin America. Perhaps Khrushchev hoped, by the Cuban gamble, to encourage potential Castros elsewhere in Latin America. Robert McNamara stated at the time that, although the effect on the strategic balance might be small, the "potential effect on Latin America and elsewhere would be large."[9]

Finally, the decision was also consistent with specific Soviet goals in Cuba. Throughout the crisis, Khrushchev stated his desire to protect Cuba from an invasion by the U.S. During the course of the crisis, once the blockade had been initiated, Khrushchev wrote a letter to Kennedy agreeing to withdraw the missiles

[8] See, for example: Horelick and Rush, 141; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, 1965), 796.

[9] Robert S. McNamara, cited in I. F. Stone, *In a Time of Torment* (New York, 1968), 18.

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from Cuba if Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba at any future date. The Bay of Pigs attempt to depose Castro also played a role in this objective. In his first letter to the president, Khrushchev claimed that the Bay of Pigs affair had forced him to emplace missiles on the island. Thus, the introduction of IR/MRBMs would contribute to deterring a U.S. attack on Cuba and generally help solidify the Soviet presence. In any event, Castro would permit deployment and Soviet leaders could—and did—claim that the missiles were there for defense purposes, a measure to which the world could not legitimately object.

Whatever specific mixture of motivations lay behind Moscow's decisions, once the secret Soviet missile buildup was discovered, the next move was up to the U.S. A wealth of material has been written about the subsequent thirteen days. For our purposes, three questions are of particular importance: Why was President Kennedy adamant about the removal of Soviet offensive missiles from Cuba? What role did U.S. strategic forces play in the actions taken by the administration to achieve this goal? How did U.S. actions and the nature of the strategic balance influence Moscow's decision to withdraw the missiles?

In his address to the American people on October 22, President Kennedy stated that the "unswerving objective" must be to "secure withdrawal or elimination" of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.[10] Indeed, as the crisis progressed, despite differences over tactics, no member of Ex Comm—as the president's advisory group was called—seriously argued that the U.S. should permit the missiles to remain. Why were they so determined to seek removal of the missiles?

U.S. officials were clearly concerned over the strictly strategic implications of Soviet missiles in Cuba. It was difficult to ignore the fact that the Soviets had suddenly doubled their capacity to deliver nuclear warheads against the U.S. via ballistic missiles. This posed an increased threat to the U.S. population as well as to U.S. strategic forces. The fact that the missiles were at close range and could bypass the U.S. warning net presented a particular danger to the survivability of U.S. bombers. And the fact that

[10] John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, Oct. 22, 1962 in *Public Papers of the President: 1962*. (Washington, D.C., 1963), 807.

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the missiles were "soft" suggested to some U.S. officials that they would only be used in a first strike. Finally, the Soviet missiles did pose a new threat to Latin American cities, which had been considered beyond the effective range of Soviet ICBMs.

On the other hand, the president and his advisers knew that the Soviet deployment could not seriously endanger the U.S. deterrent. Polaris submarines and "hardened" ICBMs would remain secure, and countermeasures could be taken to minimize the danger to U.S. bombers. Furthermore, they were aware that the Soviets already had the ability to deliver nuclear weapons against the U.S. with ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. If the Soviets had increased their long-range missile force rather than emplaced short-range missiles in Cuba, the effect would have been essentially the same. In his October address, President Kennedy reminded the American people that they "have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles" and concluded, "in that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger. . . ."[11] Early in the crisis, McNamara expressed the same thought privately, reportedly saying that "a missile is a missile," whether launched from Cuba or the Soviet Union itself.[12]

Whatever the military significance of the missiles, however, broader foreign-policy considerations apparently dominated the administration's decision to insist that they be removed. Administration officials were reacting to the possible adverse political consequences of the sudden visible increase in Soviet "strategic" power provided by having possibly hundreds of IR/MRBMs based in Cuba. President Kennedy later explained that he did not fear that the Soviets would actually fire these missiles, but that the deployment "would have politically changed the balance of power. . . . It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."[13] Although he considered that Soviet missiles in Cuba had little strategic significance, Secretary McNamara, as noted earlier, was also very much aware of their potential political consequences. The president and the secretary of defense may have feared that the U.S. would lose some of the strategic advantage it

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] McNamara, cited in Hilsman, 195.

[13] President Kennedy, cited in Alexander George, David Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston, 1971), 92.

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had recently acquired—as a consequence of its massive missile buildup—and that U.S. prestige and power might suffer a setback. More worrisome may have been the prospect that Khrushchev might again adopt the policy of "rocket rattling" which, as a minimum, could involve the U.S. in crises and weaken the Western alliance.

Nevertheless, as important as it might have been, concern that the strategic balance might shift back toward the Soviet side does not in itself fully account for the administration's determination to remove the missiles.[14] What appears to have triggered the strong U.S. response, as much as any of the foregoing factors, was the way in which the Soviets went about redressing the balance, combined with the geographic and political uniqueness of Cuba. The administration considered Soviet deployment of offensive missiles in the Western Hemisphere to be a direct challenge to the U.S., running counter to long-established policies and precedents. Equally disturbing, the Soviet government had ignored President Kennedy's warning not to install offensive missiles in Cuba, while assuring the U.S. that it had every intention of complying, even going to the extreme of denying that missiles were being installed.

In the view of President Kennedy and his advisers, the flagrant defiance of the U.S., together with Soviet secrecy and deceit, made a strong response imperative. If the U.S. acquiesced under these circumstances—and with the issue of security against nuclear attack at stake—administration officials feared that U.S. prestige and credibility would be impaired. If the Soviets were allowed to succeed in this move, the U.S. was likely to face serious problems around the world, in Europe, and, most notably, in Berlin. The president made a special point of warning Khrushchev not to underestimate the American determination and will, as if to avoid projecting an image of weakness. President Kennedy cogently sum-

[14] To be sure, the president noted that the Soviets had never before deployed nuclear systems outside its borders and stated that in the nuclear age, "any sudden change" in the deployment of ballistic missiles "may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace"; President Kennedy, Radio and Television Report . . . Cuba, 807. But again, if the Soviets had simply increased their ICBM forces rapidly or even stationed short-range missiles in Eastern Europe as part of a declared policy, the administration would almost surely have been less upset—and, of course, less able to take feasible actions to eliminate the buildup.

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med up the administration position in his public announcement: "This secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American hemispheric policy—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe."[15]

For all of these reasons, President Kennedy was reluctant to compromise and seek a purely diplomatic solution. Most notably, the president refused to accept suggestions made early in the crisis that the U.S. offer to "trade" its IRBMs—still based in Turkey and Italy despite an earlier decision to have them removed—as a *quid pro quo* for Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, and he subsequently rejected Soviet proposals to negotiate such an agreement.[16]

Having rejected purely diplomatic solutions, how did the U.S. go about accomplishing the removal of the missiles? Essentially, the administration applied the principles of "flexible response," starting with a "mounting sequence of threats" short of nuclear war.[17] All of the military options discussed by Ex Comm, for example, were nonnuclear—naval blockade, conventional air strike against the sites, and invasion—as might have been anticipated. Kennedy administration officials advocated this approach as the most effective way to manage crises and had attempted to follow this course in Berlin. Unlike the Berlin situation, however,

[15] President Kennedy, Radio and Television Report . . . Cuba, 807.

[16] Even though it was recognized that U.S. MRBMs were strategically useless and their removal would represent "no loss" to the U.S. or its allies, the president apparently feared that such an arrangement would both legitimize the Soviet action and display weakness on the part of the U.S. The president also believed that attempts to negotiate such a deal—or indeed to rely completely on any negotiated solution—would take time and could lead to a situation in which all Soviet missiles were operational. In such a circumstance, the U.S. would run a greater risk in the event military actions against Cuba were later required, and the Soviets would be in a stronger bargaining position. However, since the proposal was, in Robert Kennedy's words, "not unreasonable," while still rejecting a formal trade and refusing to negotiate under "threat or pressure," the president later informed the Soviets that our missiles would be removed once the Soviets removed their missiles; Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York, 1969), 105-10 and *passim*.

[17] Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 17 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1965), 17.

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in Cuba, the preponderance of U.S. conventional capabilities in the area made flexible response a credible, practical, and effective alternative.[18]

It was not only unnecessary and inappropriate to rely on nuclear force to solve the Cuban crisis; it was judged to be dangerous as well. Despite overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority, President Kennedy knew that nuclear war would be catastrophic. If the Soviets launched first, their relatively small ICBM and SLBM forces combined with their long-range bomber force would have been able to cause tens of millions of U.S. fatalities. To be sure, the U.S. could have launched first and destroyed an appreciable part of Soviet strategic power. But there was no *guarantee* that the entire Soviet force would be destroyed on the ground or that the USSR would not fire some of its missiles on warning. Moreover, an enormous force of Soviet medium-range missiles and bombers held Western Europe hostage. Even a few nuclear weapons landing on U.S. or European cities would be incredibly destructive.

Not surprisingly, the president at once rejected the idea that the U.S. be the first to use nuclear weapons and avoided overt nuclear threats. In his talk on October 22, stressing the seriousness of the situation, President Kennedy warned that the U.S. would launch a "full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union" if nuclear missiles were launched from Cuba "against any nation in the Western Hemisphere," that such an attack would be regarded as an attack on the U.S.[19] Although some commentators claimed that this statement conveyed a nuclear threat, it was undoubtedly designed to deter the USSR from deliberately launching nuclear missiles from Cuba against any nation in the Americas and, at the same time, to put pressure on Moscow to ensure that no missiles were fired accidentally from Cuban bases.[20] Similarly, Presi-

[18] As an immediate response to the Cuban crisis, the U.S. had readied massive conventional power in addition to calling for a general strategic alert. These forces could support the blockade and provide for the air strike and invasion contingencies. A large U.S. naval presence was established in the area, tactical aircraft wings were deployed within range of Cuba, and reserve forces were increased.

[19] President Kennedy, Radio and Television Report . . . Cuba, 808.

[20] Slocombe's analysis supports this conclusion; "The Political Implications of Strategic Parity," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 77 (London, Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971), 32. Clearly, President Kennedy did not have to remind the Soviets that a nuclear attack against the United States—whether launched from Cuba or the USSR—would bring a retaliatory response. But, to avoid possible misunderstanding, the president apparently felt it necessary to emphasize that U.S. de-

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dent Kennedy put U.S. strategic forces on alert and ordered SAC bombers to be dispersed, but again, these were plausible, prudent measures designed to safeguard the U.S. retaliatory force.

President Kennedy was concerned that events might go out of control and ultimately lead to nuclear war. Throughout the crisis, he remained highly sensitive to the possibility that a nuclear war could break out through miscalculation or an irreversible series of limited moves with each side constantly raising the ante in the hope that the other side would back down.[21] Thus, the president kept U.S. actions tightly under control and tried to avoid decisions which would be likely to push the crisis past the point of no return.[22]

The president was convinced that the Soviet Union also wanted to avoid nuclear war over Cuba, but was concerned that, if care were not taken, Khrushchev might be forced into an "irrational" nuclear response. Kennedy therefore sought to give Khrushchev room to maneuver and to find a graceful way to withdraw, rejecting actions which might push the Soviets into a corner. While bringing military pressure to bear, through such means as intensifying aerial overflights, direct and early armed confrontations were avoided, and diplomatic avenues were pursued in parallel—in the UN, with the OAS, and directly with the Soviet government.

The president's critical decision to impose a blockade, rather than launch an air strike or an invasion, as the first serious U.S. move was typical of his approach.[23] Once the blockade was insti-

terrent policy also applied to Soviet nuclear attacks against any nation in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, explicitly placing the U.S. strategic umbrella over all nations in the Western Hemisphere was not a radical departure from overall policies, given the precedent of U.S. commitment to Europe and Japan.

[21] "It isn't the first step that concerns me," the President remarked, "but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth steps—and we don't go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so"; cited in R. Kennedy, 98.

[22] The president was particularly conscious of the danger of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and gave special orders to ensure that U.S. missiles in Turkey and Italy were fully under his command.

[23] President Kennedy agreed with Robert Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara that an air strike was not yet essential and would be a hazardous step with the potential to trigger a chain of events which could move the crisis to the brink of nuclear war. Despite the fact that a blockade would not, in itself, prevent the completion of missiles already delivered, it would signal U.S. seriousness, give the Soviets time to deliberate, preserve future U.S. options, and minimize the likelihood and consequences of armed conflict. Even the term *quarantine* was selected in part because it sounded less belligerent than *blockade*.

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tuted, President Kennedy sought to decrease its risks by narrowing its limits and avoiding unnecessarily provocative boardings of Soviet ships. Later in the crisis, even after the downing of an American reconnaissance plane over Cuba and the receipt of the "tougher" letter from the Soviet foreign ministry, the president still rejected military recommendations for an air strike, refusing to attack and expressing the desire to find less risky alternatives.[24]

Yet, despite all the cautious behavior to avoid nuclear war, to ensure removal of the missiles, Kennedy seemed prepared to take actions which may well have had this result. As he himself put it in the midst of the crisis, "we will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of world-wide nuclear war—but neither will we shrink from that risk any time it must be faced."[25] Robert Kennedy recalled that the consensus of Ex Comm was "that if the Soviets were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba . . . we might as well have the showdown [now rather than] six months later."[26]

Perhaps the best example of U.S. determination was to be found in the air-strike option.[27] All important U.S. officials recognized that an air strike, alone or followed by an invasion, would increase the risk of nuclear war. The Soviets might retaliate from Cuba with surviving missiles, undertake reciprocal action against U.S. missiles in Turkey, or launch a major move against Berlin. If the Soviet response led the president to use nuclear weapons, "all mankind would be threatened."[28]

[24] R. Kennedy, 98.

[25] President Kennedy, Radio and Television Report . . . Cuba, 807.

[26] Robert Kennedy, cited in Schlesinger, 829-30.

[27] Another instance of this U.S. resolve occurred when Soviet ships were about to challenge the U.S. blockade and a Soviet submarine interposed itself between Soviet and U.S. ships. Secretary McNamara proposed that depth charges be used to force the submarine to surface. President Kennedy saw the danger of an exchange with a Soviet submarine, but agreed that there was no other choice. In the president's judgment, the U.S. had to run the risk of triggering a series of escalating moves and enforce the quarantine. We will never know what the result would have been, for the Soviets did not actually challenge the blockade; R. Kennedy, 69-72.

[28] Secretary McNamara later explained the possible Soviet reaction to a U.S. invasion of Cuba: "Had we invaded Cuba, we would have been confronted with the Soviets. . . . Had we been confronted with the Soviets we would have killed thousands of them. . . . Had we killed thousands of them the Soviets would probably have had to respond. . . . They might have had nuclear delivery weapons there [that] might have been operational and they might have been launched . . ."; McNamara testifying at hearings on Department of Defense

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Although some Ex Comm members nevertheless argued for the air strike as an initial move, President Kennedy chose the blockade. Later in the crisis, however, when it became clear that the blockade was not going to prevent the Soviets from completing work on the missiles already present, the president, despite the risks, was willing to consider seriously an air strike and to convey this highly threatening possibility to the Soviets.

On October 27, the difficult decision had been made to respond to Khrushchev's "first" letter and to agree to accept his offer to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.[29] The crisis was then at a crucial point. U.S. overflights indicated that the missile sites would soon be operational. An immediate and positive answer from Khrushchev was needed.

In transmitting President Kennedy's letter to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy explained that "we had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be removed." Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin, if the Soviets would not comply, "we would remove them."[30] And he reminded Dobrynin that if the U.S. were forced to invade Cuba and the Soviets took retaliatory action, "before that was over, there would not only be dead Americans but dead Russians as well."[31]

This was a serious threat—indeed, an ultimatum—deliberately conveyed on the president's orders to the Soviets. That Robert Kennedy, in the name of the president, also offered to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey once the crisis had ended—in a belated gesture obviously designed to help Khrushchev "save face"—does not alter this fact.[32]

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appropriations for 1964 before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, cited in Horelick and Rush, 153.

[29] Two letters had been received in rapid succession from the Soviet government. The earlier letter, asking for a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba, was clearly from Khrushchev. The later letter was apparently prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry; it demanded that the American bases in Turkey be removed as a *quid pro quo* for the Soviet bases in Cuba. It was Robert Kennedy who suggested the "Trollope ploy" of responding to the first letter as though the second had never been written; Hilsman, 223.

[30] R. Kennedy, 108.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] George, Hall, Simons, 125, explain why the Kennedy message to Dobrynin was a true ultimatum while earlier U.S. moves, such as the blockade, were not. They state that the message conveyed to Dobrynin stipulated a time limit—immediately—as well as a threat of punishment for noncompliance—that the United States would remove the missiles if the Soviets did not.

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We will never know whether President Kennedy would have actually approved the air strike and risked nuclear war if the Soviets had not responded appropriately. McNamara acknowledged that the U.S. "faced . . . the possibility of launching nuclear weapons" in the event the Soviets did not comply,[33] and President Kennedy expressed the feeling that it could go "either way."[34] Fortunately, two days after the meeting with Dobrynin, Khrushchev responded to President Kennedy's letter, stating that he was prepared to withdraw the missiles from Cuba.

How important was the strategic balance to molding the administration's course of action? A case can be made that U.S. nuclear superiority played an important role in generally strengthening the administration's resolve and, as the crisis progressed, in its willingness to take actions which ran an appreciable risk of leading to nuclear war. Although the president made no direct threats to use nuclear weapons or specific references to U.S. strategic advantage, he may well have concluded that U.S. nuclear power would have a restraining and possibly a coercive effect on the behavior of Soviet leaders. President Kennedy apparently believed that U.S. strategic superiority would reliably deter the Soviets from initiating a nuclear war. At the same time, President Kennedy seemed to believe that U.S. nuclear superiority, when coupled with U.S. conventional superiority, would compel Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles. Perhaps the president was somewhat more willing to contemplate risking a nuclear exchange because the U.S. would be in a better position than the Soviets to limit damage through counterforce attack.[35]

It is clear that the U.S. acted with determination in forcing the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. But the ultimate outcome of the crisis hinged upon the Soviet Union's perceptions and the motives which influenced Kremlin leaders to eventually agree to U.S. demands. How did the Soviets see the situation and what effect did U.S. strategic power have on Khrushchev's decision to remove the missiles?

[33] Secretary Robert S. McNamara, *Hearings* on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, cited in Horelick and Rush, 153.

[34] President Kennedy, cited in Hilsman, 224.

[35] We may question whether the president would have, for example, threatened to "retaliate" against the Soviet homeland in response to a nuclear attack against Latin America if the U.S. were not able to inflict severe damage on Soviet strategic forces.

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It should be noted that, initially, the Soviets offered a good deal of resistance to Kennedy's firm stand on the issue.[36] Despite their public stance, however, it seems clear that the Soviets were frightened by the prospect of a nuclear war over Cuba. In the early 1960s, Kremlin leaders were aware that a nuclear conflict would be catastrophic for the Soviet Union and the world. During the crisis, Khrushchev continually pointed to the danger of nuclear war.[37] He called the U.S. blockade "a step toward the unleashing of a nuclear world war" and called for a summit meeting "to do everything to remove the danger of unleashing [such a] war."[38]

Both sides were frightened by the spectre of nuclear war, but Soviet fears were greatly exacerbated by U.S. strategic superiority. As a result, Soviet leaders were extremely wary of pressing their policies to the point that use of nuclear weapons seemed inevitable.[39]

The Soviet strategic position during the crisis was highly unfavorable—as noted, this was perhaps the single most important motive for the decision to put missiles into Cuba. Not only did

[36] During the crisis, for example, in a letter to the president, Khrushchev claimed that the U.S. blockade was pushing mankind "to the abyss of a world missile-nuclear war," but said he would not order his ships' captains to obey U.S. naval officers; cited in R. Kennedy, 79-80. Later, in a personal conversation with a private U.S. citizen, Khrushchev admitted that Soviet missiles were indeed in Cuba and threatened to use them if necessary. He further threatened that if the U.S. Navy attempted to deter Soviet ships, Soviet submarines would sink them "and that would mean a third world war"; Khrushchev, paraphrased in Abel, 132-33. Even after Kennedy's strong speech of October 22, the Soviets continued to take a hard line as they maintained their speedup on completion of the MR/IRBMs. A few days after the speech, an American U-2 was shot down over Cuba. By October 25, the IL-28 bombers had been uncrated and assembled. In point of fact, these bombers were not removed from Cuba until November 20.

[37] Throughout the crisis, the real possibility that any military clash between U.S. and Soviet forces would lead to nuclear war was apparently of overriding concern to Khrushchev. Contrary to U.S. fears, the Soviets did not move against Berlin during the course of the Cuban crisis. More to the point, despite Khrushchev's threat to defy the U.S. blockade at the risk of war, he did not do so when faced with the actual choice. And Khrushchev, too, feared that a U.S. air strike or invasion against Cuba would bring both sides dangerously close to the brink.

[38] Khrushchev, cited in Tatu; 264; Khrushchev, cited in Abel, 125-26.

[39] The danger of nuclear escalation can obviously work in both directions. Khrushchev could have stood firm and refused to remove the missiles on the assumption that the U.S. would back down rather than risk nuclear war. It is interesting to contemplate the outcome of the Cuban crisis if Khrushchev had indeed decided to carry the game of "nuclear chicken" further.

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the Soviet Union at that time lack the capability to launch a first strike, but its ability to effectively deter the U.S. was open to question. Even though U.S. calculations demonstrated the difficulty of mounting a successful counterforce attack against the Soviets, from the Kremlin's vantage point, the possibility that the U.S. could do so could not be ruled out. A nuclear exchange would have resulted in considerably greater damage to the Soviet Union than to the U.S., and the Soviets had neither the forces nor the doctrine which would have enabled them to play by the rules of "limited" strategic war.[40]

If not in strictly military terms, the strategic balance seen through Soviet eyes probably placed Kremlin leaders at a psychological disadvantage[41] and lent credence to U.S. threats. Buttressed by a real and acknowledged edge in nuclear weapons, U.S. leaders would be less likely to compromise and more prone to take conventional military action on the assumption that the Soviets would be reluctant to respond with a nuclear strike. President Kennedy's statement of October 22, in which he referred to the U.S. "full retaliatory response" policy was clearly a reminder of U.S. power and may have even been taken as a threat to launch a preemptive attack against the Soviet Union if it did not comply.

U.S. strategic superiority, however, was obviously not the only factor influencing Soviet behavior. The overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority in the area added to Khrushchev's apprehensions and contributed greatly to the Soviet decision to acquiesce.[42] Indeed, it was apparently the combination of U.S. con-

[40] If some of the approximately seventy missiles stationed in Cuba had become operational, the Soviet position would have been improved, but the extreme vulnerability of these weapons would have made this contribution marginal. See Horelick and Rush, 128, 133, and Wohlstetter, 10-12.

[41] Slocombe, 32, posits the "psychological edge" thesis. He states that it is logical to assume that since the Soviets so clearly felt the strategic balance to be a factor when they put the missiles in Cuba, they were very aware of U.S. superiority during the crisis and, in turn, very cautious in taking them out of Cuba. Although he feels the U.S. did not have sufficient numerical and vulnerability advantages over the Soviet Union to prevent real damage from being done to the U.S., from the Soviet viewpoint, their own forces were too limited.

[42] One high U.S. military official was completely convinced that conventional, as opposed to nuclear, superiority was the decisive factor in the Soviet withdrawal; General Earl Wheeler, as cited in W. W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York, 1964), 273. It might be pointed out, however, that the conventional option chosen—the blockade—appeared to be of greater salience in terms of prohibiting the Soviets from further supplying Cuba, rather than in

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ventional and nuclear strength which forced the Soviets to withdraw their missiles.[43] U.S. nuclear and conventional forces served to complement each other. While American nuclear power neutralized Soviet nuclear power, U.S. conventional superiority discouraged the Soviets from a conventional confrontation. The Soviets could not, without the use of nuclear weapons, prevent the U.S. from invading Cuba or destroying the missile sites with conventional air attacks. At the same time, U.S. strategic power more than negated Soviet strategic capabilities, making the use of nuclear weapons on the part of the Soviets irrational and heightening the risks of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict over Cuba.

Consequently, as it had in the earlier Berlin crisis, the burden of avoiding nuclear war again fell upon Khrushchev; the USSR was placed in the untenable position of choosing between "holocaust and surrender." In the end, he was not prepared to run a serious risk of nuclear war over the missiles in Cuba.[44] The U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and the eleventh-hour offer to remove U.S. missiles in Turkey did give Khrushchev the opportunity to make some policy gains and avoid further embarassment. But the prime influence behind Khrushchev's decision was U.S. military power. As McNamara put it, "Khrushchev knew . . . that he faced the full military power of the U.S., including its nuclear weapons . . . that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons."[45]

terms of their total withdrawal. To "remove" the missiles without Soviet agreement would have required a U.S. air strike which could have had nuclear repercussions.

[43] Hilsman supports this view: "it is not possible to say that it was a nuclear threat, as such, that caused the Soviets to back down. . . . On the other hand, it is also not possible to say that the Soviets backed down solely in the face of a threat to invade Cuba with conventional, nonnuclear forces. . . . On balance, in other words, the best judgment seems to be that the Soviets backed down in the face of a threat that combined both conventional and nuclear power"; Hilsman, 226-27.

[44] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, 1971), 64-65, notes that the Soviets attached great significance to the threat of an air strike. Khrushchev, in reporting to the Supreme Soviet on the crisis, conveys the seriousness with which the Soviets received the threat: "We received information from Cuban comrades and from other sources on the morning of October 27 *directly stating* that this attack would be carried out in the next two or three days. We interpreted these cables as an *extremely alarming warning signal.*" Khrushchev insisted that the threat was not simply a matter of Soviet perceptions; he asserted that the threat was "explicitly stated."

[45] Secretary McNamara, *Hearings* on Dept. of Defense Appropriations for

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Evaluation of the Crisis

From one point of view, U.S. actions during the Cuban crisis seemed justifiable and sensible and to have successfully reversed a provocative Soviet move. From another point of view, however, it can be argued that Moscow's missile gambit pressed this nation to the point where, rightly or wrongly, the next steps were liable to lead inevitably to global war. In this sense, despite his irresponsible and misguided decision to install missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev[46] should be thanked for his decision not to "doom the world" by "tightening the knot."[47]

From these different perspectives, President Kennedy's behavior during the Cuban crisis has been both highly praised and severely criticized. Many observers—and almost all the participants in the U.S. government's decisions—argue that the president exhibited great restraint in his efforts to obtain removal of the missiles. They emphasize his use of "graduated responses" and his display of sensitivity to the danger of nuclear war as well as the masterful way in which, in order to avoid military clashes, he gave Khrushchev room to maneuver. Others claim that the president acted irresponsibly by bringing the world too close to nuclear war.

Much of this controversy centers around the basic security question: how important was the goal of getting the missiles withdrawn, and, given the stakes involved, to what degree should the U.S. have risked nuclear war?[48] The debate over Kennedy's behavior also raises the issue of whether there were mo-

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1964, cited in Horelick and Rush, 153.

[46] Khrushchev letter, cited in R. Kennedy, 89-90.

[47] It should be noted that all Soviet MRBMs were operational by October 28 and ground forces were equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, had the U.S. decided to invade, the consequences would have indeed been serious. Hilsman credits the Soviets with courage in their decision to withdraw: "although putting the missiles into Cuba was threatening and irresponsible, the Soviets handled the ensuing crisis with wisdom and restraint"; Hilsman, 227. Khrushchev himself, on Dec. 12, 1962, after the crisis was past, spoke of the necessity for restraint: "If it is now a 'paper tiger' [imperialism], those who say this know that this 'paper tiger' has atomic teeth. It can use them and it must not be treated lightly"; Khrushchev, cited in Abel, 191-92.

[48] Robert Kennedy later raised an even more basic question regarding the authority by which any president has the right to lead a nation close to nuclear war; note by Theodore Sorenson, cited in R. Kennedy, 128.

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tives other than concern for national security which caused him to take a firm stance.

Some commentators have claimed that the president was strongly influenced by domestic politics. The Republicans had already begun to use the buildup of Soviet arms in Cuba as an election issue, and the president finally took a strong public position warning the USSR that he would not tolerate the introduction of "offensive" weapons because of the political risk at home.[49] Other critics feel that, because of the Berlin situation and the abortive Bay of Pigs incident, the president personally felt the need to adopt a strong position against Khrushchev—at all costs.[50]

[49] A great debate ensued some years after the crisis between Steel and Hilsman regarding the "political" motivations of the president. Steel intimated that the administration was in greater jeopardy than U.S. security; Ronald Steel, "The Kennedys and the Missile Crisis," *The New York Review of Books*, XII (March 13, 1969), 15-22 and *passim*. He contended that Kennedy made a grandstand play by delivering his ultimatum to Khrushchev on television rather than privately to Gromyko and that Kennedy's motives were at least partly political. He claimed that Kennedy needed a "foreign policy victory" due to Republican charges and the upcoming elections and that the stakes were not as high as we were then led to believe; Steel in Roger Hilsman and Ronald Steel, "An Exchange on the Missile Crisis," *The New York Review of Books*, XII (May 9, 1969), 38. However, in fairness, he added, "Did we, then, nearly go up in radioactive dust to shore up the Kennedy Administration's fading image before the November 1962 elections? Not necessarily . . . considerations of high strategy and party politics reinforced one another and convinced Kennedy that the Russian withdrawal had to be complete, unilateral, and secured by the end of October"; Steel, "The Kennedys and the Missile Crisis," 15-16. To these charges, Hilsman rebutted that Kennedy was being pressured by hardliners from the military, the State Department, and the CIA, as well as both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. He states categorically: "It was political trouble, all right, but the upcoming elections were the least of it . . . it was the missiles themselves that made Kennedy adopt a tight deadline, not the upcoming elections"; Hilsman in "An Exchange on the Missile Crisis," 37-38. Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review*, LXIII (1969), 712, commented that Cuba was the Kennedy administration's "political Achilles heel." The president was being forced to take a stand on Cuba due to three major domestic factors: (1) the upcoming congressional elections, (2) the Republican announcements that Cuba would be the dominant issue of the 1962 campaign, and (3) their accusation that the president adhered to a do-nothing policy toward Cuba. He states, "These attacks drew blood. Prudence demanded a vigorous reaction."

[50] Two writers on the crisis feel that Kennedy felt his mettle was being tested by Khrushchev and for this reason he resolved to meet the tests at all costs. George, Hall, and Simons, 98-99, interpret Kennedy's earlier comments to a writer from the *New York Post*: in 1961, Kennedy was seriously concerned that

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Nevertheless, the administration's substantive reasons for demanding removal of the missiles were sound. The foreign policy consequences of a rapid increase in Soviet nuclear power and of the way in which the USSR ignored previous warnings and acted with deceit could have raised serious security problems for the West and ultimately led to other crises with nuclear risks—in Berlin, for example. Moreover, it could also be argued that the presence of a large number of "soft" Soviet missiles in Cuba would have introduced serious instabilities in the strategic balance. In a time of tension, the high vulnerability of these systems to a U.S. counterforce attack would have greatly increased the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" and possibly resulted in an unwarranted launch by the USSR of a preemptive strike upon this nation.

Against these risks must be weighed the danger that U.S. actions to remove the missiles might have led to nuclear war. Since the predictions of the potential nuclear risk were quite uncertain, the U.S. did not have to overreact. Perhaps President Kennedy could be faulted for his refusal to seek negotiated settlement early in the crisis and, in particular, for not immediately offering to trade U.S. missiles in Turkey.[51] Chances are, agreement could have been reached before the missiles were fully operational; but even if this were not the case, the U.S. would still have been in a position to force them to be withdrawn. In any event, if successful, whatever loss that might have been associated with this U.S. "concession" would have been far outweighed by never having

Khrushchev had perceived Kennedy's reluctance to wage war over Berlin as a loss of nerve. He felt some day he might have to run the "supreme risk" in order to convince Khrushchev of his strength; when Cuba occurred, Kennedy felt that the time had arrived. I.F. Stone, 19-20, is still less charitable toward the president. He believes that Kennedy felt personally inferior because of Berlin and the Bay of Pigs. Therefore, Kennedy was determined, on a purely personal level, to stand "eyeball to eyeball" with Khrushchev.

[51] Again, both Steel and I. F. Stone feel that politics was a dominant motive in Kennedy's refusal to "trade" the Turkish missiles for the Cuban. Stone feels that the U.S. risked World War Three, which could have been avoided by negotiations. He attributes Kennedy's refusal to the fall elections. On the Turkish issue, he faults Kennedy's refusal of the *quid pro quo*, since Kennedy had known for some time that our missiles in Turkey were obsolete; Stone, 21-22. Steel claims the White House was disturbed by the Turkish issue because of its fairness. He quotes RFK as saying: "The proposal the Russians made was not unreasonable and did not amount to a loss to the U.S. or to our NATO allies." However, if the administration accepted the trade, they feared accusations of weakness from the Republicans; Steel, "The Kennedys and the Missile Crisis," 17.

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had to go to the extreme of presenting Khrushchev with an ultimatum and being prepared to activate an air strike.

The Cuban episode has been the source of speculation on the general problem of the relationship of the strategic balance to the management and outcome of crises. As described earlier, in the dynamics of the Cuban crisis, the real and recognized *strategic* preponderance of the U.S. tended to shift the military and political advantage toward the U.S. and away from the USSR. But U.S. decisions throughout the crisis were strongly influenced by the overwhelming U.S. *conventional* superiority. Moreover, other characteristics unique to the Cuban crisis gave momentum to the U.S. while undermining the Soviet position. U.S. interests, for example, were apparently more dominant than Soviet interests and the U.S. was in a strong diplomatic position as a result of the USSR's deceitful and clandestine behavior. With all these factors at work, it is almost impossible to isolate the importance of the "strategic variable."

We might hypothetically ask whether the management or outcome of the crisis would have been different if the strategic balance had been "reversed" to favor the USSR, or, more plausibly, had reflected a situation of nuclear parity. In this circumstance, U.S. nuclear power would still have been sufficient to cancel Soviet nuclear capabilities. U.S. conventional superiority would have given the U.S. an advantage. Thus, it is doubtful that the U.S. would have acquiesced and permitted the USSR to station missiles in Cuba or that the Soviets would have run a nuclear risk and refused to comply. But it is plausible that President Kennedy would have been less likely to contemplate and threaten actions which ran a nuclear risk, such as the air strike, and more prone to seek a negotiated solution, simply because he might have concluded that his bluff might be called.

We may also question the outcome of a situation in which the U.S. lacked conventional superiority. As Kennedy did in the Berlin crisis of 1961, the U.S. might then have looked to its strategic forces as the prime security tool. In that case, U.S. nuclear advantage would have seemed important. Perhaps all we can conclude from the episode is that reliance on strategic forces rises as nonnuclear alternatives diminish and that in a crisis the stronger nuclear power gains some form of advantage—whether psychologi-

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cal or physical.

With reference to Cuba, President Kennedy later showed a clear appreciation of the danger that "misjudgments" and "mistakes" in the nuclear area "can make this whole thing blow up."[52] Whether or not implying regret over his course of action in Cuba, President Kennedy reportedly remarked that a world "in which nations threaten each other with nuclear weapons [was] not quite an irrational but an intolerable and impossible world."[53] Similarly, Khrushchev later remarked that "both sides displayed a sober approach" in avoiding steps which could have led to World War III.[54]

As a result of the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy gained a clearer appreciation of the dangers inherent in U.S.-Soviet confrontations. This led to a period of détente and rapid progress in reaching agreement on the limited test ban and other arms control measures. Even more significantly, since that time, both nations have tended to avoid engaging each other in serious situations which might risk nuclear war.

Impact of the Crisis on Later U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policies

In its impact on the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms race, however, the results of the Cuban crisis were not altogether desirable. Although the failure in Cuba demonstrated once more the futility of Khrushchev's policy of attempting to intimidate the U.S. with strategic threats and dramatized for Kremlin leaders the dangers associated with nuclear-related crises, the basic problem of U.S. superiority still remained. Indeed, the Cuban setback not only confirmed but reinforced Soviet interest in redressing the strategic balance. Soviet leaders believed that nuclear superiority enabled the U.S. to practice "coercive diplomacy" in Cuba and to force Khrushchev to retreat. Ironically, this U.S. "victory" vindicated Moscow's view that strategic power conferred political importance. Moscow apparently felt it did not have sufficient nuclear power to deal diplomatically with the West and maintain its position as a world power. For these reasons, the Soviet Union

[52] President Kennedy, cited in Abel, 193.
[53] President Kennedy, cited in Stone, 26-27.
[54] Khrushchev, cited in Abel, 191-92.

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came away from Cuba with an even greater desire to achieve parity in nuclear weapons.

Khrushchev could not avoid drawing the conclusion that the balance must be corrected in a legitimate and straightforward way. Cuba had proved that there were no quick or inexpensive alternatives. Consequently, after the crisis, he increased the rate of deployment of the early-generation SS-7 ICBM and pressed ahead with research and development of the advanced SS-9 and SS-11 "hardened" ICBMs, a Polaris-type missile-launching submarine, and the Galosh ABM. But Khrushchev still refused to undertake the massive and expensive missile deployment program being advocated by many leaders in the Kremlin.

Khrushchev may have hoped that this modest stimulation of the Soviet missile program would be sufficient to cope temporarily with the "U.S. threat." In the long run, he saw a gradual buildup of Soviet strategic strength aiming toward parity or perhaps even superiority. For the immediate future, Khrushchev turned once again to diplomacy to provide a substitute for weaponry—only this time, the course was one of restraint, not rocket-rattling. Although Khrushchev was genuinely interested in finding ways to reduce the risk of war and to control nuclear arms, the Soviet leader's post-Cuban policy of détente was also designed to buy time for Soviet missile deployments while slowing down U.S. programs, minimizing the possibility of another nuclear-related confrontation and generally blunting the embarrassing effect of the Cuban experience.

After Khrushchev's departure, however, the Soviets finally launched a major effort to redress the balance. The new Kremlin leaders were more motivated than Khrushchev to accomplish this objective and were willing to allocate the resources necessary for this purpose and to improve Soviet defenses. They wanted capabilities, not claims. Indeed, it is well known that Khrushchev's decision to postpone major missile construction and his general unwillingness to increase military spending—along with his Cuban misadventure—were among the key factors which contributed to his downfall.[55]

In early 1965, Brezhnev and Kosygin, drawing upon the R & D programs initiated under Khrushchev, decided to upgrade sub-

[55] Among the writers who corroborate this theory are Horelick and Rush, 155.

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stantially the quantity and quality of the Soviet Union's strategic force. At that time, the decision was made to deploy the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs and to acquire a Polaris-type missile-launching submarine system. Construction of the Moscow ABM system was continued, but this defensive program was only partially completed as increased priority was placed on offensive missiles.[56] As a result, from a force of approximately 200 "soft" ICBMs in late 1964 —four-to-one inferiority in this category alone—the Soviet force increased to 340 in 1966 and 730 in 1967. By 1968, the Soviets were approaching parity in numbers of "hardened" ICBMs and had begun to deploy Polaris-type submarines.

As the USSR began to close the gap, however, the U.S. took counteractions to maintain its position of strength. In 1965, decisions were made to procure the advanced Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles which carried multiple warheads or MIRVs. These programs were pursued primarily as a means of maintaining the U.S. deterrent capability in the event the Soviets mounted a massive ABM effort, but MIRVs were also considered a means of ensuring that U.S. superiority in numbers of nuclear warheads and damage-inflicting potential would remain unchallenged. On the defensive side, in 1967, the U.S. decided to deploy the "thin" Sentinel ABM system as a counter to the potential Chinese ICBM threat. But this system also had anti-Soviet capabilities and provided a base for expansion to a large ABM network.

As it turned out, the Soviets built a substantially larger strategic force during the years 1966 to 1969 than "worst case" U.S. estimates had predicted. To be sure, Soviet decisions to sustain their offensive program past parity in ICBMs and to develop multiple warheads stemmed from a variety of internal bureaucratic factors and may well have been influenced by a desire to seek a counterforce first-strike capacity. An equally plausible explanation centers around the perceived Soviet need to maintain a credible deterrent. From the Soviet perspective, there was a continuing and legitimate need to improve the retaliatory capacity of the USSR. Projecting ahead to the early seventies, Soviet analysts saw that

[56] It is difficult to reconstruct the details of Soviet decisionmaking during this period, and, in particular, to assign responsibility for specific strategic-arms-program decisions to either Khrushchev or his successors. The discussion in this study draws upon Thomas W. Wolfe's analyses in *Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970* (Baltimore, 1970), chaps. VIII and XVI.

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the combination of U.S. ABMs and accurate MIRVs could endanger the Soviets' deterrent. And, as they had in the early 1960s, U.S. claims of superiority in warheads added political pressure to the Soviets.

The increasing risks and costs of the strategic arms competition in the late 1960s gave the U.S. incentive to attempt to initiate strategic arms limitation talks. But the Soviet Union refused to enter into negotiations until it had attained a position of parity —not merely in terms of military capabilities but also in terms of the more political indices of numbers of missiles. Thus, progress in other arms control areas during the 1960s was not matched by progress in curtailing the strategic arms race. And, by the time the so called SALT talks began in November 1969, many possibilities for effective strategic arms control had been foreclosed, and the Moscow agreements signed in May 1972, while imposing stringent restrictions on ABM systems, placed only minimal constraints on offensive weapons.[57]

Policy Implications

The Kennedy administration's early emphasis on superiority can be said to have helped cause the Cuban crisis by tilting the nuclear balance so far against the Soviets that they were "forced" to emplace missiles in Cuba in order to rectify the strategic relationship. Had the U.S. been more sensitive to the Soviet need —both political and military—for equality, it might have not pressed its advantage as far as it did, and, consequently, might have avoided the risks of the Cuban confrontation.[58] Furthermore, as we have seen, the Soviet setback in Cuba heightened Moscow's interest in redressing the balance and ulti-

[57] The interim agreement limits the number of ICBMs and SLBMs to those currently operational and under construction, but does not control multiple warheads (MIRVs), bombers, or medium-range nuclear delivery systems. For a complete description of the offensive and defensive accords, see *The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement*, Message from the President of the United States, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., June 1972.

[58] A CIA estimate in early 1962 discussed but dismissed the possibility of the USSR installing missiles in Cuba; Ronald Steel, "The Kennedys and the Missile Crisis," 19, describes the situation, in Hilsman's words as, "a failure . . . not of rationalization, but of imagination. . . ." This perhaps indicates U.S. insensitivity to the Soviet dilemma which, as indicated, the U.S. helped to precipitate.

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mately led to the massive Soviet missile buildup of the late 1960s, which has stimulated the nuclear arms race and restricted progress in strategic arms control. Thus, while the Cuban crisis underscored the danger of nuclear confrontations, the U.S. should also have learned that mutual stability, rather than a stress on unilateral superiority, should be the primary strategic policy objective of the United States.

Although the U.S. can no longer boast of strategic superiority, a situation of parity—in the light of other political and psychological factors—may not prove to be stabilizing in itself. With the potential of new weapons technologies, it will take a deliberate effort on the part of both sides to maintain a situation of actual and perceived mutual stability. Similarly, the presence of parity will not automatically prohibit nations from turning once again to nuclear threats to obtain foreign policy objectives. Therefore, if there is one overall lesson to be learned from the Cuban crisis, it is that U.S. policy makers must take into account not only the effect of their policies on the other side at any given time, but the overall and long-term consequences for global stability.

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Who Governed the Nation's Cities in the "Era of the Common Man"?

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> Those who possess property and carry on the business of the country, can look forward only to living under a government over which they have no influence. . . .
>
> Sidney George Fisher[1]
>
> The more affluent classes of society are . . . directly removed from the direction of political affairs in the United States. . . .
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville[2]

The second quarter of the nineteenth century has long been known as the Era of the Common Man, largely because of the supposedly great political power commanded by persons of little or no property. The astute French visitor Michel Chevalier, observing that poor men in most states had the right to vote, concluded that in the United States the propertyless masses "rule[d] the capitalists, merchants, and manufacturers."[3] It was widely as-

[1] Diary of Sidney George Fisher, entry of Dec. 1, 1839, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

[2] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, 1954), I, 192.

[3] Michel Chevalier, *Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States* (Boston, 1839).

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sumed that democratization of the suffrage had made rich men politically impotent in America.

This essay tests the accuracy of that assumption. It examines the policies pursued by government in the period and considers the wealth and standing of officeholders of the time in New York City, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and Boston. Both factors are important in any inquiry into the extent of plutocratic influence on politics. Political actions must be considered in order to determine the power of a select number of political actors, for it is conceivable that a small group, such as the rich, could have had disproportionate representation in government and yet have had little influence over it. The obverse is also possible: great influence could have been wielded by a small clique barely, if at all, represented. An influential modern theory, in fact, holds that the mid-twentieth century American city is ruled precisely by covert elites outside government.[4]

A leading urban historian has recently complained that "historians of the Jacksonian era have yet to undertake the kind of systematic quantitative studies of urban [political] leadership" that would carry the modern discussion beyond impressionism.[5] Actually, modern scholars have investigated the backgrounds and occupations of officials in a number of towns and small cities in different parts of the country.[6] The discussion here of large northeastern cities of great wealth and population complements the earlier studies and should help bring us closer to a coherent overview of urban politics and power in the antebellum decades.

[4] See Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers* (Chapel Hill, 1953).

[5] Sam Bass Warner, *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Phases of Its Growth* (Boston, 1968), 80.

[6] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, 1961); D. Clayton James, *Antebellum Natchez* (Baton Rouge, 1968); Kenneth W. Wheeler, *To Wear a City's Crown: The Beginnings of Urban Growth in Texas, 1836-1865* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); Michael H. Frisch, "The Community Elite and the Emergence of Urban Politics: Springfield, Massachusetts, 1840-1880," in Stephan Thernstrom and Richard Sennett, eds., *Nineteenth-Century Cities: Essays in the New Urban History* (New Haven, 1969), 277-96; Michael Fitzgibbon Holt, *Forging a Majority: The Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860* (New Haven, 1970), chap. 1; Michael B. Katz, "Patterns of Inequality, Wealth, and Power," Unpublished paper given at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Apr. 19, 1971, New Orleans; and Daniel Aaron, "Cincinnati, 1818-1838: A Study of Attitudes in the Urban West" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1942).

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In his well known study of New Haven, Robert A. Dahl asks the question, "who governs?" and answers: the commercial and professional patriciate before 1842, a new class of industrial entrepreneurs for the rest of the nineteenth century.[7] Dahl's generalizations are based primarily on the occupations of the mayors and the family backgrounds of several of them. I have investigated not only mayors but recorders, trustees, aldermen, assistant aldermen, and select and common councilmen for the period 1825-50, and I have considered the wealth and status as well as the occupations of these officeholders. Using occupation as the sole criterion, the practice in a number of recent studies of colonial officials, can be misleading. There were merchants and merchants, some conducting modest storefront operations, others sending cargoes to the far corners of the earth. Men listed in directories as artisans have turned out to have been large entrepreneurs. Wealth *and* occupation provide a surer clue to economic standing than does occupation alone.[8]

I have also chosen to take into consideration that elusive intangible, status. Every one of the great cities had an elite, a group of notables distinct from—if containing many members of—the rich, with whom they are so often bracketed. The elite of a city typically numbered several hundred families of great prestige, many of them eminent since the seventeenth century but a surprising number whose renown dated from the middle or late eighteenth century. These families moved in a restricted social orbit, maintaining exclusive relationships, both formal and informal, attending the same dinner parties and balls, active in the same clubs and voluntary associations, living in residential enclaves populated by their own sort, marrying by a rule of social endogamy, usually although not invariably possessing great wealth.[9]

[7] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, *passim*.

[8] Edward Pessen, "The Occupations of the Antebellum Rich: A Misleading Clue to the Sources and Extent of Their Wealth," *Historical Methods Newsletter*, V (1972), 49-52.

[9] It is of course impossible to fix precisely the "membership" of the elite, a group whose nature discourages quantitative efforts to weigh the relative significance of the diverse components that enter into its social makeup. My list is drawn from the memberships of the great social clubs of the era, such as the Philadelphia Club, the Somerset Club in Boston, the Union Clubs in New York City and Brooklyn; the families that figure prominently in the diaries kept by such men as Philip Hone, Gabriel Furman, Samuel Breck, and Sidney George Fisher; persons treated as having lofty status in contemporary memoirs or nine-

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The question is to what extent did such socioeconomic elites meet Dahl's definition of a ruling elite: "a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of difference . . . on key political issues."[10]

I

In order to discern changing trends in the period, I have divided the second quarter of the nineteenth century in two, with 1837 the middle year. Insofar as the data were available, the tables on occupations record average percentages based on almost every year from 1825 to 1850 rather than randomly selected years, reducing the risk that the generalizations about the era might be based on an unrepresentative or atypical sample.

TABLE 1

Occupations of Mayors, 1825-50 (in per cent)[a]

Occupation	*NYC*	*Brooklyn*[b]	*Boston*	*Philadelphia*
merchants	72	50	60	5-10
merchant/manufacturers		10		
lawyers	20	20	32	90-95
officials		15		
publishers	4			
wholesale grocers		5		
artisans-manufacturers	4		8	

[a] In this and in the tables that follow, repeaters, or men reelected in the annual municipal elections that were the norm, are treated as new officeholders for each subsequent term. Treating a man elected a number of times as though he were one officeholder is misleading; men of high-status occupation typically were reelected more often than were those of less prestige.

[b] Includes the years prior to 1834 when Brooklyn was a village whose chief officer was the "president."

teenth-century local histories written by reliable authors. Given the elusive and subjective character of elite status, the mere attribution of such status by competent authorities is itself a suggestion that the rating may be warranted. For so objective a condition as wealth, on the other hand, contemporary attributions are no help at all. For a fuller discussion of the matter see Edward Pessen, "At the Conjunction of History and Sociology: The Lifestyle of Antebellum Elites," Paper to be delivered at the American Historical Association meeting, New Orleans, December 1972.

[10] Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (1958), 464.

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Throughout the period, there is no discernible change in the kind of men who sat in the mayor's office; they were almost invariably merchants or lawyers. Philadelphians rarely chose other than attorneys; New York City favored merchants. Brooklyn and Boston elected first the one, then the other. These were unusually wealthy men of relatively high status. In the early 1830s, a "master builder," Charles A. Wells, managed to be chosen mayor of Boston, sandwiched between such eminences as Harrison Gray Otis and Theodore Lyman Jr. Wells was no ordinary mechanic, however, since his assessed wealth placed him among the richest one per cent of taxpayers, the lofty plateau of wealth occupied by most mayors of the period.

Elite representation in political office varied in the four cities. The wealthy Philadelphians who occupied the mayor's office, for the most part, did not belong to the city's greatest families; George M. Dallas, mayor in the late 1820s, was very much the exception. Boston was another story. In the first part of the period, Josiah Quincy, Harrison Gray Otis, and Theodore Lyman Jr., eminences all, were mayors, while Quincy's son and Samuel A. Eliot occupied the office for half of the second period. Brooklyn's diverse elite of old Dutch families and later migrants from New England and elsewhere were represented in the office by the very rich General Jeremiah Johnson in the late 1830s and the highly successful lawyers and men of affairs Henry C. Murphy and Edward Copland in the 1840s. New York City had a distinctive pattern. For most of the period before 1837, mayors came from such esteemed families as the Bownes and the Lawrences, two great Long Island lines that had long intermarried. Philip Hone, mayor in 1826, was an example of the new elite—wealthy, active in a great variety of exclusive and socially purposive organizations, and near the center of a social world inhabited by great figures in commerce, the professions, and the city's lore. In the 1840s such mayors as James Harper, the publisher, William F. Havemeyer, the sugar merchant, and Caleb Woodhull, the attorney, were representatives of the prestige of relatively recent achievement rather than of distinguished family.

The backgrounds of municipal legislators were more diverse. During the period 1825-37, the occupational distribution for each

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TABLE 2

Occupations of City Councils and Boards of Aldermen 1825-37 (in per cent)[a]

			Boston		Philadelphia[b]	
Occupation	*NYC*	*Brooklyn*	*Aldermen*	*Council*	*Select Council*	*Common Council*
merchants	28	34	43	32	26	28
"gentlemen"					16	9
bankers, insurance company executives, brokers	2		6	4	6	
businessmen, publishers	13	2	17	14	4	5
owners of yards, buildings, wharves, builders, shipbuilders	4	10	4	6		4
manufacturers	3	13	3	4	10	4
attorneys	20	10	11	15	25	11
physicians	3		3	2		5
officials, military & naval officers, ship captains	1	2	3	3	1	3
engineers, accountants, printers	1	2		1		
grocers, distillers, butchers, bakers, druggists, retailers	14	16	3	6	7	13
artisan-entrepreneurs	6		1	7	1	7
artisans, mechanics	6	8	3	7	3	10
farmers		2				

[a] Because fractions have been dropped, not all columns sum to 100.

[b] The period covered for Philadelphia extends to 1840.

city was unique. Lawyers constituted 25 per cent of Philadelphia's select council, for example, while they constituted only 10 per cent of the trustees of Brooklyn village and of the chartered city of Brooklyn. In very few cases was an occupation represented by precisely the same proportion of officeholders in more than one city, and yet the overall configurations were not markedly dissimilar. Merchants, corporate and financial officials, and varied types of

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businessmen comprised more than half the governing bodies—when Philadelphia's "gentlemen" category, composed in large part of retired merchants, is included. One-fifth of New York City's aldermen and not quite 15 per cent of the two houses of Boston's legislature were lawyers. The number of manufacturers typically hovered around the 5 per cent mark, while the percentage of retail storekeepers, some of them quite wealthy, ranged from 5 per cent in Boston to almost 15 per cent in New York City. Craftsmen or artisans made up 10 per cent of the Philadelphia common council and closer to 5 per cent in the other cities. Unskilled laborers, who together with journeymen mechanics constituted roughly three-fifths of urban populations, were not to be found in office. The occupations of common men were barely visible in the politics of the first part of the era which bears their name.

Wealth was inordinately represented in office in the years before 1838. For the entire quarter-century, mayors almost without exception belonged to the upper one per cent of taxpayers.[11] In the years before 1838, 75 per cent of Brooklyn's trustees and aldermen, who can be identified, were rich. For the other cities, the rate of representation by men of wealth was not as great, and in two of them it declined significantly if not drastically between 1825 and 1838. In Philadelphia, three out of four select councilmen were rich men, both at the beginning and the end of the 1830s, while the proportion actually rose in the common coun-

[11] Unless otherwise indicated in the text, the "rich" for each city but Philadelphia are the families that were among the wealthiest one per cent of taxpayers. Boston's rich were isolated from the annual *List of Persons, Copartnerships, and Corporations who were Taxed twenty-five Dollars and Upwards in the City of Boston*, published by the city's board of assessors during the era. For the New York City and Brooklyn lists and how they were constructed, see Edward Pessen, "The Wealthiest New Yorkers of the Jacksonian Era: A New List," *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, LIV (1970), 145-72; and Pessen, "A Social and Economic Portrait of Jacksonian Brooklyn: Inequality, Social Immobility, and Class Distinction in the Nation's Seventh City," *ibid.*, LV (1971), 318-53. The list of Philadelphia rich is drawn from *Memoirs and Auto-Biography of Some of the Wealthy Citizens of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1846); there is some question as to the comprehensiveness and the accuracy of the wealth estimates made by this source. For a discussion of its usefulness, nevertheless, as a clue to Philadelphia wealth, see Edward Pessen, "The Egalitarian Myth and the American Social Reality: Wealth, Mobility, and Equality in the 'Era of the Common Man,'" *American Historical Review*, LXXVI (1971), 995-96, n. 18.

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cil during that decade, going from about one-third to three-fifths. The rich constituted slightly more than 50 per cent of Boston's aldermen, a body of eight, in the 1830s as they had in the 1820s, but in the common council, a more plebian body six times as large, the percentage of rich dropped from 42 to 33 per cent. And in New York, where rich men had comprised two-thirds of the aldermen in 1826, the proportion fell to one-half in 1831 and to about three-eighths in 1837.

Some members of the elite served in local legislatures, but not many. Members of several great commercial families sat in the Philadelphia council: Eyres, Masseys, and Wetherills, next to Duanes, Bories, Lippincotts, Rawles, and Merediths, whose status was perhaps higher. New York City had Motts, Schieffelins, Nevinses, Roosevelts, Bensons, Van Schaicks; Brooklyn had Van Nostrands, Thornes, Furmans, Hickses, Hegemans, Polhemuses, and Bergens; and Boston had Lorings, Grays, Lowells, Everetts, Shaws, Reveres, Winthrops, Prescotts, and Peabodys. In the second part of the period, ending at mid-century, elite representation held fairly firm in Boston as it did in Brooklyn: Crowninshields, Bigelows, Coolidges, Gardners, Cushings, and Frothinghams stepped in to serve the former city, while Ryersons, Boerums, Leffertses, and Van Voorhises took office in Brooklyn. There was a slight falling off in Philadelphia, despite the appearance in the councils of Gilpins, Brecks, Bartons, Binneys, and the great merchant Thomas Pym Cope. In New York City, Caleb Woodhull and Gouverneur Ogden alone served to replace the men of eminent families who had departed the board of aldermen and assistant aldermen in the 1840s.

The occupations of councilmen shifted during the 1840s in a noticeably plebeian direction. The pattern was not entirely consistent, however. Although the numbers of merchants and lawyers fell sharply in New York and slightly in Boston, the proportion rose in Philadelphia and Brooklyn. While manufacturers became more numerous, the "entrepreneurial pattern" of New Haven was hardly matched in the great northeastern cities, since nowhere did the group comprise more than, roughly, one-tenth of elected officials. The most significant change was the increase in artisans. By 1850, skilled workers made up more than one-tenth of the aldermen of New York City and of the "lower houses" of Boston

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TABLE 3
Occupations of City Councils and Boards of Aldermen
1838-50 (in per cent)[a]

Occupation	NYC	Brooklyn	Boston		Philadelphia[b]	
			Aldermen	Council	Select Council	Common Council
merchants	15	42	28	29	42	37
"gentlemen"					4	4
bankers, insurance company executives, brokers	3		1	6		1
businessmen, publishers	18	4	21	16	5	1
owners of yards, buildings, wharves, builders, shipbuilders	6	14	4	6		
manufacturers	9	7	7	3	3	13
attorneys	11	13	13	5	28	13
physicians	1		1	1		2
officials, military & naval officers, ship captains	4		3	4		3
engineers, accountants, printers	1			4		
grocers, distillers, butchers, bakers, druggists, retailers	14	18	1	6	16	15
artisan-entrepreneurs	7	1	13	8	2	2
artisans, mechanics	10	1	8	10	2	9
laborers, farmers						

[a] Because fractions have been dropped, not all columns sum to 100.
[b] The period covered for Philadelphia is 1840-50.

and Philadelphia. These changes, while significant, did not quite produce the proletarianization of city government. The occupations of officeholders at mid-century remained unrepresentative of how most city residents earned their livelihoods. The distortion between governors and governed had lessened, however.

The proportion of rich men in urban councils also declined during the 1840s. Whereas in 1846, 83 per cent of Philadelphia's se-

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lect council and 60 per cent of the common council were members of wealthy families, by 1850 only one-half the members of the former body and 15 per cent of the latter were from rich families. At five-year intervals between 1838 and 1848 the percentage of rich men in Boston's common council declined from 29 per cent to 25 per cent and finally to 17 per cent. The falling off in New York City between 1838-50 was from 38 per cent to 25 per cent. Brooklyn too became less of a "plutocracy" during the decade, although in 1850, one-half of the aldermen who can be identified remained among the richest men in the community. Although their numbers diminished significantly during the 1840s, rich men at mid-century continued to be inordinately represented in urban government.

II

What accounted for the disproportionate involvement of wealthy men in antebellum urban government, on the one hand, and the perceptible diminution of this involvement with the passage of time, on the other? One explanation for the preponderance of the well-to-do is the amazing extent of "horizontal mobility" among the poor. In addition to barring them from political participation because they could not meet residence requirements, the inordinate footlooseness of the poor appears to have produced in them a lack of concern for community affairs most unlike the feelings of the more stable and substantial elements in the community.[12]

Moreover, neither particular electoral reforms, such as broadening the suffrage, nor general changes in the provisions of city charters appears to have had very much to do either with the undue representation of rich men in city councils throughout the

[12] Peter R. Knights, *The Plain People of Boston: 1830-1860 A Study in City Growth* (New York, 1971); Michael B. Katz, 5; Robert Doherty, "Property Distribution in Jacksonian America," Unpublished paper read at the annual meeting of the OAH, Apr. 19, 1971, New Orleans; Stuart Blumin, "The Restless Citizen: Vertical Mobility, Migration, and Social Participation in Mid-Nineteenth Century America," A 1970 unpublished version of a paper presented at the Conference on Social Science Concepts in American Political History, Oct. 24, 1969, Brockport, N. Y.; Stephan Thernstrom and Peter R. Knights, "Men in Motion: Some Data and Speculations about Urban Population Mobility in Nineteenth-Century America," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, I (1970), 29-30.

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era or the falling off of their direct participation in the 1840s. Before 1854, councilmen in Philadelphia were chosen in general elections that made possible the selection of men concentrated in high-value residential districts. In Boston, New York City, and Brooklyn, councilmen were elected in separate ward elections.[13] Most of these wards were inhabited primarily by men of little property. Yet the social and economic standing of elected officials was quite similar, whether they were elected from a general ticket or in a series of separate contests.

Poor men of little property had won the right to vote *before* the beginning of the period. By 1822, New York City male residents who were "five dollar taxpayers" were eligible to vote for councilmen. After its incorporation as a city, the same year, Boston granted the vote to all taxpayers. While this system did bar transients and men of no property whatever, it nevertheless enfranchised a voting population composed predominantly of poor men. By the late 1830s, all white Philadelphia males of 21 were granted the vote in local elections; the taxpayer qualification that had prevailed earlier, based on the charter of 1790, has been appraised by scholars as approximating universal manhood suffrage. The wealthy men elected to office in the late 1820s and 1830s were elected by relatively poor voters. The decrease in the number of wealthy councilmen during the 1840s was due to other

[13] The discussion of electoral and other provisions of city charters is based primarily on facts drawn from the following sources: Edward P. Allinson and Boies Penrose, *Philadelphia 1681-1887: A History of Municipal Development* (Philadelphia, 1887); Eli K. Price, *The Hstory of the Consolidation of the City of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1873); James McKellar Bugbee, "Boston Under the Mayors, 1822-1880," in Justin Winsor, ed., *The Memorial History of Boston* (Boston, 1881), III, 217-92; C. W. Ernst, *The Constitutional History of Boston* (Boston, 1894); Josiah Quincy, *A Municipal History of the Town and City of Boston* (Boston, 1852); Henry H. Sprague, *City Government in Boston, Its Rise and Development* (Boston, 1890); John Koren, *Boston, 1822 to 1922: The Story of Its Government and Principal Activities During One Hundred Years* (Boston, 1923); Arthur W. MacMahon, *The Statutory Sources of New York City Government* (New York, 1923); Sidney I. Pomerantz, *New York An American City 1783-1803: A Study of Urban Life* (New York, 1938); Frederick Shaw, *History of the New York City Legislature* (New York, 1954); Ralph Foster Weld, *Brooklyn Village 1816-1834* (New York, 1938); and Henry R. Stiles, *Civil, Political, Professional and Ecclesiastical History and Commercial and Industrial Record of the County of Kings and the City of Brooklyn New York from 1683 to 1884* (New York, 1884).

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things than a change in the socioeconomic composition of the electorates. What was true of antebellum Natchez became increasingly true of antebellum New York City, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and Boston: "The situation was not that rich men tried for office and were defeated: very few of them even offered as candidates."[14] Those who did "offer" were rarely of the group I have elsewhere called the "richest of the rich." Thomas Pym Cope and Robert Gould Shaw, the latter a great merchant of Boston, were exceptions.

In the 1830s, the election of the mayor was transferred from the council to the people in Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and New York City. And yet, as we have seen, mayors elected by the people were of as high status and were as wealthy as mayors elected by the council. The mayor's office carried with it a yearly salary that ranged from $2,000 to $3,000 and perquisites worth several times as much.[15] Philip Hone's comment on New York City's council—"where there is much to do and no pay . . ."—applied equally to the councils of the other cities.[16] The comparatively good salary of the one office and the nonexistent salary of the other appear to explain little about who offered themselves as candidates. According to the argument made in that era by the British Chartists —*a variation on a critique dating back to Roman antiquity*—offices without salary would invariably be filled by the rich, who alone could afford to hold them. Yet richer men ran for the well-salaried mayoralty than for the nonsalaried council. As a matter of fact, poor men could serve on antebellum city councils because they seldom met; typically, meetings were held from one to four times a month and, even more important, at night, after working hours. Poor men did not hold office, however, not because it was impossible for them to attend, but because they were not nominated. The diminishing representation of the rich and the eminent suggests that membership in the council exerted no irresistible pull on these men.

The mayoralty held greater appeal because combined with the greater prestige of the office was a potential power that for all the inherent weaknesses of the office permitted a man of force and

[14] James, 91.

[15] Martha Lamb and Mrs. Burton Harrison, *History of the City of New York* (New York, 1877-96), III, 471.

[16] Diary of Philip Hone, New York Historical Society, New York City, XX, 419.

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stature such as Josiah Quincy to place his own imprint on it. But what attraction could the city council or board of aldermen hold for great figures in view of the slight part played by any one member in the performance of its tasks and the limited and prosaic nature of these tasks?

After he completed his term as mayor, Philip Hone showed no interest in sitting on the council. When a crisis arose in the winter of 1828-29, however, Hone did agree to preside over a meeting of the third ward, "to adopt measures to relieve the distress of the poor in the present inclement season."[17] Let an issue of critical importance arise and the very rich and the eminent displayed a lively interest in political participation. In 1829, perhaps one-half of New York City's 28 aldermen were rich men, with only 3 worth at least the $100,000 that placed them among the super rich. Possibly 7 or 8 were among the city's socioeconomic elite. Yet when meetings were called and delegates elected that spring to attend a convention that would consider the vitally important matter of changes in the city charter, Hone and a large number of other notables participated. Despite the fact that delegates to a planning meeting were elected by ward, 60 per cent of those elected were wealthy men, most of them of prominent family. The rich and the eminent comprised 80 per cent of the 70 convention delegates elected, five from each ward. Lambert Suydam, Evert Bancker, Peter Augustus Jay, Garret Storm, Robert Bogardus, Effingham Schieffelin, John Hone, Stephen Allen, John Bradhurst, Cornelius Schuyler, M. M. Quackenboss, Philip Hone, and dozens of other men of high status were elected. According to Hone's diary entry, what moved him to action was not the prospect of public activity: he had more than enough of such diversions. Rather, he had "an apprehension that the mistaken zeal of some persons concerned might lead to violent and indiscreet measures."[18]

Not that the duties of urban government were unimportant. Modern historians may find it hard to write dramatic accounts of the problems of police and fire protection, water supply, public health, garbage disposal, poor relief, regulation of markets, street maintenance and lighting, harbors and wharves, building codes,

[17] *Ibid.*, I, 240.
[18] *Ibid.*, II, 27, 31, 66-67.

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tax assessments, and tax collection. These were nonetheless significant responsibilities. No doubt the ineffable blandness of much urban history derives from the routine and neutral quality of so much of what municipal government did, useful as it was to persons of whatever status. And yet, for all the undramatic character of these problems, the particular manner of treating them could and did reflect conflicts of interest. Whether the city chose to improve harbors or to keep working-class districts clean depended on whether preponderant influence as well as representation was possessed by the urban rich and business classes. For, influence and power are manifested, above all, in the actions of government.

III

Detailed and comprehensive modern studies of municipal governments' policies and enactments in the antebellum period remain to be done. There is, however, substantial evidence available, and its burden is fairly clear. Antebellum cities were governed largely by the propertied for the propertied. Municipal budgets were minuscule largely because wealthy taxpayers were known to be unwilling to pay more. Wealth was notoriously underassessed because rich men insisted that it be.[19] Public outdoor and indoor relief was administered by well-to-do guardians, its scope limited by the parsimony of the great taxpayers, the attendant dissemination of conservative social doctrine reflective of their values.[20] What government did not do is as instructive as what it did do; detailed itemizations of municipal expenditures reveal much. Comparatively little money was allotted to social services. Social inequities and pervasive misery were not simply dealt with in a niggardly way; they were treated as the wages of sin and of individual fault. In Boston, far more money was spent on street repairs and sewers. Street improvements were a matter of broad public interest, to be sure, yet most contemporaries agreed that prosperous districts got the first, the most, and the

[19] For detailed documentation of this point, see Pessen, "The Egalitarian Myth," 998, n. 23; and Pessen, "The Wealthiest New Yorkers," 150-51, nn. 8-9.

[20] See, letter of Samuel A. Eliot to the mayors of New York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, New York City Board of Aldermen, City Clerk Filed Papers, Location 2990.

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best attention.[21]

The history of each city contains numerous examples of the special sensitivity municipal governments showed their wealthiest constituents. In New York City, valuable real estate in the form of wharves and "water grants" was leased on easy terms or sold cheaply to members of the Astor, Lorillard, Lenox, Schermerhorn, Havemeyer, Roosevelt, Colden, Bowne, and Goelet families. And aldermen subsequently granted special rights solicited by wealthy owners or lessees.[22] In Brooklyn, opposition by merchants to the special assessment necessary to finance a proposed sewer system on a major thoroughfare succeeded in blocking the project. Mayor Henry C. Murphy, high-minded member of Brooklyn's elite, complained in the 1840s that the city's legislators were indifferent to health problems in poor sections.[23] Unhappy because their city's per capita public expenditures on poor relief in the mid-1820s were almost double the New York City rate, Philadelphia's leaders succeeded, in part by a "more careful screening of applicants," in reducing total costs over the next two decades despite a doubling in the city's population.[24] During the same period, the city's businessmen and politicians lobbied for and helped finance the transportation improvements likely to promote their business prospects.[25] In Boston, men like Harrison Gray Otis cut back expenditures for a proposed expansion of the sewer system, since, "living on well-drained Beacon Hill," they saw little purpose in it. A mayor such as Josiah Quincy was more public spirited and gets higher marks than Otis from a modern historian of Boston. Yet to both mayors, the city was "primarily a place of business, a

[21] Raymond A. Mohl, *Poverty in New York, 1783-1825* (New York, 1971), 72, *passim*; Benjamin J. Klebaner, "The Home Relief Controversy in Philadelphia, 1782-1861," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXVIII (1954), 403-23; Charles Huse, *Financial History of Boston* (Boston, 1916), 12-13, appendix; Roger Lane, *Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 11-13; and Jacob Judd, "A City's Streets: A Case Study of Brooklyn, 1834-1855," *Journal of Long Island History*, IX (1969), 32-43.

[22] *List of Real Estate Belonging to the Corporation of the City of New York* (New York, 1838); *Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen, 1832-1833*, IV, 416-18; Gustavus Myers, *History of the Great American Fortunes* (Chicago, 1909), I, 148-50.

[23] Jacob Judd, "The History of Brooklyn, 1834-1855: Political and Administrative Aspects" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1959), 128.

[24] Klebaner, 405, 420-21.

[25] Warner, 79.

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port, a market and financial capital."[26] In Boston as in New York City, police expenditures were minimal and service pitifully incompetent when men of substance felt no need for better. The professionalization of police services and the high costs it entailed were delayed until lower-class ethnic riots and disorders posed a threat to the life and property of the privileged.[27]

Rich men and their interests did not invariably prevail. For one thing, the rich were not a monolithic class; nor did they conceive of themselves as such. The wealthy had diverse interests. The opposition of many property owners to an expensive improvement of Faneuil Hall, for example, did not stop Quincy from going ahead with it. Otis was compelled by "public demand" to maintain street cleaning operations he wanted to cut back. What is of interest is how often rich men won. A contemporary New Yorker explained their success in realistic terms: "Nearly every alderman has in some degree owed his success to the presonal efforts and influence of 'backers,' who must be recompensed for their services. This recompense sometimes consists in a return of political assistance. . . ."[28] It is more likely that the relatively substantial men who predominated in city government dealt with issues from the viewpoint of the property owners they themselves were. Until demonstrated otherwise, it appears more sensible to understand them to have been men honestly acting out their conviction that the prosperity of the city depended on the prosperity of its most successful residents, rather than to regard them as politically corrupt.

Whatever the reasons, wealthy men do appear to have had great power in urban government, their influence over local affairs far transcending their small numbers. While the super rich rarely sought office during the era, the presence in city councils and mayors' offices of substantial numbers of large property owners meant that the viewpoints and socioeconomic interests of wealth would have direct representation in government. That

[26] Lane, 26-27.

[27] James F. Richardson, "The Struggle to Establish a London-Style Police Force for New York City," *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, XLIX (1965), 175-98; Lane, *passim.*; Jacob Judd, "Policing the City of Brooklyn in the 1840s and 1850s," *Journal of Long Island History*, VI (1966), 13-22.

[28] [William A. Brewer], *A Few Thoughts for Tax Payers and Voters* (New York, 1853), 74.

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such representation declined in the 1840s is no sure sign that the influence of the rich suffered a similar diminution. Men of status, as Robert Zemsky has shown for colonial Massachusetts, need not be a majority in order to dominate.[29] Certainly the pattern of municipal legislation and policy does not suggest that the plebeian interest was more vigorously promoted in the latter part of the period.

There is no way of proving whether covert elites dominated antebellum cities in the way that Floyd Hunter has suggested they control the modern American city. For even if we stumbled across evidence the equivalent of Hunter's, in which some very influential men stated flatly that a given number of named individuals "ran the city," we would have no grounds for accepting such an assertion as authoritative. Robert Dahl has argued that, whatever the merits of Hunter's thesis—and Dahl grants it few—it is not applicable to antebellum New Haven, which was overtly controlled by a commercial and professional patriciate.[30] New York City, Brooklyn, Boston, and Philadelphia before 1850 were hardly governed by the kind of patriciate of old families that ostensibly ruled New Haven. The elite of the great northeastern cities governed, rather, the hundreds of voluntary associations that complemented and in some cases surpassed in importance the work of municipal political bodies. Politics was left to men of wealth but not the greatest wealth and to a sprinkling of elite family representatives, a combination that appears to have been sufficient to assure men of substance, whether they were of the social elite or not, that local governments not only would pose no threat but would be sympathetic to their interests.

IV

Discussions of politics in what historians continue to call the Jacksonian Era usually assign a central role to the major par-

[29] Robert M. Zemsky, "Power, Influence, and Status: Leadership Patterns in the Massachusetts Assembly, 1740-1755," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XXVI (1969), 502-20.

[30] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, 62-66, 117. See also Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven, 1963), for a vigorous critique of the Hunter thesis.

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ties. Certainly Democrats and Whigs competed vigorously for local offices. Occasionally contests between them became so hot that Whig and Democratic voters cracked one another's heads, most notably in New York City's local elections of 1834. Councilmen representing the one party or the other were not indifferent to their parties. At one point, Brooklyn Democrats voted against the continuation of the comptroller's office largely because Whigs had created the post.[31] Since rich men overwhelmingly preferred the Whigs to the Democrats,[32] it might seem that the wealthy men influential in local government can be equally well understood if they are treated as Whigs in local government. A recent study of antebellum Boston does precisely that, reporting that "the Common Council, Board of Aldermen, and other city posts were often filled by [wealthy] Whigs. . . ."[33] Assuredly wealthy Whigs often filled municipal posts in the other cities as well. The question is, is the behavior of such men serving in municipal offices better explained by their membership in the Whig party or by the fact of their wealth and standing.

The issues confronting local Whig and Democratic councilmen bore little relation to the matters agitating Martin Van Buren and Daniel Webster in Washington or Daniel Henshaw and William H. Seward in state capitals. James points out that national party alignments meant little in the city politics of antebellum Natchez; the same was true for the great northeastern cities.[34] Many of the rich men who sat in local legislatures were Democrats. Whigs were great winners in Boston elections during the 1830s and 1840s, while in New York City they were more often losers. Yet the socioeconomic composition of New York City's legislature was no more plebeian than Boston's. In Philadelphia, leading Democratic officeholders and political figures, such as Benjamin Richards, Richard Vaux, George Wharton, Henry D. Gilpin, were men of wealth. In Brooklyn, most of the Democratic candidates for council were local merchants and large property holders, as,

[31] Judd, "History of Brooklyn."

[32] Frank Otto Gatell, "Money and Party in Jacksonian America: A Quantitative Look at New York City's Men of Quality," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXI (1967), 235-52.

[33] Robert Rich, "'A Wilderness of Whigs': The Wealthy Men of Boston," *Journal of Social History*, IV (1971), 266.

[34] James, 94.

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for that matter, they were in a number of other cities. There is little evidence that the national party preferences of wealthy Democrats in municipal office led them to support policies and expenditures that were either distinctively Democratic or inimical to the interests of large property owners.[35]

Philip Hone so detested the Democrats that from the 1830s on he would not call the party by its rightful name. Yet he maintained close personal relations and often cooperated politically with such elitest "locofocos" as John Treat Irving, Stephen Allen, Walter Bowne, and Jonathan Coddington.[36] Evidence of similar cooperation in the other cities suggests that class attachments counted for more than party differences in determining the political—as it did the social—behavior of rich men.[37]

V

Some perspective on early nineteenth century urban politics can be had by examining the earlier political tradition. Men of wealth understood the significance of political power; as William Bingham, the fabled accumulator of Philadelphia, wrote: "The interests of commerce, as connected with politics, are so striking, that it is difficult to separate one from the other." From this it followed that political leaders should come, as an early eighteenth-century author had written, from "families of distinction, edu-

[35] Judd, "History of Brooklyn," 81; Warner, 82, 92; Joseph J. McCadden, "Roberts Vaux and His Associates in the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Public Schools," *Pennsylvania History*, III (1936), 10; Dahl, *Who Governs?*, 12, 18-19; John V. Mering, *The Whig Party in Missouri* (Columbia, Mo., 1967), 72, 83-84; *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, XL (1888), 141; Ralph D. Gray, "Henry D. Gilpin, A Pennsylvania Jacksonian," *Pennsylvania History*, XXXVII (1970), 340-51.

[36] Diary of Philip Hone, XIV, 30-31, *passim*.

[37] According to Robert Rich, eminent Bostonians who became Democrats lost their "elect status." His documentation for this assertion is a libel suit brought against the Democratic publicist George Bancroft by Daniel Webster, and a later reminiscence cited in the twentieth century; Rich, 268. Actually, bearers of Boston names of greater repute than Bancroft's managed to retain both their unusual Democratic affiliation and the elite status earned by their families before them. Most of the sources cited in n. 35 above give evidence of the insignificance of major party labels in the affairs of urban government. My impression is also based on my reading of the legislative histories recorded by local governments during the era.

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cation, and substance."[38] Practice, whether early or late in the colonial era, lived up to this theory. Modern studies of such towns as Salem and Kent reveal that both in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, political leadership correlated with wealth. Salem merchants, perhaps one-seventh the number of artisans, outnumbered artisans in government by five to one, as "political power fell in disproportionate share to men of wealth." As for Kent, the rule was clear: the higher the position, the wealthier its occupant. If the mass of officeholders were an economic cut above nonofficeholders, the town leaders "tend[ed] to be among the wealthiest men" of the community.[39]

Of particular interest are the earlier patterns in the four cities that have been considered in this essay. In his classic study of colonial urban society, Carl Bridenbaugh found that "the commercial, political, and social leadership of [all] the towns was in [the] hands" of a small commercial aristocracy.[40] Detailed investigations of each of the great northeastern cities tend to confirm the validity of Bridenbaugh's generalizations. A small, wealthy, largely Quaker oligarchy controlled the government of colonial Philadelphia.[41] Before 1776, property requirements confined the vote to the wealthiest 2 per cent of the population, yet the liberalization of the suffrage that followed the Revolution produced no great change in the social character of local officeholders. According to Sam Bass Warner, at the end of the eighteenth century, "the wealthy presided over a municipal regime of little government" whose power was confined to "the management of the markets and the holding of the Recorder's Court." Bridenbaugh had noted that such power was not insignificant in the minds of the wealthy merchants who controlled it, since it enabled them to

[38] Samuel Fisk, *The Character of the Candidate for Civil Government . . .* (Boston, 1731), 40, cited in Zemsky, 520; William Bingham to W. and J. Willink, cited in Margaret L. Brown, "William Bingham, Eighteenth Century Magnate," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LXI (1937), 388.

[39] Charles S. Grant, *Democracy in the Connecticut Frontier Town of Kent* (New York, 1961), 150-51; Donald Warner Koch, "Income Distribution and Political Structure in Seventeenth-Century Salem, Massachusetts," *Essex Institute Historical Collections*, CV (1969), 60-66.

[40] Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in America* (New York, 1938), 478-79.

[41] Frederic B. Tolles, *Meeting House and Counting House: The Quaker Merchants of Colonial Philadelphia, 1682-1763* (Chapel Hill, 1948), 117.

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"throttle economic competition from below."[42] Regardless of the breadth of their voting constituencies or the scope of their powers, the men who were mayors, aldermen, or members of the common council early and late in the eighteenth century were predominantly of the great families of Philadelphia. Both before and after 1750, the city was ruled by Willings, Shippens, Biddles, Mifflins, Morrises, Hopkinsons, Chews, Cadwaladers, Binghams, Duchés, Powels, Emlens, and Tilghmans.[43]

The politics of colonial Boston have not been as thoroughly examined by modern researchers as the politics of its two great commercial rivals. Recent studies of related themes do nothing to weaken Bridenbaugh's earlier conclusion that Boston too was dominated by a commercial "aristocracy."[44] Lists of officers of Brooklyn and the neighboring village of Flatbush reveal that the old Dutch families of the eighteenth century also ruled in the nineteenth. Lotts, Boerums, Vanderveers, Wyckoffs, Couwenhovens, Rapelyes, Strykers, Hegemans, Leffertses, and Gerritsons were the supervisors, treasurers, and chief clerks of the town.

Two recent detailed studies of the socioeconomic status of New York City councilmen and other officials reveal that the same pattern applied to New York from 1689 to 1815.[45] All during the colonial period, a disproportionate number of councilmen were from the upper occupational strata—merchants, lawyers, large landowners. From 1689 to 1733, 44 per cent of the identifiable councilmen were of the "occupational elite," while the remaining

[42] Carl and Jessica Bridenbaugh, *Rebels and Gentlemen: Philadelphia in the Age of Franklin* (New York, 1942), 13; Sam Bass Warner, 9; Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness*, 362; Tolles, 43, 117-19; E. Digby Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class* (New York, 1958), 79; Struthers Burt, *Philadelphia, Holy Experiment* (London, n.d.), 261.

[43] *The Minutes of the Common Council of the City of Philadelphia, 1704 to 1776* (Philadelphia, 1847).

[44] Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness*, 479, *passim*. See also Zemsky; James A. Henretta, "Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial Boston," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XXII (1965), 79-92.

[45] Bruce M. Wilkenfeld, "The New York City Common Council, 1689-1800," *New York History*, LII (1971), 249-74, examines the occupations and a few indices of "status." Edmund Willis, "Social Origins of Political Leadership in New York City from the Revolution to 1815" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1967), is an extraordinarily broad-gauged quantitative study that considers ten significant criteria.

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56 per cent were of the "middle occupational range"—carpenters, bolters, bakers, innkeepers. Between 1733 and the outbreak of the Revolution, the proportion of councilmen from the occupational elite rose to slightly more than 50 per cent. There was also a rise in the status of officeholders, as measured by religious affiliations, occupations, and previous offices held by their fathers. Skipping over the war years, when the city was controlled by the British, to 1784-1800, the data show slight changes occurred in the occupations and status of officeholders. Forty-seven per cent of the council were of "upper occupational groups," as were 57 per cent of the aldermen.[46] In the generation or one-third of a century after the Revolution, "mechanics" made up one-half of the city's elected officials, with merchants and lawyers equally dividing the other half. These mechanics were hardly ordinary working men, however, since their median wealth almost matched that of the merchants, and a "significant portion" of them were bank and insurance company directors. Measured by a variety of criteria, New York City's officeholders "constituted an elite."[47] As they did in Philadelphia, property restrictions on voting doubtless played an important part in accounting for the disproportionate representation of upper-class New Yorkers in colonial city government; yet even after the post-Revolutionary suffrage liberalization, only a tiny fragment of the eligible voting population cast ballots in the "charter elections" of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[48]

The role of tradition should not be discounted in attempting to explain the socioeconomic standing of nineteenth-century urban officeholders. The eighteenth-century "habit" of electing merchants and lawyers of high status and mechanics, whose wealth and backgrounds indicate they are better classified as entrepreneurs than as workingmen, continued to be followed in the nineteenth century. The enlarged, increasingly plebeian electorate of the later time continued to look for leadership from among men of substance, as the election returns from poor wards often indicate.[49]

[46] Wilkenfeld, 256-57, 263-73.

[47] Willis, 280, 167, 171, 333.

[48] Pomerantz is masterful on changing voting requirements.

[49] Professor Ira M. Leonard of Southern Connecticut State College, who is engaged in a study of New York City politics at mid-century, advises me that the "elite" appear to have tried to reassert in the 1850s the kind of direct influence they had exercised in the 1820s and 1830s.

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VI

The great political influence exercised by substantial property owners in the second quarter of the nineteenth century was evidently not a phenomenon confined to the great cities of the northeastern seaboard. Small towns elsewhere in the northeast, in the south, and in the west exhibit similar patterns. Along the "urban frontier," in the youthful cities, "the mercantile class presided over urban affairs." In Cincinnati, after the democratization of the suffrage in 1827, as before, wealthy bankers, merchants, and lawyers controlled government in a city marked by an "indisputable connection between the policies of the City Council and the interests of the wealthier inhabitants." Natchez's selectmen "usually came of two bourgeois categories, young lawyers . . . and the 'rising entrepreneurs.' " Despite its democratic suffrage, Natchez was dominated by a small upper crust. Aldermen in Springfield, Massachusetts in 1850 were primarily lawyers, bankers, business men and merchants, manufacturers, and builders. Representation by artisans and workmen, who had constituted slightly more than 30 per cent of the total, shrank to 6 per cent over the next two decades as the town's economic development brought it closer to the character of its great neighbors in the antebellum period.[50]

In contrast to the beliefs expressed by Chevalier, Tocqueville, and Sidney George Fisher, the "more affluent classes" and "those who carried on the business of the country" had a great deal of influence over the government of the nation's cities during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The political scientist Norton E. Long has written that American government "places its fundamental politics out of the reach of its formal politics."[51] Men of property had so direct a control over the government of the antebellum community as to place the "fundamental politics" well within the reach of the "formal politics." In view of the power and influence they commanded over the economic, social, and political life of antebellum cities, the rich appear to have been

[50] Frisch, 282, 284-85; James, 92-94; Aaron, 113; Richard C. Wade, *The Urban Frontier* (Chicago, 1959), 209. Michael B. Katz has shown that in the small town of Hamilton, Ontario, a similar pattern prevailed in which "the wealthy monopolized local political offices" at mid-century: "the connection between wealth and political power was clear"; Katz, 9.

[51] Norton E. Long, "Political Science and the City," in Leo F. Schnore, ed., *Social Science and the City: A Survey of Urban Research* (New York, 1968), 247.

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a true "governing class."[52] Despite his possession of the suffrage, the common man had little influence, let alone power, in the nation's cities during the era named in his honor.

[52] William Domhoff defines a "governing class" as a "social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of a country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of a country's yearly income, and contributes a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country"; Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (New York, 1967), 5. Domhoff's definition is unsatisfactory, since what is "disproportionate" is not necessarily substantial or decisive. And, as Polsby has noted, a "disproportionate number" does not automatically act in its own "interest." A more precise and at the same time a bolder definition is required, one that indicates more clearly the kind or amount of disproportionate influence a "governing class" exercises.

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Israel and the Third World

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A new dimension has been added during the past two years to the tortuous drama of peacemaking in the Middle East with the decision by the Organization of African Unity, represented by four distinguished heads of state—Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, and Yakubu Gowan of Nigeria—to take an active role in the attempts to find a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. While the attempts have not thus far borne fruit, they have drawn attention to the growing importance of Israel's relations with that amorphous group of nations (almost 70 per cent of humanity) known as the Third World.

When Israel came into existence in 1948, the concept of a Third World was just being born out of the travail of Yugoslavia's bold defiance of Stalinist domination and India's first steps to establish her own identity as an independent nation. Since then the ranks of Third World countries have swelled greatly, but so have the differences among them, leaving as their major common characteristic a passion for rapid development.

For Israel the emergence of the Third World has presented both a challenge and an opportunity. Gaining the acceptance and if possible the friendship of these nations provided the challenge; the opportunity lay in transforming Israel's own quest for speedy

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progress and her recent experience in bringing it to fruition into usable know-how for other nations.

Unlike most of the new states which had come into being after World War II, Israel's very right to existence has been disputed since the first day of independence. Acceptance by the community of nations was for Israel, therefore, more than a matter of prestige—it quickly became an insurance policy for survival. Without it, an isolated Israel, at best, would have withered on the vine; with it, she has been able to defend herself successfully against attack and has found, in turn, opportunities for making her own contribution to the world community.

Israel's ties to the Third World occupy a major place in the country's foreign relations. Her "presence" in some African countries is as prominent as that of leading Western powers, and about one-third of her foreign ministry's budget goes to support a far-flung program of cooperation with developing countries. But three recent events indicate Israel's deep involvement most clearly: the appearance of four leading African statesmen in the halls of the Israeli parliament; the announcement of a forthcoming visit by Chile's President Salvador Allende; and—in a nonpolitical context—the graduation of the fifteen thousandth participant from one of many Israeli training courses for developing countries. To understand the full scope of these ties as well as the related risks and uncertainties, we must look at their evolution over the past 23 years.

Early Contacts

During the early period of statehood, the Third World played a minor role in Israeli foreign policy. The nonaligned world in those days primarily consisted of countries like India, Yugoslavia, Burma, and Egypt, Israel's sworn enemy. Nehru and Tito were both decidedly cool toward Israel, preferring to cultivate relations with Nasser. Unofficial contacts with Indians and Yugoslavs, primarily through trade-union and professional channels, were cordial but limited. The most significant contact was established by Israel's dominant Mapai Labor party, which took an active role in a loosely functioning association of Asian Socialist parties. It was, in fact, this early association at party and trade-

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union levels which led to Israel's first official contacts in Asia.

At an Asian Socialist conference in Rangoon in 1953, Israel's representative Moshe Sharett, a prominent member of the Mapai party and then Israel's foreign minister, took the opportunity to conduct discussions with Burmese officials. These talks led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the appointment of Israel's first ambassador to an Asian country—David Hacohen, a leading trade-union and Mapai official. One of the first consequences of the new relationship was an agreement on technical cooperation whereby Israel sent experts and advisers in a number of fields to Burma and organized training and observation visits in Israel for Burmese officials and technicians. While the emphasis in this agreement was on agriculture, cooperation extended also to the military sphere, Israel providing training for air force ground crews and other army technicians. In the spring of 1955, Prime Minister U Nu paid a visit to Israel, where he received a tumultuous welcome, and further expansion of contacts followed.

A few years later Israel's technical cooperation program was greatly expanded, but the basic politico-economic conditions which favored its expansion were already discernible in the Burma-Israel connection. There was the desire of both countries to broaden their international contacts and to break out of the mold which history and geography had imposed upon them in the past. There was the fact that Israel, a small country, offered no threat of political or economic domination. And, last but not least, there were Israel's social and economic achievements, her mixed public and private economy, and her socialist experimentation that acted like powerful magnets for the struggling new nations.

In this pre-Suez period a different set of circumstances determined the development of Israel's relations with Latin America. Unlike the countries of Asia and most of Africa, the Latin countries were sovereign states at the time Israel achieved statehood in 1948. Two-thirds of them had supported the UN resolution of November 29, 1947 on the partition of Palestine which became the legal charter for Israel's independence and its acceptance into the United Nations. Two Latin American delegates to the UN, Professor Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat of Uruguay and Jorge

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Garcia-Granados of Guatemala, served on the UN Special Committee on Palestine which recommended the partition plan and were among its foremost advocates during the long UN debate. Diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic missions followed quickly upon Israel's independence.

Although relations with most of the Latin countries were cordial, they remained limited and were confined largely to political matters. Trade was insignificant and Israeli technical assistance a distant thought. The primary bases on which friendship with these countries rested during this early period were sentiment, that is, Latin American sympathy for the survivors of Hitler's holocaust; a certain attachment to the "People of the Book," based on a common Judeo-Christian heritage; and United States support for the continued existence of the Jewish state. The latter was perhaps decisive, for at that time most of the Latin countries usually followed United States policy.

Thus, on the eve of the 1956 Suez crisis, Israel had no articulated policy toward the Third World. Relations with Latin America were submerged in the U.S.-Israel relationship, and the newer nations of Asia and Africa for the most part either gave Israel a cold shoulder or had not yet come into being.

Fashioning a Third World Policy

The trauma of Israel's 1956 preventive war, in concert with France and Great Britain, against Egypt radically changed Israel's vision of the world. On the one hand, she became painfully aware of her vulnerability to big-power pressure and to international condemnation. On the other, she saw in the opening up of the Gulf of Aqaba a long sought chance to break the chains of isolation which the Arab countries had forged around her and a historic chance to follow in the Solomonic tradition of building ties with the lands to the east. Simultaneous with this change in Israel's own perception came the increasing pace of decolonization in Asia and Africa. In line with Israel's basic policy goal of seeking the recognition of the world community, establishing contacts with these ex-colonial countries was a political necessity. The Sinai victory made it a practical and challenging opportunity.

In the decade that followed, Israel sought to establish cordial

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relations with all the newly emerging nations. With few exceptions—the newly independent Arab and Moslem states, such as Pakistan or Mauritania—she succeeded. The key to this achievement certainly cannot be found in Israel's attractiveness as a political partner; some countries, in fact, in maintaining friendship with Israel risk political or economic repercussions from Arab nations. It is not explained by Israel's minimal economic power, nor by sentimental attachments nor by big-power leadership. The source of the friendship between Israel and the new nations of Africa and Asia has been Israel's ability to provide fresh, useful experience and assistance in economic and social development. As President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya has said, Israelis "have shown what a small country can do for itself through hard work and faith in its destiny. The good example of Israel has been a useful lesson which other developing countries are trying to follow."[1]

Characteristics of the Cooperation Program

Two salient features distinguish the Israeli international cooperation program: the almost total focus on technical assistance and the emphasis on cooperation. The concentration on the former, brought on by financial necessity rather than by choice, greatly limits the scope of the Israeli effort and complicates enormously the task of project preparation and implementation. Yet it is an inescapable fact of Israel's political and economic life; she cannot afford to lend or grant funds for capital projects. Israel's outlay for the program is reportedly under $10 million per year, almost all of it going to the nuts and bolts of technical assistance—training experts, and some small amounts for support items like seeds and tools. This compares to annual outlays (in 1969) of $40 million for Denmark or $15.6 million for Norway.

The funding limitation has been a severe handicap for the Israeli planners as well as their local partners. It has forced them to concentrate on relatively small projects—often of an experimental or demonstration character—to require more than the customary sharing of costs by the local partners, and also to seek financial support from third sources, such as OECD, IDB, OAS, and

[1] Quoted in *Israel, Africa, Colonialism and Racism* (New York, American Jewish Congress, 1967), 8.

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private organizations. Nevertheless, the level of activities and of requests for new projects has remained consistently high, some gauge of the value which developing countries place on the Israeli efforts. Similarly, the fact that local partners must make a relatively heavy investment in Israeli-supported projects often generates an exceptional sense of local involvement and concern for the success of a project.

This sense of involvement is fully reciprocated by the Israelis themselves—both at the political and the professional-expert level. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israel's defense expenditures had to be sharply increased. As a result nondefense spending was slashed, curtailing some of the technical cooperation with the Third World. In 1970, expert assignments were down to 429 from 640 in 1966, and the number of trainees brought to Israel declined from 1,749 in 1966 to 1,054 in 1970. The broad outlines of the program, however, and the basic commitment to its continuation were not affected by the ever-rising burden of national defense.

The personal involvement of the Israeli experts or trainers seems to reflect a widely held belief that the program is an important investment of precious national resources. This may help explain the dedication with which many Israeli technical cooperation workers perform their assignments. A good example is the Israeli farm manager in an African country who journeyed to the distant capital one night recently in order to advise his ambassador that a sudden attack by pests threatened to decimate his crop within 48 hours. Unable to locate the necessary pesticide in the country, the ambassador telephoned Jerusalem, and a few hours later, two planes were on their way, loaded with pesticide and accompanied by a plant entomologist. The crop was saved and the bonds of cooperation fortified.

But dedication, involvement, and ingenuity alone do not explain the apparent attractiveness of the Israeli efforts to the newly developing countries. What seems at least equally important is Israel's success in fashioning in a comparatively brief period of time a modern economy, a fairly well integrated society, and a social system in which cooperative and socialist principles of organization and distribution play an important role. For example, socialist-oriented Tanzania, although usually critical of Israel in

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international forums since the Six Day War, nevertheless requested Israel to provide a special training course in agricultural cooperation in connection with the Tanzanian drive to establish new forms of cooperative agricultural settlements—the so called *ujamaa* (socialist) village scheme. Israel was the only free-world country to which Tanzania looked for instruction in this area; the other countries reportedly approached were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Similarly, in Ghana during the reign of Nkrumah only four out of the more than one hundred state farms were entrusted to foreign advisers—two to Israeli and two to Soviet experts.

The interest in the Israeli-supported program of activities with developing countries evidently centers on Israel's agricultural and cooperative achievements. During 1970, more than 40 per cent of the trainees coming to Israel received instruction in agricultural or cooperative practices and one-third of the expert assignments were in those specialties.

At the same time as Israel's own base of science- and technology-oriented industries and institutions has continued to grow, so has her capacity to assist other nations in this sphere. The impetus has come from Israel's various technical and scientific institutions, spearheaded since the early 1960s by the Weizmann Institute for Science in Rehovoth. Under the auspices of the institute, international conferences are being held every two years on a major developmental problem, such as agriculture, monetary and fiscal policy, health, and urbanization. What distinguishes the so called Rehovoth Movement from other international conferences is the conscious effort to bring together political leaders from developing nations and prominent scientists and technical experts. Abba Eban, Israel's present foreign minister, who in 1960 was president of the Weizmann Institute and initiator of the Rehovoth Movement, called it "an exhortation to new states to link their future to the scientific age . . . (and) an effort to galvanize the scientific conscience into a deeper preoccupation with the problems of new struggling societies."[2] The impact of these conferences outside of Israel is hard to gauge, but within the Israeli

[2] Quoted in *The Rehovoth Declaration, 1960*, pamphlet of the International Conference on Science in the Advancement of New States (New York, American Committee for the Weizmann Institute of Science, 1960), 7.

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scientific community, they have certainly stimulated greater attention and sensitivity to the needs of the Third World in such areas as agricultural research, arid-zone ecology, ground water research, or the development of sister relationships with academic and scientific institutions in developing countries. The relatively small but important UN Development Program in Israel has helped this tendency along by supporting science-related projects such as desalination and the use of brackish water, which could potentially prove useful to many low-income, resource-poor countries of the world.

Most pervasive among the characteristics of Israel's cooperation program is the emphasis on nationbuilding and personal participation in development. This pedagogic approach flows from Israel's own labor-oriented social philosophy and institutions, especially its mass youth movements and the nationbuilding programs carried out by Israel's defense establishment. Accordingly, foreign trainees in Israel are usually exposed to manual labor and to life in a cooperative settlement, and Israeli experts abroad often succeed as much by their personal example, leadership qualities, and sense of commitment as by their technical experience.

Economic Relations

Israel is perhaps unique among aid-giving nations in having an assistance program which is of greater importance than her economic relationship with Third World countries. There are notable exceptions of course, such as the hotelbuilding and managing ventures of the Israeli firm, Mayer Brothers, which is currently at work on a massive, internationally financed $50 million "African Riviera" tourism development project in the Ivory Coast.

In 1960, Israel's trade with Third World countries accounted for a little better than 12 per cent of her exports and less than 5 per cent of imports; by 1970, the volume of trade had tripled in absolute terms, but both the import and export shares had declined slightly. To be sure, Israel has not neglected the possibilities of increased trade with Third World countries and there are special government-supported trading companies and investment guaranty schemes to stimulate such trade. If despite these efforts, the share of Third World trade has actually shrunk a bit, this is

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at least in part explained by the character of Israel's economy and of the economies of most Third World countries. In many respects, these economies do not easily complement each other. Israel's chief exports, citrus fruits and polished diamonds, are of little interest to Third World customers; even the fast-burgeoning Israeli electronics industry has a readier market in the industrialized Western countries than in the less sophisticated countries of the Third World. At the same time Israel lacks the processing facilities to absorb directly the primary raw materials (except for crude oil), which are still the main exports from the Third World. Moreover, as these countries become to a greater extent secondary producers of medium and light industrial products themselves, they often become less, rather than more, attractive as trading partners. Israel's trade with Ghana is typical of this situation. In 1965, Ghana was Israel's best customer in Africa, buying $5.3 million worth of Israeli imports and exporting only about $900,000 worth of goods to Israel. Since then Israeli exports to Ghana have declined sharply, one reason being the establishment by Ghana of its own tire manufacturing facility, while Ghanaian exports to Israel have remained unchanged. In 1971, trade in both directions stood at about $3.9 million.

Political considerations also appear to have played a role in Israel's economic relations with Third World countries. Thus, in the case of Ghana, Israeli cement for Ghana's National Construction Company was replaced by cement from Egypt, as Kwame Nkrumah, in his quest for African leadership, attempted to strengthen relations with Nasser. Similarly, as Turkey, Israel's most active trading partner in the Third World during the mid-1960s ($15 million or 15 per cent of Israel's Third World trade in 1965) sought Arab support in its dispute over Cyprus, trade with Israel slumped and, in 1969, stood at less than $7 million.

One of the most interesting recent developments is Israel's increasing utilization of her professional expertise to earn much needed foreign exchange. Perhaps her most successful effort in this sphere has been Tahal Water Planning Ltd., a publicly controlled company, with foreign operations now exceeding domestic operations. Tahal is active primarily in Asia and Latin America and has expanded its scope of operations to include comprehensive regional and sectoral planning, design of transporta-

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tion systems, and consultative services in a variety of related areas.

In many Third World countries, Israel has also sought to evolve a combination of commercial and cooperative relations. To overcome in part her lack of investment capital, Israel has encouraged the formation of small or medium-sized mixed companies involving one of Israel's numerous public and semi-public companies and a local partner. The partnerships are time limited, Israel's share is never more than 50 per cent, and a major goal is to train local personnel eventually to take over.

During the early and middle sixties, Israel's publicly owned Zim Navigation Company helped Burma and Ghana establish national shipping lines under joint-venture and -management arrangements. A number of joint companies were also established in Africa by Solel Boneh, a construction company owned by Israel's trade union (Histadrut). More recent examples are commercial cotton production and pharmaceutical companies in Ethiopia and agricultural machinery stations in the Ivory Coast.

The projects have not always been successful, for, in some cases, the newly established enterprises turned out to be uneconomical, or they unintentionally involved the Israeli partner in internal politics. Israeli policy makers discovered that being partners to newborn nationalism could be a painful process, and they appear now to be exercising more caution in exploring economic feasibility and other risks involved. Generally, however, Israeli projects, though limited in scope, have offered Third World governments opportunities to enter economic priority areas with assurance of managerial competence, some external contribution to capitalization, and, perhaps most importantly, without fear of foreign domination.

Political Relations

The 1967 Six Day War and its political aftermath dramatized as never before the role of the Third World in Israel's foreign relations. Even though Israeli armed might had secured her borders and reopened the route to Africa and the Far East in six days, the ensuing political battle raged for many months in the United Nations. Two resolutions condemning Israel and demanding her un-

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conditional withdrawal from occupied territories—one introduced by the Soviet Union and the other by Yugoslavia and a group of other nonaligned countries—were presented to the UN General Assembly. Both failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority vote for passage, largely because they lacked support from African countries. The Yugoslav resolution, more popular than the Soviet one, obtained only 13 votes among non-Arab African nations, while 18 African nations opposed it or abstained. The third resolution introduced by Latin American countries and eventually approved by the General Assembly linked a call for withdrawal of Israeli troops to Arab abandonment of the state of belligerency with Israel; it had the support of 42 developing countries including the majority of African states and this assured its passage.

Thus the strain of the Six Day War on Israel's international position did not seem to alter significantly the pattern which had developed over the previous decade in UN forums, namely, a strong Arab-Soviet bloc of anti-Israel votes supported by a group of Third World countries (for example, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Somalia, Guinea) but not powerful enough to obtain approval of extreme, anti-Israel positions. The same pattern was confirmed later in 1967 by the Security Council's unanimous approval of a relatively moderate resolution (the now famous Resolution No. 242), which reiterated a link between Israeli withdrawal and some form of mutually agreed upon coexistence between Israel and her Arab neighbors. In this case the six Third World countries represented on the Council supported the resolution. This pattern held in subsequent General Assembly sessions in 1968 and 1969, but by 1970, Third World support for Israel in international forums, often expressed previously through abstention rather than through votes, began to weaken.

The 1970 UN General Assembly, acting over Israeli and U.S. opposition, passed an Afro-Asian resolution, somewhat watered down at French initiative, but nevertheless going beyond the 1967 Security Council resolution by deploring Israel's continuing occupation of Arab territory and specifically recognizing the rights of the Palestinians in any settlement of the conflict. The resolution received the necessary two-thirds majority (though 39 nations abstained and 16 voted against it), and this time a more moderate Latin American proposal failed to pass. Two major Latin

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American countries, Chile and Mexico, broke hemispheric solidarity by voting in favor of the Afro-Asian resolution, and Cameroon, one of Israel's staunchest supporters in Africa, joined the sponsors of the resolution. The weakening of Israel's support among Third World countries in the General Assembly had been foreshadowed in September 1970 at the Lusaka Conference of so called nonaligned nations by the adoption of a harshly condemnatory resolution, which only after a last-minute intervention by certain heads of state omitted calling for UN sanctions against Israel. Of the 62 nations represented at Lusaka, only 26 voted against this resolution. Earlier in the year the normally nonpolitical Assembly of the World Health Organization had also condemned Israel as had the UN Commission on Human Rights.

What accounts for this apparent loss of support for Israel in international forums? No doubt the primary reason is the inconclusive state of peacemaking in the Middle East, which leaves Israel in the position of an occupying power, ruling over large areas of Arab territory. Prior to 1967, of course, the conflict had been no nearer solution than now. Israel was not regarded as a conquering state holding on to Arab land by any but all-out supporters of the Arab cause. The Arab threats and the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba which lead up to the Six Day War of 1967 earned Israel much international sympathy, and the war itself gained for her respect and understanding, which helped bolster her position for several years in international forums.

By 1970, however, the biblical image of a valiant David standing up to Goliath had disappeared, and Third World nations appeared to have become more receptive to charges of Israel's expansionist or colonialist designs. The somewhat bizarre charges of subversion leveled against the Israelis by Uganda's President Idi Amin in 1972, are a dramatic expression of this tendency. Thus far, the loss of support for Israel has not affected the basically moderate position embodied in the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. However, as Israel's foreign minister, Abba Eban, has stated, the Afro-Asian resolution which passed the UN General Assembly in 1970 came close to aligning the world organization with the Arab side in the conflict.[3] Thus, unless there is a breakthrough toward peace, Israel is likely to

[3] *Jerusalem Post*, Nov. 4, 1970.

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find herself under increasing pressure in international forums. At the same time, it is interesting to note that, thus far at least, this change in world opinion has not appreciably affected Israel's cordial bilateral relations with nations of the Third World. In the years since the Six Day War, only two Third World nations, Guinea and Ceylon following the election of Ms. Bandaranaike, chose to break off relations with Israel over the Arab-Israel issue.[4] Several others, on the other hand, including Mali and Singapore, have chosen to expand their relations. Technical assistance programs continued even with Third World countries like Tanzania, Senegal, and Zambia, which increasingly have supported the Arab point of view in international forums. The Israelis are adhering strictly to a policy adopted in the early days of their cooperation program of not linking technical assistance to political conditions. That is not to say that Israel is unconcerned with the positions on the Arab-Israel conflict of her Third World partners in cooperation, but her leaders have decided that any link to political conditions would likely alienate countries, while willingness to help regardless of politics is likely to gain appreciation, which might eventually find political expression. Despite occasional grumblings, Israel's public and legislature have thus far accepted this policy. Until recently, as we have seen, the calculation has proved correct, and even with declining support in international forums, Israel retains much good will among Third World countries that is traceable to cordial bilateral relations and especially to the nonpolitical conduct of cooperation programs. Whether this policy could withstand more widespread erosion of support from Third World nations, however, is an open question.

Israeli programs have also implicated her willy-nilly in domestic political squabbles, particularly in countries where Israel has been involved in military assistance programs. Milton Obote, the deposed leader of Uganda, for example, lost no time in accusing Israel of complicity in the coup d'état led by Army leader Major General Idi Amin which caused Obote's ouster. No evidence was offered to support the charge, but those willing to believe it could point to the Israeli military advisers and Israeli planes and other

[4] Uganda's break with Israel earlier this year was apparently not precipitated by the Arab-Israel issue as such.

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military equipment sold to the Ugandan army. Less dramatic than Obote's public accusation but in the long-run perhaps more significant is the frustration which some members of the disaffected intelligentsia in developing countries are beginning to give voice to over Israeli assistance to the "establishments" of their countries. For obvious reasons, Israeli military assistance is particularly odious to these elements. Israeli policy makers, necessarily concerned about relations with existing governments rather than revolutionary aspirants and perhaps somewhat wary of revolutionary extremism, do not seem particularly perturbed over extremist criticism. Their principal answer is to point out that wherever there are politically sensitive military-related assistance activities, Israel supports in at least equal manner socially progressive projects in agriculture, health, and the like. While this may be true, it is also probably true that the association with sometimes repressive "establishments" has dimmed somewhat the bright glow of Israel as a model of socialistically oriented progressive nationalism. To the extent that this image has been a political asset to Israel vis-à-vis the Third World—and there is little doubt that it has been—the now tarnished image represents a net political loss to Israel in her relations to Third World countries.

Arab and Communist governmental and unofficial newspapers have sought to profit from these developments and have encouraged the notion that Israel is a mere tool of Western neocolonialism in the Third World. An article in *Pravda* attempted to show that Israel's varied activities in Africa, while perhaps unexceptionable in themselves, actually paved the way for the incursion of Western capital.[5] Exposés on the same theme but stressing Israel's military assistance activities were widely publicized in U.S. radical publications, in the Egyptian press, and in the publications of the Afro-Asian and Latin American Solidarity organizations.

Actually there is very little indication of close collaboration between the Western powers and Israel in Third World countries. In general, each wants to avoid being tarred by the brush of the other. The United States, Great Britain, and France, supremely conscious after the Six Day War of their continuing interests in

[5] "Expansion under the Cover of 'Assistance,' " *Pravda*, July 31, 1970.

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the Arab world and of the sensitivities of Third World countries, have no desire or need to be associated with Israel in these areas. Great Britain and France, in fact, have considered Israel at times to be an interloper in countries where they, as ex-colonial powers, continue to enjoy political or economic advantages and have been known to block and obstruct Israeli assistance or commercial activities. Israel, on the other hand, seeking to hold on to the image of socialistically oriented progressive nationalism, is equally chary of becoming too closely associated with Western policies and interests in Third World countries. By tacit agreement, Israel and the Western powers at present seem satisfied to leave each other alone. Symbolic of this is the fact that Israel is not a member of the OECD and of its Development Assistance Committee, the Western "donors club" where economic and assistance policies in less developed countries are discussed and coordinated.

How are future relations between Israel and Third World countries likely to develop? Are they likely to influence the basic Arab-Israel conflict? At this time, it seems probable that Israel's relations with the Third World will continue to grow and prosper. There is a clear and persuasive community of interests, arising out of Israel's need for friendship and understanding with the 70 per cent of humanity represented in the Third World and out of the urgent need of those nations for techniques and, above all, the constructive attitude toward nationbuilding and techniques of realizing it which Israel possesses. Thus, unless Israel forfeits her acceptance through some blatantly aggressive act or unless the majority of Third World nations fall into the hands of extremists, this relationship is likely to continue and to be a constructive one. Whether it is likely to affect major questions of peace or war in the Middle East is much harder to predict. In pre-1967 days, it was fashionable in Israel to speculate that "the road to Cairo may lead through Africa," that is, that African leaders friendly to both Israel and the Arabs might convince Egypt, and through Egypt all Arabs, to opt for coexistence. This hope was seriously dimmed by the events of 1967 and the subsequent hardening of the negotiating positions as a result of the massive influx of Soviet arms and personnel into the area.[6] Nevertheless, that

[6] The expulsion of Soviet personnel from Egypt has created a new situation, which could result in an increased role for Third World countries.

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it is not an entirely vain hope is apparent from the recent African political initiative. In any event, whether directly or indirectly, the nations of the Third World will continue to exercise an important influence on the atmosphere and tone of discussions in the international forum. Isolating Israel could embolden her enemies and help precipitate another armed confrontation; whereas a balanced attitude on the part of the world community, which recognizes Israel's basic security needs as well as the psychological and political needs of the Arab nations, may help point the way toward peace.

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Poverty and Welfare: A Review Essay*

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Intense concern over poverty has now been on the national agenda for over a decade. Not since the depression of the thirties has there been such interest in welfare and income maintenance as within the last five years. It has burst upon the nation-

* The books under review in this essay are: Robert H. Binstock and Katherine Ely, eds., *The Politics of the Powerless.* Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers, 1971.—xii, 340 pp. $7.95; Edgar S. Cahn and Barry A. Passett, ed., *Citizen Participation: Effecting Community Changes.* New York, Praeger Publishers, published in cooperation with the New Jersey Community Action Training Institute, 1971.—xii, 294 pp. $10.00; Leonard Freedman, *Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty.* New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969.—xiv, 217 pp. $3.95; Howard W. Hallman, *Neighborhood Control of Public Programs: Case Studies of Community Corporations and Neighborhood Boards.* New York, Praeger Publishers, published in cooperation with the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1970.—xvi, 226 pp. $12.50; Joseph A. Kershaw, with the assistance of Paul N. Courant, *Government Against Poverty.* Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1970.—viii, 174 pp. $6.95; Nick Kotz, *Let Them Eat Promises: The Politics of Hunger in America.* Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1971.—xvi, 261 pp. $1.95; Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., *Toward a National Urban Policy.* New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1970.—xiv, 348 pp. $7.95; Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare.* New York, Pantheon Books, Inc., 1971.—xvii, 389 pp. $10.00; George A. Shipman, *Designing Program Action—Against Urban Poverty.* University, Ala., The University of Alabama Press, 1971.—124 pp. $5.75; Bruno Stein, *On Relief: The Economics of Poverty and Public Welfare.* New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1971. —xii, 211 pp. $6.95.

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al scene primarily as a result of the staggering increases in the number of persons on public assistance since the early sixties. The number of persons receiving public assistance has more than doubled in the eleven years since President Kennedy took office in January 1961. Ironically, two-thirds of this increase of over 7.5 million persons on the rolls materialized in the last three years since Richard Nixon, a Republican president, took office.

TABLE 1

Persons on Public Assistance, 1961-72

	Persons on Public Assistance	*Increase*
January 1961	7,322,000	
January 1965	7,845,000	+ 523,000
January 1969	9,880,000	+2,035,000
January 1972	14,867,000	+4,987,000
cumulative increase		+7,545,000

In city after city, figures have appeared showing that one in eight, one in seven, one in six of the city's population is on the welfare rolls. In many ghetto communities, 40 per cent, 50 per cent, or 60 per cent of the children are on the welfare rolls. With figures such as these, welfare is bound to become a major public topic, instead of being neglected as a marginal routine affair. As long as America's blacks stayed in the South, their economic, social, and health status was largely hidden from national view and, therefore, was not a matter of broad national concern. Even though the Supreme Court in 1954 through its school integration decision had sparked a long-range effort at enlarging the civil rights of blacks, it is unlikely, but for their massive migration to the North and West where they became a political factor, that the economic and social plight of the Southern black would have become a major national political issue.[1] The publication in 1944, just before the end of World War II, of Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* provided basic documentation and informed and influenced many Americans; but it did not raise the questions it dealt with to

[1] Even with the experience over the last twenty years of maintaining the spotlight on the conditions of the poor in the South, how much evades the light is apparent in the stirring recital of the effort to focus attention on America's hunger problem by Nick Kotz.

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the highest levels of national consciousness.[2]

In its early stages, the postwar migration of blacks to the North and West, through its impact on white political leadership in the new areas of settlement, had the effect of reinforcing the interests of Southern blacks. In its later stages, when the cumulative numbers had become so substantial that in many larger American cities one-quarter or more—in several over one-half—of the population were black, the migration confronted the major cities directly. Before considering what the impact of the migration has been on the cities, let us review further who the migrants were, why they came, what they sought.

While we have referred so far only to blacks, and shall concentrate on them in most of this discussion, we must keep in mind that simultaneously with the black migration, Puerto Ricans in large numbers were migrating from the island to mainland cities and Mexican-Americans were moving from southwestern and western agricultural areas into many cities in those states. Among these groups, poverty is endemic. Together blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans constitute one-seventh of the nation's population. Formerly outside the mainstream of American life, the groups have spread through the nation carrying with them the problems associated with poverty.

TABLE 2

United States Population—1970: By Selected Racial Characteristics for U.S. Total and U.S. Urban (in thousands)

	Total	*Urban*	*% Urban*
White[a]	171,749	128,773	74.9
Negro	22,580	18,367	81.3
Mexican-American	5,254	b	b
Puerto Rican (mainland)	1,379	b	b
Puerto Rican (island)	2,712	1,575	58.0

[a] Excluding Mexican-American and Puerto Rican.
[b] 1970 data not available.

Interestingly enough and perhaps not surprisingly, the three groups mentioned, plus the American Indian, among whom pov-

[2] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York, 1944).

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erty is also endemic, were incorporated in the American destiny through some form of conquest: the black through slavery; the Mexican-American initially by the acquisition of land through conquest and/or enforced purchase; the Puerto Rican as a result of the American conquest of the Spanish islands; and, of course, the American Indian by virtue of white settlement of the continent. Virtually all other United States residents are descendents of people who participated in the conquests or are later immigrant stock not tainted with the stigma of the humbled. These others are directly or indirectly the beneficiaries of the American conquests.

"Everyone is powerless in some specific way," Robert H. Binstock and Katherine Ely point out, "But some people are powerless in virtually every aspect of their lives."[3] The powerlessness and exclusion from the mainstream which characterizes these four groups is a function of the attitudes of superiority and inferiority which define the postconquest relationships between the conquerors and the subdued. These deeply rooted attitudes may arise in part from the security arrangements which were devised in earlier times to retain white power and to maintain subjugation. For years after the reality has been altered, these attitudes and feelings persist and are seen as caste phenomena. In the case of the blacks, color has become associated with the inferiority with which whites have invested blacks. For the white immigrant groups which were mainly of lower-class and peasant stock upon arrival, the United States was a relatively open society. Despite the negative attitudes that the already settled frequently hold about newcomers, many were able, in an expanding economy, to move onto an entrepreneurial track, educate their children, and assure themselves of the rewards of work with dignity through unionization. These new Americans contributed to the expansion of American enterprise as did the conquered groups, but the immigrants were able to participate and share in the benefits of this expansion while the conquered groups stood outside the pale. Foreign immigrants and especially their children found in the American experience a spur to their energies. The conquered Americans have experienced a different history, giving rise to a different set of expectations and perceptions about

[3] Binstock and Ely, 1.

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Americans and the American experience. Their sense of defeat and alienation has been reinforced.

The mechanization of agriculture resulted in a tremendous loss of employment opportunities on the farms. The nation's farm population declined by almost 21 million people between 1940 and 1970. This technological revolution set in motion a tidal wave of migration to urban areas. The migration was not confined to the blacks and Spanish-speaking minorities. For example, there was a net outmigration of whites from the seven west and north central states[4] of 2,479,000 between 1940 and 1970. During the same thirty-year period, however, net black migration from the South exceeded four million (4,434,000).[5] Few other sectors of American economic activity experienced such substantial productivity increases between 1940 and 1970 as did agriculture. This surge of productivity was made possible by heavy federal investment in agricultural research, insured farm loans, and subsidization of farm entrepreneurs through price supports and payments for reductions in farm acreage. For example, in 1960, about 70 per cent of the net federal expenditure on subsidy programs was concentrated in agriculture. In that same year, 229 million or 3 per cent of the subsidy total was made available in grants-in-aid for public housing and urban renewal.

Just at the time that blacks were beginning to develop political power in the South as a consequence of the breakdown in voting barriers, economic conditions sustained by a restrictive welfare system propelled blacks north and west. The black political threat in the South was kept in check.[6]

Little consideration was given to the impact of the migration on the cities, and the price the nation would pay for concentrating primarily on agricultural productivity and ignoring the plight of the people set loose without work. The history of agricultural modernization, mass unemployment, and the migration to the cities is extensively discussed by Piven and Cloward.[7]

[4] Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas.

[5] Between 1940 and 1960, the data includes other nonwhites; their numbers until 1960 were, however, insignificant and therefore would have no more than a slight effect on the figures as shown for blacks.

[6] Piven and Cloward, 206-11.

[7] *Ibid.*, chaps. 7, 8.

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By 1963, one hundred years after the Emancipation Proclamation, more than half of the nation's blacks lived outside the states of the old Confederacy. A new generation of black children was growing up in the more open society of the North and West. While America's metropolitan areas were growing, their need for unskilled labor and for blue-collar workers was not growing proportionally. The professional, managerial, and clerical occupations which were the urban growth occupations were those which the migrating blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans, with their inadequate educational backgrounds, were least equipped to fill. Yet opportunities were more available in the North than in the South. Slowly, a black middle class began to develop; in the thousands, blacks began to enter employment in government, and political activism also grew. Frustrations were great. For most jobs, when available, wages were low. Discrimination was an ever-present reality. Life in a slum is threatening and debilitating. The passages to many jobs were blocked by existing job-holders and by rules of the game (civil service regulations, union agreements) that gave incumbents great advantages over newcomers.

Despite more liberal welfare benefits and arrangements in the Northern and Western states than in the South, there is little evidence that people migrated solely for the purpose of going on welfare. On the contrary, as Piven and Cloward point out, during the fifties most migrants obtained low-paying jobs, and welfare served as a last resort. However, the cushion effect of welfare may have played a role in decisions to go North and West. Though the push to move from the South was very great indeed, the pull of the North and West would not have been so great but for the welfare cushion. It is very likely that, had public assistance been federalized after World War II, some of the migration would have been stemmed.

The Impact of Migration on the Cities

The migration has been tragic for millions of individuals and families forced from their homes into crowded ghettoes. The influx has also been calamitous for the cities; their services, always razor thin, have been brought close to breakdown; substantial

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portions of the housing stock have deteriorated;[8] local tax structures have been overwhelmed; crime and lawlessness have skyrocketed; community after community has become racially polarized; and vital inadequacies have materialized in the urban labor force. As Lee Rainwater points out, "The economic system and the system of social segregation operate to concentrate lower-class people into particular communities."[9] For the system of institutionalized pathology which grows up in these communities both the poor and the city as a whole pay a terrible price. One of the consequences of the population dispersal from the South was the spread of fear and threat to all parts of the country. Though anti-black attitudes have undoubtedly been widespread throughout white America—North and South—there is a difference between a relatively latent, underlying attitude and a relatively active, surface attitude. When latent, the attitude is more likely to be held in check; political and social behavior are more likely to be governed by other competing values which enhance sympathy and foster cooperation. When active and on the surface, the attitude is more likely to become the basis for political and social behavior, and to overwhelm other values which stress the commonality of the human experience. The spread of the "Southern" problem is, hence, the spread of a politics of exclusion and a defeat for a politics of inclusion.[10]

The intensification of racial polarization in the cities as a result of militancy, resistance, and fear leads to various forms of defensive behavior on the part of whites, for example, migration to the suburbs, organizations against school busing, coalitions against the extension of "social" programs and against higher taxes. These illiberal responses consume productive energy and interfere with the running of cities. By highlighting stereotyped attitudes and behavior based on them, racial polarization makes the search for equitable solutions and effective compromises more

[8] For a review of the difficulties in coping with the housing problem of the poor, see Freedman.

[9] In Moynihan, 199.

[10] In the politics of inclusion, a broad array of diverse ethnic groups and interests coalesces for the purpose of achieving or maintaining power. Ethnic ticket-balancing is a typical technique of a politics of inclusion. A politics of exclusion regards certain ethnic constituencies or others as nonpersons in the organization of coalitions by which to secure or maintain power.

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difficult. For example, the white school principal having worked a lifetime to achieve his position cannot simply be discarded in order to achieve greater racial balance in supervisory positions. The blacks have rights that must be advanced, but the individual white principal also has equities which cannot be peremptorily erased. Polarization makes it difficult to resolve the conflicting rights and interests, and in its wake it destroys or seriously impairs the coalitions which are essential to dealing with a broad range of problems of which the poor are the inheritors.

The polarization of the city is insidious in another significant way; it contributes to endangering the economic base of the city, the strength of which is essential to the eventual absorption of the newcomers. The city is an enterprise. It exists as a center in which to fabricate goods and increasingly to serve others in various ways, as is evident in its financial, trading, cultural, and communications services. There is a constant struggle on the part of local government and private interests to maintain the economic viability of their city as an enterprise.

Each city as an enterprise is in a cost and quality competition with other centers of activity—suburbs, other cities, other countries. Developments which raise the costs of one city and reduce the quality of its products or services relative to other centers of activities weaken the economic base of that city. This may occur when a city's enterprises cannot attract the type of talent they need to maintain their vitality or assure the effectiveness of their management. If local taxes rise because of an increase in services —such as welfare, police, health—relative to other locations, this raises the cost of doing business at the one location. If the labor force becomes more inefficient relative to labor in other locations, this also raises business costs and may reduce the quality of the product or services of that location. Some of these differential cost burdens could be equalized if higher levels of government assume certain types of local costs. The federalization of welfare and revenue-sharing are among measures which may reduce the competitive pressures on particular communities. Federal taxation is more inescapable than is local taxation. However, not all of the relative disadvantages can be dealt with by federalization. Thus the demographic pressures have not only created political polarization, but have also impinged on the economic viability of the

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city. While the business sector may be less than imaginative in adapting itself to the characteristics of the new labor force or adapting the labor force to meet business needs, many concerns of the business community are reasonable and must not be lost sight of in antiestablishment rhetoric. Taxpayers have reason to be concerned with the startling rise in the welfare rolls of the last few years.

The Rise in Public Welfare

The rise of the public assistance caseload during the sixties is to a great extent a measure of national failure. It represents in the initial instance a failure to protect blacks in the South. It represents a failure to develop a strategy to absorb blacks in the economy of the South. It is a mark also of the difficulty of absorbing blacks in the North.

To what is the rise attributable? Obviously, if the blacks and Puerto Ricans had not migrated in large numbers to the North and West after World War II, there would not have been a large pool of poor to contribute to the rising welfare rolls in the Northern and Western cities. As indicated earlier, the available evidence indicates that the bulk of the migrants were in search of work, and most initially found marginal jobs. As Piven and Cloward point out, during the forties and fifties when migration was at its peak, the welfare rolls increased only modestly. Only in the sixties, after migration had slowed down, did the rolls rise at an accelerated rate. Why?

In the more turbulent atmosphere of the sixties, there came together a number of strands which contributed to the rise in the rolls:

(1) Public assistance without strings was projected as a right which people in need should be mobilized to exercise.

(2) A number of restrictive features of the welfare system—such as midnight searches, employable-mother rules, man-in-the-house rules, arbitrary terminations without hearings, and residency laws—were contested in the courts and invalidated.[11]

(3) In an effort to make welfare less demeaning to the individual, administrative procedures were relaxed, investigatory procedures were minimized, and the right to representation was rec-

[11] Piven and Cloward, 306-20

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ognized.

(4) The attack on low-paying jobs as demeaning and exploitative combined with the emerging concept of welfare as a right encouraged many marginally employed women to cease working and to go on welfare. The raising of benefit levels undoubtedly affected the incentive to work, though Piven and Cloward discount its impact in the rise of relief rolls.[12]

(5) The increasing employment of minority personnel in welfare agencies brought in many workers who sided with applicants and clients and intimidated many others who might have been prepared to play a more restricting role.

(6) The availability of welfare probably encouraged a certain amount of family-splitting or nonfamily formation, since the woman with a child was no longer financially dependent on a man. Of course, the economic basis for the nuclear family was tenuous at best considering the poor job opportunities for black males.

(7) The increasing ease with which welfare could be obtained undoubtedly contributed to a certain amount of manipulation of the system to maximize income, such as feigned family-splitting and hiding part-time work and income. The community action programs, the legal service programs, the riots, and the increasing militancy of civil rights activists contributed to an easing of the rules and to the creation of an environment which made tight administration difficult. Piven and Cloward also maintain that it was "easier to give welfare than to press for concessions that would challenge the interests of other groups in the cities."[13] They interpret the loosening of regulations as a political response to the riots. Since the system could not contend with the real problems—discrimination and unemployment—give them money. After all, what is money?!

Public Assistance and the Hazards of Life

The basic function of public assistance is to deal with the hazards of life. A hazard usually implies an element of chance or accident; it is something unpredictable. There has grown up a tradition of community responsibility to assist people subject to hazards

[12] *Ibid.*, 191.
[13] *Ibid.*, 286.

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which are beyond the individual's control. Furthermore, a hazard which may be unpredictable for an individual is often predictable for a group; therefore, we speak of an incidence factor for different hazards and even develop actuarial tables. We have reached broad agreement in this country that widowhood, orphanhood, blindness, disability, short-term unemployment, and old age are life hazards for which some form of community protection and assistance is needed. Among these hazards, old age differs from the others. It alone among this group of hazards is both hazard and avoidance of hazard (death).

There are many other types of life hazards for which assistance programs are occasionally available, but where broad agreement on assistance is lacking. These hazards include increases in the cost of living; long-term unemployment; illnesses which are treatable but only at tremendous cost, such as kidney diseases and certain psychiatric disorders. With respect to these hazards, there is greater debate over their character and the costs of the programs designed to deal with them.

Blacks as a group have had a high incidence of life's hazards. They have been exposed to the trials of Job: slavery, subjection in a postemancipation caste society, and technological unemployment. Many would argue that public welfare is a right of blacks and others who need help in coping with economic deprivation. Is it a right to be exercised periodically for brief intervals when economic hardship is most severe? Or is it a right to a lifetime guaranteed income made available as a form of restitution by white society for cumulative deprivations suffered? What does the black community, if it has a dominant goal, really wish? Restitution? Absorption into the mainstream of American life leading to parity? Will a restitution strategy help blacks achieve parity, or might it in some ways be counterproductive? To consider these questions, we need to examine the work issue more closely.

The Work Issue

In the whole of history, this is the first generation of the human race in which serious speculation has developed about life without work for broad masses and classes of society. Work for survival has been a constant activity of mankind, except for very limited

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categories of men and women—small ruling groups, the severely handicapped, the very young, and the very old. For all others, work has been the constant companion: "Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work" (Exod. 20:9).

While views about work and labor have varied, and attitudes about the meniality of certain types of labor have been prevalent at one time or another, more often than not the issue of work has been invested with moral authority. With regard to the work ethic, Protestantism is rather late upon the scene. Proverbs 21:25 says: "The desire of the slothful killeth him; for his hands refuse to labor." Furthermore, the notion of reward or incentive for work has long been accepted. Aristophanes in the *Plutus* (511-17) wrote:

> Why, if Wealth should allot himself equally out. . . .
> Then none would to science his talents devote or practice
> a craft anymore.
> Yet if science and art from the world should depart,
> pray whom would ye get for the future
> To build you a ship, or your leather to snip,
> or to make you a wheel or a suture?
> Do you think that a man will be likely to tan,
> or a smithy or laundry to keep,
> Or to break up the soil with his ploughshare, and toil
> the fruits of Demeter to reap,
> If regardless of these he can dwell at his ease,
> a life without labour enjoying?

Historically, four types of groups have been able to secure and sustain a workfree existence. The first are those who by means of physical coercion and/or control of devices of physical coercion are able to exact sustenance from others. The category includes the in-group in autocratic regimes, slaveholders, robbers, and thieves. The second are producers or owners of wealth who do not need to work to retain their wealth, such as the inheritors of wealth. The third are groups who by virtue of cultural arrangements or other emotional systems of control secure the means of sustenance with little or no question on the part of the producers. This category includes a variety of types, such as elderly relatives, the young, and spiritual personnel, among others. The fourth are

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groups who have been subject to hazards beyond their personal control. With respect to them, a communal consensus may develop with accompanying moral suasion. The producers accept responsibility for the sustenance of people in this group even though individual beneficiaries are not known to them personally.

What concerns us here are the latter two groups, and with respect to them, there is a crucial difference. In the third group, relationships are based mainly on the primary group where the people involved are known to one another. In the fourth group, the relationships are more distant and abstract; they are not personal. They are a function of a complex, corporate society in which many of the needy, the helpless, the victims are not known to the producers. Therefore, the actions to be taken to provide assistance require political rather than private decisions, corporate rather than personal modes.

Individuals are likely to have one set of attitudes with respect to the distant needy and another for the needy within the primary group. Within the primary group, the elements of emotional tone are different: there is a history of relationship, there are patterns of mutual aid and reciprocity. There can be discussion, argument, and emotional pressures of a variety of sorts. Within the political system, the forces seeking support and those giving or withholding support are distant and are not engaged in direct discussion with one another. They deal with each other through political and bureaucratic intermediaries. The impersonality forces an abstraction of posture and attitude, and the controls exercised are more formal. Support is given or withheld on the basis of defined criteria; support is raised or lowered on the basis of a variety of political and administrative judgments. Obviously, since the decisions in this arena are strongly influenced by distant producers, support, even when given, is generally devoid of the empathy for the needy person which may be present in the primary relationship when the producer shares his resources on the basis of kinship and feeling. It is therefore inevitable in the corporate society that the producing sectors of the population will share resources reluctantly with those in need, and that criteria for receiving assistance will be constantly scrutinized, and that waste which results either from client manipulation or managerial ineffectiveness in computing benefits and investigating and rein-

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vestigating eligibility will be deplored and will arouse severe political reaction.

It is not surprising that people who work question the validity of public support of nonwork. While some of the questioning may be poorly informed or based on prejudice, it is unlikely that the questioning can be eliminated or discounted in its entirety. The questioning is in part reactive, but it is also functional, for it is protective of a productive society. Through work, resources are expanded and both public and private wants satisfied.

The producers are generally willing to contribute to the sustenance of nonproducers particularly when made nonproductive as a result of life's hazards. When the hazards are vivid and the number of victims relatively small (such as disasters arising from flood or hurricane damage), the larger public has little difficulty in responding to the demands for public expenditures; when the hazards are less clear and the number of people involved great, tensions arise in the body politic about enlarging public expenditures for public assistance.

Piven and Cloward argue that the function of relief giving is to reinforce work norms. It is not clear why they devote so much intellectual effort to this point or what policy implications flow from this insight. Perhaps they are concerned over the exploitative practices to which work-oriented people submit themselves: "Those who exploit the cheap labor guaranteed by these [harsh relief] practices can take comfort not only in their godliness but in their profits as well."[14] Why not deal directly with exploitation without insidiously attacking the work norm! We can speculate about the work ethic in the postindustrial society, but if we destroy the work ethic and sink back into a subsistence culture, we may also destroy the luxury of speculation.

The Levels of Benefits

The same considerations that influence the producer groups in their attitudes about the needy and work also operate with regard to two other issues—benefit levels and family structure.

If the cumulative benefits for the nonworking needy approach the net income levels of the lower ranges in the producer group,

[14] *Ibid.*, 172-77.

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this creates shock waves, as we have seen, about social programs addressed to those on assistance. This clash is heightened by a number of anomalies, or what Bruno Stein refers to as the "notch" problem, which occurs when added earnings make the earner economically worse off than before. For one thing, the low-wage worker incurs expenses in connection with working—transportation costs, social security taxes, possibly certain clothing expenses, and possibly marginally higher lunch costs. Then his income is taxed, and for each additional child his annual tax saving at the lowest tax bracket may be about $100 compared to an average annual cash benefit of about $600 for additional children born in AFDC households. Furthermore, his rent, more often unsubsidized than subsidized, comes out of his gross pay, while the person on welfare may receive a housing allowance. His medical care coverage is not likely to be comprehensive. It is to be expected, therefore, that many workers are very resentful of the variety and level of benefits available, particularly in the most liberal states, to many people on public assistance. The benefit levels are constructed on the basis of the cost of basic necessities, and they cumulate as different necessities are included in the package as a result of either client pressures or humanitarian pressures. Since the low-wage earner frequently works in difficult to organize occupations where the leverage for higher wages or benefits is low, there are few organized groups attending to his interests. Yet the incongruity in the "effort" to "income" relationships is great and feeds the resentment toward those receiving assistance.

Similar attitudes prevail among many workers who are not the lowest on the wage scale. No strategy for improving benefit levels for those needing assistance can succeed without a parallel strategy for enriching the lives of those who work and who through their taxes feel they contribute to sustain the needy.

Family Structure

No issue in the poverty/welfare nexus other than the work issue is as emotion laden as the issue of family structure. It is equally emotion laden for the advocates of liberalized welfare benefits as it is for those who question or resist liberalization. While the work-incentive and benefit-level issues are old issues in relief giv-

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ing, that of family structure is a relatively new one and arises primarily as a result of the migration of the blacks. The Southern experience for blacks was not conducive to the development of the nuclear family. After the Civil War there was a slight trend toward the nuclear family in rural areas. With the movement to the cities and the inadequate employment opportunities there for black males, the socioeconomic basis for the nuclear family was further eroded among the very poor. While there are many positive elements in the matrifocal family, such as its acceptance of children, it has many features which are destructive of the qualities needed to succeed in an urban environment. The caste system has contributed to the creation of a family structure which is dysfunctional for success, even when social and economic opportunities become available. The weaknesses of the black slum family have been described vividly by Lee Rainwater.[15] The victimization created by the caste system is reinforced by the social adaptations within the ghetto: the debasement of the male, the excessive use of alcohol and now drugs, the inadequacy of the means of socializing children in ways that will prepare them for the larger world, the anger of blacks toward blacks, and the inadequate development of strategies for career success. One of its consequences as it relates to the welfare system is the intergenerational cycle of dependency—adolescent girls producing illegitimate babies in households supported by public assistance with no framework for "making it." White America, which did not moralize over black family structure when it was exploiting black America, now persists in moralizing when black America needs assistance to cope with the problems of that exploitation. The question, however, goes beyond moralizing and that is why it will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve benefits for the poor as a matter of right, "divorced from the work ethic or tests of deservingness," as Stein suggests.[16] Is a system of assistance without controls or so called tests of deservingness feasible when the producers have the political upper-hand? And if it were, would it be effective in bringing the impoverished blacks and other poor into the productive mainstream of American life?

[15] Lee Rainwater, "Crucible of Identity: The Negro Lower-Class Family," *Daedalus* (Winter, 1966), 172-216.

[16] Stein, 76.

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While some of the public resistance has an overly moralistic quality, there are serious doubts that an income-maintenance strategy alone can create productive households and productive individuals. We have no experience with a broad application of an income-maintenance strategy; for, as indicated earlier, this is the first generation in the history of the human race where work for most people is not a condition of survival. Money alone, though it may maintain people at a subsistence level, may not be sufficient to complete the social transformation of deprived people into productive and effective citizens. We are thus left with a basic set of questions: By what programmatic and political strategy do we draw the final curtain on America's despoilation of the black? How do we complete the absorption into America's cities of this most recent great migration?

Directions

A substantial literature has developed dealing with poverty and welfare, calling attention to problems which we as a nation have swept, or kept, under the rug, and profering solutions and approaches to overcoming poverty, inequality, and injustice. The reflections in this essay arise from considerations raised in a number of recent books; but, in addition to general considerations, each book raises particular problems.

In *On Relief*, Bruno Stein deals with poverty and welfare, concentrating on welfare and alternative forms of income maintenance. He sketches a profile of the poor and raises questions about measuring poverty that impinge on public assistance policy. Reviewing current practices in a historical context, he concludes that most seemingly new ideas on poverty and public charity are, in fact, quite old. Finally, he discusses poverty as inequality in the distribution of income and attempts to delineate the necessary conditions for a systematic antipoverty policy.

Piven and Cloward have written a brilliant tract, *Regulating the Poor*, about relief giving and its uses in regulating the political and economic behavior of the poor. They seek to explain why relief arrangements exist and why, from time to time, the relief rolls precipitously expand or contract. According to them, historical evidence suggests that relief arrangements are initiated or ex-

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panded during the occasional outbreaks of civil disorder produced by mass unemployment and are then abolished or contracted when political stability is restored. They argue that expansive relief policies are intended to mute civil disorder, and restrictive ones to reinforce work norms. The bulk of the book deals with the contemporary American public welfare system. The authors review the events of the Depression, as well as developments during the post-World War II period, including the civil disorder that broke out and spread during the 1960s and resulted in a great upsurge in relief rolls, especially after 1964. Piven and Cloward maintain that they are not against work; they contend, however, that the relief-giving mechanism defines and enforces the terms on which different classes of people are made to do different kinds of work and has a great deal to do with maintaining social and economic inequities.

Let Them Eat Promises by Nick Kotz describes the emergence of hunger as a national political issue in 1967 and the ensuing struggle both in and out of government to do something about the problem. He recounts the efforts of private groups, congressional committees, and selected communications media to focus on the issues, and reviews the response of the executive branch. He details the activities of a citizens' board of inquiry and the Poor People's Campaign and its March on Washington. There are interesting journalistic glimpses into both congressional and bureaucratic in-fighting and manipulation.

Robert H. Binstock and Katherine Ely have collected in *The Politics of the Powerless* readings about the struggles of powerless groups to better the conditions of their lives in American society. The readings, including selections from Malcolm X, Saul Alinsky, Charles Silberman, James Q. Wilson, Irving Howe, and Robert Bendiner, deal with such questions as: What options are available to persons who wish to change the policies and institutions of the society in which they live? Should they work for change inside or outside the system? How patiently can one wait for the established procedures of representative government and constitutional politics to bring about desired changes? Under what circumstances is there a moral imperative to break the law? Can the prospective blacklash, repressive violence, and social disintegration become so costly that they outweigh the benefits of militant,

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direct action? The variety of readings is excellent, and the analytical framework provided by the editors is extremely useful.

Edgar S. Cahn and Barry A. Passett's *Citizen Participation* is a casebook, designed for trainees, on the experience of citizen participation in the 1960s. It provides discussions of the tension between government and citizen over the status of individual and community self-determination. The editors analyze the sociology of politics, citizen participation, and the governmental and administrative implications. Included are a number of case studies of community action in rural cooperatives, an urban school system, a manpower program, a block program in a slum, and an economic development program.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and other Great Society measures to assist low-income groups are the subject of *Government Against Poverty* by Joseph A. Kershaw. The review of past performance and the proposals for the future are based on a combination of cost-benefit analysis of specific programs and general economic analysis of the problems of domestic poverty. Kershaw concludes that, on balance, the outcome has been disappointing, although some highly beneficial results have been achieved. In large part, the modesty of the achievement is accounted for by the nation's unwillingness to devote the quantity of resources visualized in 1964 as necessary over the coming years.

Leonard Freedman in *Public Housing* offers a broad study of the reasons why the public housing program has had such a difficult time in America. Freedman concludes that the basic problem derives from the profound weakness of the poor in the American system of government and politics. He reviews the legislative process, group pressures, and the general cultural climate with regard to poverty, race, and public ownership which contribute to the difficulties. Yet he argues for a consensus strategy rather than a confrontation strategy.

Daniel P. Moynihan has brought together a collection of essays, *Toward a National Urban Policy*, by a distinguished group of authors which represents an effort to formulate a national urban policy. The essays explore many facets of urban policy, from housing to transportation and from crime to education. Several discuss the migration to the cities and the problems of the migrants in the cities. The book examines as well the policies needed to restore

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the fiscal vitality of urban government and to assure equality in the provision of public services among different jurisdictions in metropolitan areas.

In *Neighborhood Control of Public Programs*, Howard Hallman undertakes an intensive review of a wide number of neighborhood boards and community corporations initiated during the sixties aimed at strengthening citizen participation in the operation of public programs. The case studies cover both urban and rural programs, and describe both their historical backgrounds and their current operations. Hallman concludes that community control of public service programs is making a difference in a number of cities. While he recognizes the balance needed between centralization and decentralization, he concludes that at this time in American history, decentralization should have greater emphasis.

George A. Shipman reviews the federal government's efforts to combat poverty in *Designing Program Action—Against Urban Poverty* and concludes that the failure is primarily the result of the lack of a uniform urban organizational apparatus, and a lack of a design for program action suitable for the typical metropolis. He provides a model of the organizational elements necessary to cope with poverty and a model of operational activity that relates the elements of the poverty program to the elements of the organizational design.

What is clear to this reader is that single solutions, such as money, will not work, though they may be helpful. It is also clear, if unpleasant, that even a multiprogram strategy will not work quickly. We are dealing with poverty, not simply with an economic problem which some manipulation of income-distribution patterns might cope with; not simply with a problem in lack of opportunities which some job-stimulating approaches might overcome; and not simply with a lack of power which organization, discipline, and numbers might overcome. We are dealing with all of these and more. We lack a conceptual framework, politically acceptable and manageable, which is both realistic and constructive. What are some elements of such a framework?

(1) It must be based on compassion for the poor without romanticizing poverty. To be very poor and degraded is a misery; being poor creates people who are ill adapted to being anything other than poor. The poor have very little understanding about

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how to manage the business of not being poor; they have very little understanding of the social and psychological ingredients of social mobility. Admittedly, the larger community needs greater understanding of the ways of poor people, and new programs need to be devised which show sensitivity to and awareness of these ways. But self-help and community development approaches which invest great worldly wisdom in the poor themselves are built on a chimera.

(2) Income distribution schemes, to be workable and politically feasible, cannot be insulated from work and other requirements. If the objective is not merely to eliminate penury but also to create productive individuals and families, then the larger community is entitled to consider ways of controlling income redistribution so that it does not undermine the general work ethic. A tangential issue has recently arisen with respect to narcotic addicts on welfare. Is their right to welfare absolute, or may the authorities require that they enter rehabilitation programs?

(3) We need a long-term strategy, not four-year strategies linked to the election cycle. The short-term strategies abound in rhetoric, raise false expectations, and lead to terrible disappointments which further undermine confidence in democratic government. Certainly there are short-term urgencies which call for response, but a long-term strategy must be devised that is based on a number of realistic assumptions: (a) that it will take several generations of poor children born in an urban environment to respond to the opportunities that are gradually opening up for the oppressed minorities; (b) that the availability of new opportunities in professional and managerial occupations will develop in evolutionary though accelerated fashion rather than by abrupt, wholesale displacement of incumbents; (c) that institutional change is slow and that this is equally true for nonminority institutions as it is for the minority family and community institutions. Gradually, the nonminority institutions will respond and adapt to the needs and interests of the oppressed poor, and the minority family and community institutions will become more adaptive to the acculturation and success requirements of their members.

(4) It must be multifunctional in scope, but basically oriented to human resources development and to work. Education must be

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strengthened. Unemployment, particularly among minority males (women's liberation to the contrary notwithstanding), must be reduced to 3-4 per cent, even if this requires subsidized work programs over long periods of time. Open housing at reasonable rentals must be provided extensively throughout the metropolitan areas.

(5) There must be elements of risk and audacity in comprehensive programming, since new approaches must be tried and many old approaches abandoned. The balance between taking risks and acting prudently is never an easy one to find. In the narrow sense, of particular benefits received for money spent, many experimental programs will be failures. In a broader sense, if a community or society works its way to programs and policies of demonstrated value through trial and error, then even the failures and the "waste" may be seen as contributing to success. The conservative preoccupation with not wasting money can often be costly because it limits thrusts toward new efforts at problem-solving.

We are a wealthy nation and we have still many poor in our midst. The large and developing literature is a sign of deep national concern with the problems of the poor, and an indication of the ferment within the academic community as efforts to deal with the poor accelerate.

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Book Reviews

Beyond Freedom and Dignity *by B. F. Skinner. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1971.—225 pp. $6.95.*

Professor Skinner's new book shares with Immanuel Velikovsky's *Worlds in Collision* and Eric Segal's *Love Story* the perverse distinction of being slighted by almost all serious critics and yet being avidly bought and read by a huge public. Works of fiction, we know, suffer or enjoy this ambivalent fate more often than scientific works, and this observation itself says something about the content of Professor Skinner's speculations. It also raises a question about the choice of reinforcement which, he holds, directs all conduct; and I shall press the question in good time.

First, however, the content of Professor Skinner's thoughts. He considers that we must treat the human person as a black box, operationally; stimuli enter at one end, and result realistically in an output of actions at the other. What happens in between, the reflections, emotions, conflicts, and motives, "are by-products and not to be mistaken for causes" (p. 16)—that is, as epiphenomena they only seem to mediate between the ends, and the resolute conditioner ignores them.

Nevertheless, not all methods of conditioning are equally effective in the long run. It is wasteful (at best) to try to preserve freedom by using weak conditioning: for instance, to influence conduct by intellectual argument. And strong conditioning by punishment or suffering, while it preserves dignity, defeats itself; Professor Skinner is explicit here: "We say that there is something 'morally wrong' about a totalitarian state, a gambling enterprise, uncontrolled piecework wages, the sale of harmful drugs, or undue personal influence, not because of any absolute

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set of values, but because all these things have aversive consequences" (p. 174).

The sound procedure is operant conditioning, which works by rewarding each small, involuntary step on the way to the total action that the conditioner seeks to evoke and fix. Professor Skinner calls this sequential reinforcement of the components of an action, the design of contingencies; and he regards it as a man-made analog to natural and cultural selection.

So much by way of exposition. By way of evidence, I ought to say that operant conditioning has indeed been effective and gracious in making something of the lives of those who lack a part of the full human endowment—mongoloid children, for example, psychotics, and others among the mentally afflicted. Yet that example is telltale. It shows that defective and rather passive personalities can be helped by Professor Skinner's devices to reach minimal social norms, and are happier for that. But the example also reminds us, brutally, that the minimal norms do not go far; they do not express most of the forms of behavior that we prize in a full man and a full society.

Professor Skinner does not shirk a definition of man; after two chapters on "The Evolution of a Culture" and "The Design of a Culture," he ends boldly with a chapter called "What is Man?" What strikes and chills one in reading it also is what astonishes one in his prescriptions of reinforcement: the poverty of imagination. Professor Skinner has no sense of the subtlety of conduct, of course, but it also turns out that he has no sense simply of the variety of man. Yet variety is what makes the human species and human societies unique among the animals. As a matter of biology, the diversity within populations has made man survive and succeed in all environments, when he is so ill equipped for any one environment.

Every culture is aware of that and contains safeguards (such as caring for the poor) to maintain both genetic and behavioral diversity; the most unexpected is the prohibition of incest, which is one of the few universals that all cultures share. Professor Skinner has a grander design: "If we are looking for variety, we should not fall back upon accident," he writes; "the only hope is *planned* diversification" (p. 162). Yet he is unable to point to any plan, for a fundamental and crucial reason.

The reason is that, like all behaviorists, Professor Skinner makes no distinction between *behavior* and *action*. A culture is a learned form of communally preferred behavior, certainly, but it is not a learned form of action. Human behavior is characterized by, and is unique by virtue of, its high content of *inaction*—of internal delay in preparation for de-

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ferred action. Again, there is a biological groundwork for this in the long childhood of man; but the deferment of action in man goes far beyond that. It is most striking in the way in which our actions are mediated by values, that is, by general strategies designed to balance opposing impulses or "reinforcements." We do not run our lives, that is, our overall behavior, by any scheme of problem solving; we devise strategies to ensure that what is attractive in the short term is weighed in the balance of coherence that we experience as long-term satisfaction.

By comparison with such internal debates, which we all hold with ourselves, Professor Skinner's analysis is crude to the point of vulgarity. He has a chapter called "Values" of which a typical sentence reads, "To make a value judgment by calling something good or bad is to classify it in terms of its reinforcing effects" (p. 105). It is almost inconceivable that a student of human behavior could think that that sentence is about values, or plans, or strategies, or any human component of judgment. For example, by the test of that sentence, Professor Skinner has had good sales but bad reviews. How does he think about that dilemma? And does he think that the daily dilemmas of his fellow men, for whom he presumes to write prescriptions, are any less profound?

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Man and His Work: A Sociological Study *edited by A. G. Zdravomyslov, V. P. Rozhin, and V. A. Iadov; English text edited and translated by Stephen P. Dunn. White Plains, N. Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1970.—398 pp.*

Originally published in Moscow in 1967 as *Chelovek i ero rabota*, this book is the product of four years' work at the Laboratory of Sociological Research, Leningrad State University. The team set out to probe the Marxist proposition that under communism, work will become for the workers "a first need of life," i.e., cease to be a means and acquire the character of an end, allowing human potentialities full expression. Since the age of communism has not yet dawned in the Soviet Union, the researchers focused upon young workers (18-30) who made up 30-40 per cent of industrial workers in the Leningrad area and whose attitudes to work under socialism could be sifted for pointers to the next stage of Soviet development. The general hypotheses are naturally of Marxist origin: the attitudes to work of all workers are expected to be

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governed by three broad factors, the "totality of social, primarily economic, relationships" (crucially, the ownership of the means of production); the "functional content of labor," i.e., the character of the job or role; and the personality characteristics of the workers, although only the last two are investigated. The method of investigation "is that of concrete sociological research," for which Marxist philosophy is said to provide the "general methodological basis." For detailed study, however, that philosophy (they acknowledge) is incomplete and has to be complemented by other disciplines. The inquiry then followed familiar lines: the derivation of more specific hypotheses to be verified; the operationalizing of variables, e.g., the "functional content of labor"; and the search for connections between them and the attitudes disclosed by a (non-proportionally distributed) sample of 2,665 young workers employed in 24 enterprises in various branches of industry in Leningrad.

After a sophisticated technical analysis, the two root hypotheses are confirmed. With one of these political scientists and historians may be particularly concerned, the finding that the "functional content of labor" does determine both the objective results, primarily the degree of initiative displayed on the job, and the subjective satisfaction from it, the wages received *not* constituting an independent factor but varying with that satisfaction. Even a factor so fundamental as the ownership of the means of production is found to influence the structure of attitudes only as it is "refracted through the prism of the specific characteristics" of the laboring activity. Thus, in contradistinction to what is represented by the team as an erroneous interpretation of Lenin, the abolition of such private ownership is not a sufficient condition for a constructive change in workers' attitudes under communism. It follows that the building up of a communist attitude toward work (to match the proposition that work is to become "a first need of life") must depend (in part) upon changing the functional content of the jobs, e.g., increasing the proportion of interesting activity, injecting more creative possibilities into the productive process, and the like. Since the general conclusion accords with some Western findings (e.g., about nationalization in Great Britain), this research may mark another kind of convergence from that discussed in 1964 by Brzezinski and Huntington. The possibility is strengthened by the assumption of a hierarchy of personal needs reminiscent, by implication, of A. H. Maslow's formulation and by the method of verifying propositions once these have been derived from the Marxist canon.

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Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology. A Macrosociological Analysis *by Joachim Israel. Boston, Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1971. —x, 358 pp. $6.95.*

Like certain wines, certain books do not travel well; that is, they lose their characteristic flavor when exported. This volume is a case in point. The author is an eminent Swedish social psychologist who previously taught at the University of Upsala and the University of Stockholm and is currently professor of sociology at the University of Copenhagen. This work was written as a graduate-level textbook in sociological theory and has been translated from the Swedish into all other Scandinavian languages as well as into German and French. It seems to have met certain felt needs in Europe, but the present English translation, which has been carried out by the author, is not likely to find a similar acclaim here since much of what it has to say is quite familiar to American readers.

Writing from a neo-Marxist perspective, Israel attempts to trace the development of the concept of alienation beginning with Marx. He then confronts it with the ways in which classical sociological theorists, in particular Weber, Simmel, and Durkheim, have dealt with the problem in their own terms. Later chapters discuss the work of such writers as Fromm, Marcuse, and Mills in the light of theories of alienation and examine the uses of these theories in the empirical work of such American sociologists as Mizruchi and Blauner and of the Finnish sociologist Allardt. A penultimate chapter deals with the recent revival of concern with alienation in certain countries of the Eastern block. The author develops his own overall theory in the final chapter entitled "The Problem of Reification."

One would imagine that a book that brings to the attention of European students a number of American studies not readily available there and that relates these studies to the currently fashionable concern with problems of alienation, would be eminently successful. But the matter is different when it comes to this country, where most of these studies have become the common fare not only of social scientists but of the educated layman. There seems but little need for capsule summaries of the work of the classics or for yet another critical evaluation of Marcuse or Fromm. As to the discussion of the concept of alienation in Marx, even though the author's treatment is painstaking and scholarly, it hardly comes as a surprise to learn from Israel that the young Marx's use of the term is both vague and ambiguous and that it has a strongly romantic flavor.

Israel suggests that the term alienation should be discarded from sociological theorizing and that social science should instead make use of

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the related concept of reification to refer to a process through which the works of men have become things that are in the saddle. Relying heavily on Lukacs and Galbraith, as well as on the Marxian notion of the fetishism of commodities, Israel argues for the development of a new social science which, in addition to being "positive" as well as "understanding," should be critical in that it would help to free men from the dominance of the "things" which, be it through the production of unnecessary commodities or the manipulation of inhuman bureaucracies, stunt their growth.

This is a worthwhile project, provided one keeps in mind the cautionary advice of the British philosopher-sociologist Ernest Gellner, who recently wrote: "The idea of non-alienated man, freed in his choices and values from social constraints, is about as realistic as the idea of a quintessential onion, left when all the leaves have been stripped off."

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American Convictions: Cycles of Public Thought, 1600-1850 *by Charles A. Barker. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1970. —xix, 632 pp. $15.00.*

Charles Barker has made a stately effort to fit what he calls *public thought*—"main ideas and impulses, loyalties and traditions, which have concerned public-community life in America"—into an enduring pattern. He distinguishes four key realms of thought—politics and the law, economics, education, and, most central in his judgment, religion—and surveys each in leisurely style and massive detail. He confidently traces governing "convictions" back to the English polity that the first settlers brought over with them and agrees with Howard Mumford Jones that the colonials were "of the Renaissance but not in it." They were captivated by the masterful legal, religious, and artistic thought of Elizabethan England, which they applied with lesser genius to the New World, and conceived a loyalty to English traditions that has proved "durable" to the present.

What caused the cyclical patterns is not so clearly specified, however. When Barker refers to *cycles*, he means something considerably less drastic than revolutions, in which new forms obliterate the old. Yet there is an unstable momentum in even the gentlest cyclic condition that calls for explanation. Perhaps the American case has been one of worthy social principles failing to be maintained by weak human nature. Bar-

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ker indicates as much. But he does not deny that the fault may have been with the principles, that they may have been flawed and so have forced American society to be unstable. In any event, American life has seldom been as orderly as Barker would have had it. His central contention is that the nation's moments of glory and fulfillment have occurred when some great man or concept has managed, temporarily, to reconcile conflicting passions and interests.

Like most cyclical historians, Barker has a conservative fondness for continuity and tends to see quiescent periods as the normal ones. He points out how, repeatedly, "great expansion and great outlay of cultural energy in America was [*sic*] immediately accompanied by doubts and challenges, and before long by political disintegration and violence." Essentially, his story is of an imperfect order continually challenged by dissenters who strain toward unwise freedom.

Barker thus rejects the idea that there may have been two (or more) rival sets of convictions vying legitimately for dominance—that Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore Parker, Robert Owen and George Ripley, and other "outsiders" may have been the spokesmen for alternative cultural norms, rather than mere critics of the one and only. All this is to say nothing, of course, of the even more divisive cultural collisions, especially those involving masses of new immigrants, that took place after the mid-nineteenth century, where Barker's story ends.

Nowhere is Barker's unitary view of an ongoing Establishment more tellingly stated than in his discussion of Transcendentalism, the great New England challenge to traditional social authority. Barker contends that the prevailing polity and culture suffered Transcendentalists "to speak and act subversively among those institutions—church and college —which were no longer allied with the state." The lesson, which could be applied to most of the brushes Barker describes between the social order and dissenters, is that "the self-assertion of Ralph Waldo Emerson needs to be remembered . . . for the external opportunity which it enjoyed but did not create, as well as for its acuteness and integrity."

Such large weighted judgments lend form to Barker's full-dress review. Credit is due him for embracing in reasonable argument such a wide range of American history. He has clung to lofty old school historical ambitions and dared to sense a wholeness about the American experience in an age when so many others have been discouraged into thinking that all Great Designs are hopeless illusions.

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Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government *by Gerald Stourzh. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970.—278 pp. $8.50.*

Alexander Hamilton and American Foreign Policy: A Design for Greatness *by Gilbert L. Lycan. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1970.—xi, 459 pp. $9.95.*

In the year 1822, Timothy Pickering, a prominent Federalist and former secretary of state, lamented that George Washington's "acts are so blended with the efficiency of Hamilton that I fear it will be difficult to find a biographer bold enough to do justice to the latter." The proof may have taken more than a century, but the books under review, along with the many other recent studies of Hamilton, demonstrate how groundless such fears were. Indeed, with the publication of these two studies the pro-Hamilton revival of our generation (as one scholar mistakenly said of Broadus Mitchell's distinguished two-volume biography some fifteen-odd years ago) has reached an apogee.

Professor Stourzh's book is the most perceptive and brilliant study of Hamilton's political thought yet written. His analysis of Hamilton's understanding of republican government and the American mold into which he attempted to cast it raise fundamental issues which point, as Stourzh comments, "beyond Hamilton's career to the core of the problems confronting the Founders between about 1760 and 1800." It is on these issues and problems, rather than the biographical details of Hamilton's life, that Stourzh focuses attention. The nature and range of his analysis is indicated by his chapter titles: " 'Resort to First Principles': Blackstone, Hamilton, and the Natural Right to Revolution"; "The Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Freedom, and Virtue"; "The Springs of Republican Government: Private Passions, Public Interest, and the Love of Fame"; "The Foreign Policy of Republican Government"; and "The Pursuit of Greatness."

Stourzh has read Hamilton's writings not only with a careful but a critical eye, perceiving more clearly than any previous scholar the nuances of his political thought, particularly the meaning which he attached to certain key words or phrases (the "depravity of man," "self-interest," and "influence," for example) which are so often uncritically bandied about by scholars more intent on indicting than on understanding his ideas. Stourzh is no less adept at destroying the stereotypes by which Hamilton is so often misrepresented—his love of power, distrust of democracy, and alleged commitment to monarchy, among others. Instead, Stourzh plausibly argues that the core of Hamilton's political thought and practice was his search for "the perfect balance between liberty and

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power." One is impressed, finally, by Professor Stourzh's exemplary knowledge of the history of political philosophy which permits him to relate eighteenth-century thought to political concepts of preceding centuries as well as today.

Hamilton's ideas on foreign policy to which Stourzh devotes almost one-half of his study are the subject of Professor Lycan's book. To compare the two is perhaps unfair—the former is a sophisticated analysis of political thought; the latter, in the author's words, "is intended to be, not a deep philosophical analysis of Hamilton's politics, but rather an illustration of his practical views on the day-to-day affairs of government." Lycan's study, unfortunately, suffers from yet another unfair comparison. For all the laborious research and careful thought it entailed, his book leaves the professional historian with a sense of *déjà vu*. The recent spate of studies on early American foreign policy dealing in large part with Hamilton's notable contribution to its formulation make Lycan's otherwise praiseworthy appraisal of the same subject appear stale rather than fresh, derivative rather than original. It is, in brief, the right book at the wrong time.

Nevertheless, no other study has so exhaustively examined Hamilton's role in the creation of American foreign policy nor assessed it more appreciatively. Professor Lycan's thesis is that Hamilton's work in laying the foundations of a sound foreign policy entitle him to rank as one of America's finest statesmen. Like Stourzh and other historians, Lycan concludes that "harmonious relations with Great Britain were at the heart of Hamilton's purpose." Unlike many other historians, he also argues that "as far as relations with Britain were concerned Hamilton was the chief author of United States foreign policy from 1791 to 1798." Although Lycan's defense of his subject's ideas and policies is untinctured by criticism, it is, for the most part, convincing. This book's greatest strength, in sum, lies in its revision of aspects of Hamilton's policies which persistently have been misunderstood. For this contribution alone scholars should be grateful.

JACOB E. COOKE
Lafayette College

The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic *by Richard E. Ellis. New York, Oxford University Press, 1971. —xii, 377 pp. $9.75.*

The central thesis of this book is that "the judiciary issue . . . became the overriding domestic issue of Jefferson's first administration . . . the issue

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around which the meaning of the 'revolution of 1800' was to be defined." Ellis argues that "radicals," a segment of the Democratic-Republican party that had its base among the agrarian masses, sought to democratize American society by making judges and the courts more amenable to popular control and the judicial system less complicated and expensive to use. Arrayed against them were "moderates," the dominant elites in both the Federalist and Republican parties whose constituencies were among commercial planters and merchants who favored "a legal system which was not subject to the immediate control of the public."

Ellis tests his thesis first by examining the struggle over the national judiciary, focusing on the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the impeachment trials of Justice Pickering and Justice Chase. The outcome, he concludes, was inconclusive. The Federalist-dominated judiciary prudently retreated in the face of criticism, but no radical transformation occurred because Jefferson and the moderate Republican majority "never seemed to have favored . . . the total destruction of the independence of the national judiciary." Ellis next turns in the major portion of the book to the struggle for judicial reform in the states, spotlighting Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. In every case "moderates" conceded limited reforms, but though justice was made cheaper, faster, more dependable and convenient, "radicals" were no more successful in the states than in the nation in achieving "an elective judiciary and a system of law . . . which was directly and immediately responsible to the people."

Finally, Ellis accounts for the court reform movement as the outcome of the democratic ferment unleashed by the American Revolution, the antilegalism of the evangelical revivalist tradition stemming from the Great Awakening, and the pressure from "agrarian-minded people" who were "outside the market economy" and wanted "a cheap, simple, and easily accessible legal system . . . under the control of men who were locally known and . . . who could easily be held accountable for their decisions." The agrarians were only partially successful because, according to Ellis, their entrepreneurial allies within the Republican party sought power only to acquire political recognition and economic privilege for themselves. Elitists, the "moderate" Republicans combined with Federalists to block "radical" democracy. The result was "probably" to secure "the liberal tradition in America."

Ellis has written one of the more interesting and provocative recent studies of the early Republic. On first glance it seems to carry forward the radical-conservative hypothesis which Beard and Merrill Jensen formulated for the revolutionary decades but which has not survived

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critical scrutiny. But Ellis manages to make his thesis more persuasive, if not entirely convincing. First, it rests on prodigious research and tellingly used data. Second, he recognizes the complexity of the forces involved—the heterogeneity of the Republican party, the inconsistencies of leaders, the necessity to probe deeply into local politics to understand national politics. Best of all, Ellis knows that no *simple* social class dichotomy can quite accommodate the data.

Yet for all his persuasiveness, Ellis is not entirely convincing. First, the "radical-moderate" split within the Republican party needs clearer definition. As Ellis himself notes, some of the sharpest critics of the courts were urban, not agrarian Republicans. Neat labeling of politicians has its pitfalls, and one wonders why James Garrard of Kentucky is a "firm moderate" on p. 154 but appears as a radical on p. 155. Moreover, in Pennsylvania and Kentucky leading advocates of reform seem to have been the "outs" who utilized attacks on the legal system as a popular issue through which they hoped to become the "ins." Political ambition, the challenge of aspiring elites against established elites, not ideological commitment to popular democracy, motivated a good deal of the "radical" leadership. And if we discount for opportunism and the political mileage to be gained from hot rhetoric against lawyers and judges, what is left of the "radical" movement? Part of the problem is that party politics may not be an entirely satisfactory perspective from which to study court reform. In Kentucky, Federalists supported "radical" Republicans as a way of striking at the ruling Republican junto and in Massachusetts rural Federalists teamed up with rural Republicans to block court reform favored by entrepreneurial Federalists and Republicans. Finally, by attempting to reinterpret the meaning of Jeffersonian "democracy" through intensive study of one issue, Ellis may have erected too ambitious a structure on too slender foundations.

New Left historians will applaud this impressive effort to make fundamental conflict rather than bland consensus—conflict between democrats in the Republican party and elitists in both parties—the key to understanding the revolution of 1800 but one wonders how deep the social cleavages Ellis insists upon really were when in the end he concludes that the radicals failed "for the simple reason that most of the public grievances against the courts and the legal profession had been remedied" by reforms enacted by wily "moderates" determined to secure "the liberal tradition in America."

PAUL GOODMAN
University of California, Davis

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Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil War *by Bray Hammond. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970.—ix, 364 pp. $10.00.*

As everybody knows, the commercial banks of the antebellum United States were incorporated institutions whose banknote issues provided Americans with the most important component of their money supply. Except for those very few states, notably New York and Michigan, whose adoption of free banking laws made uniform and automatic the process of incorporation, promoters of banks lobbied and bribed their way in state capitals for the advantageous provisions made possible by special charters. Banking and politics were thus intimately intertwined, and not for these reasons alone, and this undoubtedly explains why the late Bray Hammond chose to entitle his Pulitzer Prize winning volume of 1957 *Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War* and why, too, the present volume bears the subtitle it does. The latter, however, has relatively little to do with politics and even less with banks. It is primarily a study of the fiscal problems of a Treasury Department directed by a man, Salmon P. Chase, who Hammond is convinced, to the point of invective, was incompetent in that role; it is also a study whose principal argument is that with the authorization by Congress of the issue of legal tender notes (mainly the "greenbacks") and the subsequent taxing out of existence of state banknotes, the federal government not only assumed at long last the monetary powers which the Constitution intended it to have but in that very process also began to exercise those positive powers of sovereignty which sharply differentiate the government of twentieth-century America from its "stunted" counterpart of the antebellum period. Degrees of competence and of sovereignty, however, are clearly matters of judgment on which scholars may differ.

As for the first of these, it must be acknowledged that Chase is widely regarded as deserving a place of low esteem among our secretaries of treasury. He invited inflation by failing to recommend vigorous taxation and by endorsing excessive issues of legal tender paper; in addition, and unlike Hamilton, instead of seeking to sustain the value of government bonds by open-market operations, he simply refused to sell them below par and thus brought their sale to a standstill. Nevertheless, even standard texts give him credit for securing the funds necessary for the conduct of the war and point out that, after all, this was most important. Hammond, in contrast, almost tirelessly flays Chase for his "ignorance of monetary practice joined [to] a stubborn, dogmatic wrong-headedness" (p. 156), for his "obtuseness" (p. 177), "noble delusions" (p. 258), and "sly, dis-

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ingenuous, rude, and ignorant behavior" (p. 337). He goes so far as to characterize as "an inexcusable misdeed blackened by breach of trust" Chase's "scuttling" of an amendment allegedly designed to suspend the specie requirement of the Independent Treasury Act (p. 337).

But on Hammond's own evidence, while Chase favored payment in gold of sums lent the Treasury and opposed the drawing of the sums by check from the commercial banks, he did write the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee that was considering the amendment: "I submit it to the better judgment of the committee" (p. 61). Confidence in Hammond's own judgment is not enhanced by his ability to say in one place (p. 79) that "everyone" understood that the purpose of the amendment was to authorize Chase to suspend the specie requirement and in another (p. 99) that "most contemporaries mistook what the amendment authorized." Furthermore, Hammond appears to have been unable to decide whether a government of stunted powers is to be deplored, appreciated in preference to wasteful advocacy of nationalist measures in wartime, or regarded wistfully from the vista of mid-twentieth-century centralization. As for the question of degrees of sovereignty, I would point out that our antebellum history contains not only such strong executive behavior as that of Presidents Jefferson and Jackson, but also highly important activity by Congress in the fields of public land policy, internal improvements, and territorial aggrandizement. Legal tender acts may look particularly conspicuous to historians of money and banking, but they appear less elevated on historical landscapes of greater breadth.

STUART BRUCHEY
Columbia University

Peace and Counterpeace: From Wilson to Hitler *by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971.—xi, 585 pp. $12.95.*

"When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs." So judged Elihu Root writing in the first issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The second part of the statement especially might be taken as summing up the theme of this book.

The generation that achieved maturity after the Second World War may have difficulty in realizing the extent to which a large section of the American people after the First World War looked upon foreign

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affairs as a somewhat tainted activity. Yet there were those who understood the irretrievability of lost innocence that was America's participation in the First World War and the importance of the American role in the outcome of that war and in the shaping of the future course of events. One expression of that concern was the creation of the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan organization designed to promote interest in and spread information about foreign problems. The periodical *Foreign Affairs* had a similar purpose. The initial organizing group included a number of those who had participated in the process of peacemaking. Started under the editorship of a distinguished historian, Professor Archibald Carey Coolidge, much of the editorial work fell from the beginning to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who in 1928 himself became its chief editor.

Mr. Armstrong was fortunate in the circumstances that brought him to that position. A somewhat tenuous and accidental connection with Serbian affairs was the wedge of his entreé into the Balkan world, a first love never thereafter abandoned. His position with *Foreign Affairs* broadened the horizon of his activity and connections; between meeting and securing articles from important political figures and travel in Europe, he was given the opportunity to observe at close range, even at times to participate in, the operation of international activity.

These memoirs as a consequence provide mainly first-hand sketches of personalities combined with a review of the events of post-First World War peacemaking and the subsequent twenty-year truce. The wide range of access enjoyed by the author makes him a valuable witness: his judgments, the anecdotes with which he intersperses his tale, make engrossing reading, especially to anyone who has lived through and can recall the period.

Much that has been forgotten in the aftermath of another conflict is brought to life again: the difficulties of the peacemaking, the controversial role of Woodrow Wilson, the plight of the French, that circumstances placed in a well nigh impossible position, the comparable though different problems with which the British proved unable to cope. The author is not without his predilections. For the Italian regime and Italian policy his sympathies are scant; the Yugoslavs are closer to his heart, and the dilemma of King Alexander is presented with understanding. Vignettes of personalities add flavor to the record. One can only hope that Mr. Armstrong will give us more of the tale for the period following the one with which he has dealt.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ
Barnard College

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The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration *by William C. Berman. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1970.—xi, 261 pp. $8.00.*

Despite his great reputation as an outstanding liberal, Franklin D. Roosevelt's civil rights record is a meager one. Berman, associate professor of history at the University of Toronto, gives Roosevelt credit for only two civil rights contributions: the creation of a Civil Rights Section in the Department of Justice, and Executive Order 8802, creating a Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). But the former may have been chiefly the work of Frank Murphy when he was attorney general, and the latter was the result of A. Philip Randolph's threat to lead 100,000 Negroes into Washington under the banner of his March on Washington. Wherever his heart may have been, FDR's political strategy with respect to civil rights demands was to placate and hold in line Southern Democrats in and out of Congress.

As a senator, Harry Truman supported civil rights measures. One of his first acts as president, on behalf of civil rights, was his appointment in 1945 of the first Negro as a federal judge. At times his support of civil rights seemed to be merely ritualistic rhetoric, but there can be little doubt that on the whole he was sincerely committed to the idea of finding ways to advance racial equality and justice. The present Commission on Civil Rights had its origin in Truman's executive order that established the President's Committee on Civil Rights, with Charles Wilson as chairman, and this was followed two days later with Truman's request that Congress enact FEPC legislation that would set up a permanent agency charged with the duty to end discrimination in employment.

In a speech delivered in 1947, Truman formulated his philosophy of civil rights. He said:

> We must keep moving forward with new concepts of civil rights to safeguard our heritage. The extension of civil rights today means, not protection of the people against the government, but protection of the people by the government. We must make the Federal Government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and equalities of all Americans. And again I mean all Americans. . . . Our national government must show the way. . . . We cannot wait another decade or another generation to remedy these evils.

This, says Berman, was the first time in the twentieth century that a president of the United States publicly discussed the problem of racial discrimination "with frankness and humanity."

The author rightly records the outstanding contribution made by the Truman administration to civil rights through the solicitor general, Philip Perlman, whose briefs filed with the Supreme Court took what were

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then considered extreme positions in defense of Negroes who fought to vindicate their rights under the Constitution, notably in *Shelley* v *Kraemer*, the famous restrictive covenant case decided in 1948.

In 1948, Truman sent to Congress a proposal for an omnibus Civil Rights Act, which called for a permanent commission on civil rights, protection of the right to vote, an FEPC commission, the outlawing of Jim Crow in interstate traffic, home rule and voting rights in the District of Columbia, statehood for Alaska and Hawaii, and other changes requested before their time had come.

Perhaps the most significant contribution made by Truman to the civil rights struggle was his Executive Order 9981, by which he created the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, and the terms of which called for racial equality in the armed services. In 1949, Truman named William R. Hastie a judge of the federal court of appeals, the first Negro to be named to so high a judicial position. In 1951, Truman established, by an executive order, a Government Contract Compliance Committee, as a further step toward ending racial discrimination in employment. And finally, as the author rightly reminds us, it was in the Truman administration that a brief filed by Attorney General James P. McGranery in 1952 argued that the separate but equal facilities rule was a contradiction in terms, that schools and other public facilities where persons are segregated by race cannot under any circumstances be considered equal in the constitutional sense. This was several years before Chief Justice Warren led the Supreme Court to accept this position.

This is no mean record, and Professor Berman does not exaggerate when he concludes his solid study with the judgment that Truman's actions and policies "did much to shape and advance the civil rights struggle in America in the years he occupied the White House."

MILTON R. KONVITZ
Cornell University

The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate *by Robert Griffith. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1971. —xi, 362 pp. $8.50.*

There is a certain kind of history that concentrates upon the lives of the great, the near great, and the merely swollen, and which then holds them so close to the reader's face that he can never really see the true meaning of the dramatic events in which they participated. For exam-

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ple, Plutarch's Caesar fills the stage even more masterfully than Shakespeare's. The modern contribution to this art form is precise documentation with thick layers of reference to drawers and boxes of scattered collections of political incunabula, the tablets, the shards, the detritus of struggle, triumph, and ruin left behind by officers of the commonwealth and the private citizens in whose behalf they spoke and acted, often in their interest.

Professor Griffith's book is based in great part upon such spoils, and the reader is encouraged by the scrupulous attention and careful regard given small details about small matters to feel that the most professional conventions have been satisfied.This account of the career of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin—a well written work—even provides the reader with imaginative touches that only literary license allows. Thus there is notice of the significant prophecy in the early sign—the Malmedy hearings "confirmed the direction in which he was heading." There is surmise—McCarthy "may have received the list" of names for the Wheeling and Salt Lake City speeches from a House investigator. There is mind-reading—"He had begun to realize. . . ." And dramatic exposition—" . . . snapped the angry Arkansas Democrat." It is also by an exercise of artistic license that the author plays down the astonishments of the *Amerasia* case (the documents were "for the most part harmless and over-classified"), and plays up what he calls the McCarthy "lobby" in the wrecking operation that the senator performed on the Tydings Committee hearings, although it turns out that there was no "lobby," and that "it" was not McCarthy's. Professor Griffith impenetrably refers to McCarthyism as something that "was frequently although mistakenly called 'McCarthyism' " and concludes that the reasons for the collapse of McCarthyism were "broad and complex," which they undoubtedly were, and still are.

The chronicle moves along in smooth style, but the reader misses the broader meaning of events that are so closely footnoted. There is, for example, no effort to evaluate the meaning of McCarthyism for the many victims of the senator's inquisitions; nor an appraisal of the consequences in the operations of the federal agencies for which he can be held responsible, such, one might say, as the intimidation of the State Department and the ruinous effect his attentions had on the morale of both the departmental and the foreign services. The author's principal modest venture into interpretation does not go beyond the statements of the many who have preceded him, namely, that the generating force behind McCarthy and McCarthyism was the struggle of conservative elements, centered for the most part in the Republican party, to regain the power

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they lost in 1932 and were not to recover until 1952.

There are references in the text and the bibliography to the work on McCarthy, McCarthyism, and kindred matters done by political scientists, but there is a great difference between citing the books and comprehending the truth of them. This is strongly evident in the confusion shown by the author about the judgment one should make of McCarthyism as an aspect of American politics, whether it should be seen as something common or uncommon, usual or not. At one point, Professor Griffith says that McCarthyism was a symptom of a "malfunctioning of the entire political system" (p. 116). But he concludes the book with the dictum that "both McCarthy and McCarthyism can be understood as products of the normal operation of American political parties" (p. 320).

The book is an accurate report of what is reported, but it is just a little bit like a music review in which the critic concentrates on Nero and fails to mention that he was burning down Rome at the time of the recital.

EARL LATHAM
Amherst College

Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 *by Lloyd C. Gardner. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970.—xi, 365 pp. $8.95.*

The Anti-Communist Impulse *by Michael Parenti. New York, Random House, 1969.—333 pp. $7.95.*

The value (and novelty) of a study of the cold war from whose pages its author—following the lead of Sir John Maynard in *Russia in Flux*—has sought "to banish . . . wolves, angels, and predatory fat gentlemen with a gift for arithmetic" can scarcely be exaggerated. For while the preoccupation of many cold-war historians with heroes and villains is understandable, and not uninstructive, its unfortunate consequence has been to obscure the larger forces which acted upon policy makers—those structural and cultural "inputs" which must surely figure in any adequate explanation of the origins and development of the cold war. And until the role of these forces is better understood, one may legitimately ask whether a Wallace or a Taft in Truman's place would have made a difference, given the common culture and system which produced them and within which they would have had to operate.

Two works dealing explicitly with the cultural sources of American conduct in this period are Michael Parenti's *The Anti-Communist Impulse* and Lloyd Gardner's *Architects of Illusion*. Parenti seeks to provide

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"an overview of the origins, the development, the cultural predispositions, and the . . . manifestations of American anti-communism" (p. 6) through an impressionistic review of ideas and policies in the period 1917-68. Gardner examines the ideas and "illusions" of nine actors of the period 1941-49 in his assessment of "the major influences on key American policy-makers as the Cold War began and developed to 1949" (p. xi).

As polemic, Parenti's work is passionate and effective. But as political analysis, it is fatally damaged by his use of anticommunism as a catch-all category to classify any quality of culture which can remotely be conceived of as having influenced any policy which can be described as anticommunist in intent or effect. The consequences of this methodological crudity are twofold: first, it produces tautological "explanations" (anti-communism produces anticommunist policies); and second, it obscures one important and poignant reality of American foreign policy (and of politics in general)—namely, that authentically humanitarian motives may well be conducive to the adoption of policies which benefit no one.

Gardner rejects at the outset the possibility of "explaining" American foreign policy in terms of anticommunism, making clear his conviction that values and attitudes quite unrelated to anticommunism may have contributed to the adoption of anticommunist policies. Reading the rich psycho-intellectual portraits he has drawn from extensive manuscript sources, one sees why there is some truth in virtually any model of motivation one might apply to the behavior of these men: in the complex data on their states-of-mind, there is evidence enough to partially sustain a realist, an idealist, or a Marxian interpretation.

For this very reason, it becomes clear that Gardner has not gone quite far enough in his analysis to claim success in his effort "to establish the major influences." For the effort to establish an idea or a value as an "influence" on decisionmaking entails the demonstration of some correlation or congruity between that idea or value and specific decisions. In the absence of this kind of demonstration, we may rightly ask whether ideas and calculations unrelated to those cataloged by Gardner (calculations related to the election of 1948, to cite only one example) might not have been the dominant influences on policy makers.

Gardner, like Parenti, seems to assume a simple and mechanical relationship between ideas and policies. Both writers seem uncertain of the nature and implications of the mode of analysis they have undertaken —essentially, what Weber described as "value-analysis," and what Thomas termed "situational analysis." Gardner's use of the word "illusion" is curious in a work predicated, implicitly, on the Thomas theorem—"If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." And

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Parenti's assertion that "American 'cold-warriors' utilize the mechanisms of selective perception" (p. 38)—implying, as it does, that others are immune to the influence of values and attitudes on their perceptions and judgment—suggests further methodological uncertainty. Both works might have benefited immeasurably from the insights and procedures of social psychology. That neither study suggests anything more than a crude correlation between the many values and attitudes of American political culture with which it deals and the policies which it laments is doubly regrettable; a study which succeeded in doing more would contribute not only to our understanding of the origins and dynamics of the cold war, but to the task of self-analysis in which the nation is now engaged.

THOMAS P. RAYNOR
Columbia University

Priming the German Economy: American Occupational Policies, 1945-1948 *by John H. Backer. Durham, Duke University Press, 1971.—vi, 212 pp. $6.75.*

Combining personal experience with careful research, Backer has written a substantial economic-administrative history of the American occupation of Germany. Arguing that the military government did essentially what postwar economic conditions required, Backer develops the theme that American-sponsored reconstruction of the German economy began early in the summer of 1945. Subsequent policy changes, such as those accompanying the Marshall Plan, simply removed impediments and intensified the program. For example, the July 1947, directive to General Clay "did not entail a drastic change of prevailing policies" (p. 58). It set the stage for the European Recovery Program under which military government "could pursue the same objectives at a much accelerated pace" (p. 201).

Backer reviews familiar wartime German-policy disputes in Washington, adding the insights that no agreed text of the Morgenthau Plan exists and that the *Handbook*—which FDR rescinded on Morgenthau's insistence—was nevertheless used in the field as interim policy. He shows that the American directive JCS 1067 and the Potsdam Agreement both reflected and departed from Morgenthau's views. The departures in JCS 1067 are important to Backer's thesis, especially the instruction "to ensure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to prevent starvation or such disease and unrest as would endanger the oc-

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cupying forces" [*sic*]. It was "the open-sesame—the key to a whole series of future actions" (p. 37).

The heart of Backer's study is in two chapters: "Starting from Scratch" and "The Joint Export Import Agency (US/UK)." The first is an analysis of the American application of the disease-and-unrest "escape clause" (p. 199) to develop an export program to pay for essential German imports of food and raw materials. The second describes the same program at the bizonal level. There is also a chapter on reparations and one on the prologue to European recovery.

Backer may be criticized for failing to relate his findings to current scholarship. He answers effectively the questions raised in the late forties and the fifties, but he ignores the cold-war revisionists. The early critics of the occupation argued that "Morgenthauism," Soviet "appeasement," left-liberal bias in the State Department, and unrealistic New Deal advisers had caused the occupation to flounder. Economic sense and stability emerged only after Byrnes's Stuttgart speech of September 1946; after Herbert Hoover outlined a positive approach in March 1947; and after the Eightieth Congress changed German policy. But the cold-war revisionists have reversed the earlier criticism. They ignore the omissions so important to the early critics, and they now charge Americans in Germany with sins of commission: Americans abandoned the Potsdam Agreement; they reneged on reparations; they re-nazified rather than de-nazified; they pushed for a capitalist reconstruction in Germany to squelch democratic socialism and to build a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and (according to Lloyd C. Gardner) they turned the German problem upside down. Backer fails to respond to these charges, and his focus on the earlier critics contributes much evidence to support the reverse-criticism of the cold-war revisionists. That is ironic, because Backer's study is sympathetic to the military government.

JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt State College

American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community *by William Welch. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.—xiii, 316 pp. $10.00.*

All of us who have hung out shingles as Sovietologists are, or should be, painfully conscious of the shortcomings of our craft, the mixture of art and science involved in the effort to apply canons of scholarship to the study of the limited data available in this field. Stimulated by this sense

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of dissatisfaction, William Welch, professor of political science at the University of Colorado, has set himself the task of analyzing a representative sample of American academic writing on Soviet foreign policy in order to examine the disparate images of the subject set forth or implied in these works. His purpose goes further: to encourage a more rigorous attention to scholarly method and to widen the area of consensus among students of Soviet foreign policy.

Of the 22 works selected for study from the 1959-68 period, nine are classified as "Ultra-Hard" (the "Great Beast" image); seven as "Hard" (the "Mellowing Tiger"); and six as "Mixed" (the "Neurotic Bear"). The spectrum runs from Strausz-Hupé to Fleming, with Kennan marking an approximate midpoint. A corresponding classification distinguishes the degree of change perceived in Soviet conduct, from "unvarying" to "significant."

The most valuable part of the book is a series of analytic reviews of selected works in each of the three categories, questioning the central thesis of each, and examining how well the thesis is supported by the data offered. The works examined are held up to rigorous standards of scholarship, and none emerge unscathed. (As one of the authors subjected to the treatment, the reviewer testifies to the fairness of the criticisms.) In the absence of a Better Business Bureau for Sovietologists, Professor Welch's astringent going-over will serve a salutary function for the profession. In general, the book finds the writers in the "Ultra-Hard" and the "Mixed" image categories less well disciplined in scholarship than those in the "Hard" category.

In his recommendations, Professor Welch shows some preference for behavioral measurements which can be expressed in numbers, but he shows sensitivity to the limitations of such schemata and does not press the point. He illustrates his recommendation by an analysis of Soviet observance of treaty obligations, but at the end of the quantitative exercise, comes back to essentially qualitative judgments.

Happily, Professor Welch for the most part avoids the diversion of explaining the differences of images in terms of the psyche of the writer and directs our attention to the proper question: what images can be validated by the evidence?

One of the research frontiers that might have received more attention, had the sample covered later writings, is the methodologically challenging investigation of the tugs and hauls of internal pressures and interests upon foreign policy decisionmaking in the Soviet Union.

The book closes with a plea for scholars to pay more explicit attention to basic assumptions and to have greater self-awareness about the emo-

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tional and cultural bias which is the inescapable baggage of this contentious and compelling subject.

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Columbia University

In Search of Nixon. A Psychohistorical Inquiry *by Bruce Mazlish. New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972.—x, 187 pp. $6.95.*

In an article published in 1910, Freud discussed the case of a woman suffering from "anxiety states" who had been referred to him by another physician. The woman had become anxious following her divorce, and the referring physician, who was neither a psychoanalyst nor a psychiatrist, had deduced that her anxiety was the consequence of a lack of sexual satisfaction. He advised her that there were three possible remedies: she could return to her husband or take a lover or masturbate. The result was an intensification of her anxiety, since she was a moral and religious woman; whereupon her physician referred her to Freud, saying that "this was a new discovery for which I [Freud] was responsible, and that she had only to come and ask me to confirm what he said, and I should tell her that this and nothing else was the truth." Inasmuch as the referring physician knew very little about his patient and nothing at all about psychoanalysis—his name was unknown to Freud—and since, further, he assumed that the simple cure for anxiety was sexual intercourse or masturbation, Freud regarded the whole episode as an example of " 'Wild' Psychoanalysis." Such an approach to a patient, devoid as it is of any grasp of psychoanalytic theory and the technical rules of procedure, is a counterfeit of psychoanalysis and a clumsy one at that.

In Search of Nixon, I regret to say, comes close to qualifying as "wild" psychoanalysis in the political field, which is not to say that it is totally lacking in timidity or caution. As far as can be determined, the book is based entirely on published sources, of which the most important are *Nixon: A Political Portrait* (1968) by Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, and Gary Wills's *Nixon Agonistes* (1972). There is no evidence that Mazlish interviewed anyone or had access to Nixon's correspondence or private papers. Second, the author frequently applies his knowledge of psychoanalytic theory, a knowledge which we know from his other writings to be considerable, not to Nixon's decisionmaking behavior, much less to the decisions themselves, but to character traits and quirks that are more colorful than revealing. For example, we are told what Nixon ate for breakfast following his famous confrontation with

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the students at the Lincoln Memorial, but we are not told why he went there. It is as if Mazlish felt more comfortable exploring the regressive aspects of Nixon's breakfast at the Mayflower than exploring the developmental processes by which Nixon the Quaker has become the Mad Bomber of all time. Indeed, fewer than a dozen pages are given over to Nixon's foreign and military policy views; there are no index references to Vietnam.

But the most serious flaw in Mazlish's book is its approach. Mazlish admits, in effect, that we do not know how Nixon felt about various key events in his life, but he argues that we can *infer* what he felt by knowing how others have felt who have experienced similar events, such as separation from parents. Thus Nixon was sent to live with an aunt during the school year when he was twelve or thirteen years old (the dates are not certain), and several years later his mother left him and the family for two years during which time she lived in Arizona with an older son who was suffering from tuberculosis (and who subsequently died). Mazlish writes:

> [There is] a strong possibility that he [Nixon] unconsciously viewed his being sent away to live with his aunt as some sort of punishment, or lack of real affection on the part of his mother. Next, we may surmise that he unconsciously perceived his beloved mother's leaving him for two years as a betrayal. . . . We can also postulate that he must have perceived the birth of his brother Donald, only a little over a year after his own birth, as 'taking' his mother away from him, thus laying the first seeds of his feelings of the precariousness of life and love.

One difficulty with such "wild" analysis is that, given the paucity of data, it can neither be affirmed nor refuted. We do not know, for example, how Nixon really felt about his mother or the brother who died from tuberculosis or the aunt (was she younger or older than his mother?). We do not even know Nixon's exact age when these events took place.

Questions may also be raised about Mazlish's use of these interpretations. Nixon's "unconscious" sense of betrayal by his mother, according to the author, "might have affected his later attitudes on 'traitors' in high places by helping to prepare him emotionally for such a belief." Is Mazlish implying that Nixon "unconsciously" regarded his "beloved mother" as a "traitor" and that, many years later, this feeling about his mother was transferred to Alger Hiss? Why is it not more probable that Hiss was a brother figure who, in this context, received the full force of Nixon's ambivalent feelings about his own brothers and other rivals for his mother's affection? The fact is, we do not know enough to assign probabilities in such cases, and, even if we did, there would be the further question: when we know such-and-such, what do we know? The alleged feeling of betrayal may or may not reveal itself in Nixon's attitude toward "traitors." The least we would expect is that it reveals itself

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in his attitude toward women, but about this we have no information. "Wild" psychoanalysis can speculate about the role of Nixon's mother in determining his attitude toward Golda Meir or Indira Gandhi, but it cannot prove anything.

Still, as Freud noted in the article cited, the intervention of the referring physician was not all bad inasmuch as "he forced her attention to the real cause of her trouble, or in that direction. . . ." In a similar way Mazlish has directed our attention to the importance of personal history and personality theory in politics, and for this he deserves our gratitude. Unfortunately, like his predecessor in Freud's article, Mazlish has done some harm to the cause of psychoanalytic inquiry or, more precisely, psychopolitics, by unintentionally strengthening those prejudices against it that are always strong in academic circles.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW
City University of New York

Quest for the New Moral World: Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America. *by J. F. C. Harrison. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969.—xi, 392 pp. $7.95.*

J. F. C. Harrison's *Quest for the New Moral World* offers a most useful view of the Owenite movement. Harrison's major contribution to the study of Owenism is somewhat obscured, however, by the planning of the volume. First, the book's subtitle, *Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America*, inaccurately suggests a definitive study, and the author's wish to fulfill this implicit commitment impels him to touch all, or almost all, bases of a many-sided subject. Unfortunately, this makes for frequently dry cataloging. This is particularly unfortunate in the discussion of Owenite thought. Though Harrison describes Owenism as "a movement of intellectuals," to state another grievance, ideas, with the partial exception of millennial and educational ideas, receive much too little attention. Secondly, Harrison describes his book as "an experiment" in the "comparative social and intellectual history" of American and British Owenism, but does not, and it seems to me quite properly, make genuine comparisons. Since Owen wished to establish his communities on both sides of the Atlantic apart from the industrial towns, it clearly did not really matter, as Harrison himself observes at one point, whether they were set upon the borders of Wales or, like New Harmony, on the banks of the Wabash.

But despite these deficiencies, the book comes off very well in its discussion of Owen as "the prophet of a new millennial sect." In early nineteenth-century England, Owenism was obliged to make the appeal of

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religious enthusiasm if it were to have meaning for the middle and working classes—this despite the fact that Owen himself was a rationalist of the school of Tom Paine. (It was because he was said to preach "infidelity" that Owen came under the most severe attack, not because he preached socialism.) The Owenites preached a "rational religion" so fully using the concepts and slogans of an evangelical Protestantism that one of Owen's chief disciples, John Finch, suggested that the Owenite organization should adopt the title of "Millennial Christian Church, founded on the Rock of Truth, the doctrine of Circumstances." Finch even asked Owen, the Social Father, to ordain him a bishop of that church. Shades of Comteian positivism! The religious impulses of the Owenite Rational Religionists also received nourishment from what was called "Physical Puritanism," that espoused temperance, vegetarianism, mesmerism, hydropathy, and the like, as well as from the phrenology preached by George Combe—matters well handled by Harrison.

While Harrison understands the influence, especially in America, of such sects as the Shakers and Rappites on Owenism, it would be good to have him follow up Halévy's interesting suggestion that the Moravians in eighteenth-century England had a powerful influence on Owenism. With the dispersal of the Yorkshire Moravian societies (which had established a commune at Lamb's Hill), Halévy tells us, a number of their members passed over to the Scottish sect of "Daleites," named after their leader, who was to become Owen's father-in-law. It was Dale, as is well known, who was the initiator of the social experiments of the New Lanark factory, which Owen was to continue. Yet it would be churlish to ask for more when quite enough has been offered.

BERNARD SEMMEL
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Lloyd George: Twelve Essays *edited by A. J. P. Taylor. New York, Atheneum, 1971.—xiv, 393 pp. $12.95.*

Politicians at War, July 1914 to May 1915: A Prologue to the Triumph of Lloyd George *by Cameron Hazlehurst. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1971.—346 pp. $8.95.*

David Lloyd George, impudent fellow that he was, has thus far managed to confound as many biographers as he has attracted. Various lives of him have been written, all rather pitiable failures, by those who dared to venture where angels fear to tread. The only successful approach to the subject has been A. J. P. Taylor's 1961 Leslie Stephen Lecture, "The Rise and Fall of Lloyd George" (reprinted in *Politics in Wartime* [Lon-

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don, 1964], pp. 123-49), in which the great "rogue" of modern British politics met his match in the great rogue of modern British historiography. It is, on every count, a brilliant *tour de force* that captures the man's sparkle, pugnacity, and, not least of all, his predicament. "Lloyd George's success marked the last triumph of individual enterprise," Taylor declared in his peroration; "his fall showed that the days of individual enterprise were over. Combines ruled, in politics as in everything else. Nowadays even historians work in teams."

A decade later, Taylor, seemingly resigned to a degree of collectivization in the profession, has edited a volume of a dozen essays that provide useful, sometimes penetrating reassessments of controversies in which Lloyd George was engaged. The wide range of topics, while not exactly a source of strength to the volume, testifies not only to the crucial importance of the subject, but also to the immense influence of the editor, who has done so much to encourage as well as enliven scholarship. The members of his team include historians of several nationalities, among whom the eldest is 39 and the two youngest are 25. The spirit of youth pervades this book, as it does each of those that boasts Taylor's name on the title page. "The man who likes to stir things up," as he was affectionately described by Lord Beaverbrook, whose life he is now writing, Taylor could not be more gratified than when he points to the fact (which his readers might otherwise overlook) that two of these essays contain evidence that contradict his own earlier writings.

To some extent, the table of contents has been dictated by the nature of the manuscript collections in London's Beaverbrook Library, where Taylor has officiated since 1967 as honorary director. There is, for example, no coverage of Lloyd George's early parliamentary career or his "pro-Boer" activities, for which source materials do not exist at the library. More surprisingly, as Taylor is the first to recognize, no member of the team has chosen to focus upon Lloyd George's involvement in foreign affairs, especially at Versailles. Inevitably, such essays will reflect the disparate interests and intentions of their authors, and one cannot expect a single volume to accommodate every facet of the Lloyd George phenomenon. Nonetheless, it would have been helpful to have had an investigation of the background to National Insurance, to assess the extent of Lloyd George's reliance upon the Free Churches, and to examine the uses to which he put the press and its proprietors.

But one mustn't be greedy, H. V. Emy, dealing with the agitation for "free trade in land," helps to explain the Radical psychology at the same time that he skillfully dissects a persistent social problem. F. W. Wiemann convincingly argues that Lloyd George's pacifist followers misunderstood his stand on naval disarmament and therefore failed to appreci-

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ate his position at the outbreak of war; he offers some interesting glimpses of Churchill at the Admiralty, but declines to account for the fact that Lloyd George permitted C. P. Scott and others to persist in their delusion. George Boyce describes how Lloyd George, a somewhat tepid Home Ruler, grappled with the Irish situation; and K.O. Morgan and Chris Cook handle the complexities of Liberal party organization, the former bringing to the Coalition Liberals a sensitivity and sympathy that they are usually denied. Peter Lowe's chronicle of Lloyd George's ascent to the premiership nobly sacrifices drama in its attempt to be judicious; it should come as no surprise that Lloyd George's displacement of Asquith is depicted as an act of patriotism and not as one of ambition.

Essentially the same verdict on the events of December 1916 was previously offered by Cameron Hazlehurst ("The Conspiracy Myth," in M. Gilbert, ed., *Lloyd George* [Engelwood Cliffs, N.J., 1968], pp. 148-57), a scholar whose age, connections, and field of research would have entitled him to representation in the Taylor volume. But Hazlehurst, who apparently intends to revive the days of individual enterprise, has instead produced the first of three volumes on *Politicians at War*, this one being "a prologue to the triumph of Lloyd George," of whom (his publisher tells us) Hazlehurst is "preparing a major biography."

Hazlehurst's study has much to commend it: a mastery of unpublished manuscripts, a brisk narrative style, and a genuine feeling for the interplay of political forces. Quite obviously, the author has definite ideas on the way that political history is to be written (he has consulted the private papers of journalists, but largely ignores their public writings), and especially on the moral integrity of certain politicians. Whether one accepts his general conclusions will depend, in the last analysis, upon whether one subscribes to a view that places primary emphasis upon personality. Supremely confident that he knows what occurred, and therefore what could *not* have occurred, he loses patience with contemporaries who lack his clear vision. Nor can he resist the temptation to reply, often gratuitously and in one instance at excessive length, to other historians who have trespassed upon the terrain that he retroactively claims as his own. He might have trusted his fellow-professionals to discern with whom among them he disagrees and on what grounds; the general reader, whom he cannot expect to comprehend the issues, will most likely be confused or annoyed. The spectacle of politicians at war is itself sufficiently unedifying; that of historians at war is all the worse.

STEPHEN E. KOSS
Columbia University

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The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World War *by Marvin Swartz. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. —xiv, 267 pp. $10.25.*

Radical pressure groups in Britain during the First World War, that vital watershed in the history of the British Left, have long awaited their historian. Much the most influential of them was the Union of Democratic Control, founded on August 5, 1914 by two antiwar Liberals, E. D. Morel and C. P. Trevelyan. During the next four years, it played a major part in the undermining of the Liberals by the Labour party. Further, through such publicists as Brailsford and Gooch, Lowes Dickinson and Russell, its views largely colored subsequent interpretations of the postwar peace settlement, that "system of Versailles" denounced by the Left throughout the twenties. The UDC thus provided a vital thread in the appeasement policies of successive governments along the road that led to Munich. A scholarly study of the UDC has long been required, and it has now been most admirably provided by Dr. Swartz's new monograph. Basing himself on an impressive range of manuscript and printed sources, he analyzes the strategy, organization, finances, and influence of the movement from August 1914 onward. Initially, it was dominated by radical Liberals, Trevelyan, Ponsonby, Angell, and, above all, the imperious Morel. But while they severed their links with their own party by September 17, 1914 (to the dismay of old allies like C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian*), they were reluctant to merge with Labour for they were preoccupied with popular control not with economic power, with democracy not with capitalism. They preferred at this period to work with the ILP, the suffragettes, and other groups in a grand radical popular front, crusading against secret diplomacy and urging a popularly directed foreign policy, arms control, and "an International Council" as part of a peace settlement. At this stage, the UDC held back from adopting an overt "stop-the-war" position.

But with the advent of Lloyd George as prime minister, the UDC's outlook and strategy changed. It now campaigned mainly among industrial workers and acted far more intimately with the Labour party, its antiwar fervor kindled anew by the revolution in Russia. It now called uninhibitedly for immediate peace negotiations and a new international order along the line of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Not surprisingly, the Lloyd George government saw the hand of the "pacifist revolutionaries" of the UDC in the industrial unrest of the 1917-18 period; Morel himself was imprisoned and other UDC leaders actively persecuted, to the dismay of high-principled Liberals. The UDC thus played its part in hastening the disintegration of the Liberal party and in broadening the base

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of the Labour party whose postwar foreign policy program of 1918 it largely formulated. Its belated triumph came in 1924 when Ramsay MacDonald, a long-serving member of the UDC executive, became Labour's prime minister. Predictably, with the unfamiliar restraints of office, UDC influence immediately waned, a process symbolized by the death of Morel later that year.

On all the subtle complexities of this period, Dr. Swartz is a reliable guide, and his account admirably precise. On the wider political history of the Liberal party his touch is sometimes less sure. His view of the pre-1914 party is unduly pessimistic, while his interpretations of the Liberals' decline during the wartime years seem to follow one or two somewhat controversial secondary works. Again, the flight of radical Liberals toward Labour from 1917 onward was more gradual and episodic than is implied here, and a good many factors were involved apart from the propaganda of the UDC. But these points are all incidental. Dr. Swartz has contributed a valuable addition to the growing literature of wartime politics in Britain and has rescued an influential and courageous vehicle of radical dissent from undeserved oblivion.

KENNETH O. MORGAN
The Queen's College, Oxford

The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939 *by Derek H. Aldcroft. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.—441 pp. $12.50.*

This is probably Dr. Aldcroft's most useful work to date. His book is unpretentious; the aims are set out clearly at the beginning and in general they are fulfilled very satisfactorily. The intention is to bring the main economic issues of the period to the attention of students and to give them some confidence in the handling of statistical material. Growth, fluctuations, the balance of payments, income distribution, developments in particular sectors are all discussed on the basis of secondary sources, and, where relevant, a most useful attempt is made to present the essentials of the analysis in theoretical terms. One blinks somewhat at the assertion in the preface that agriculture has been omitted because it is "incredibly boring." Be that as it may, it is hard to accept the argument that a sector which, in the thirties, still employed more men than the coal industry and four times those in textiles "did not fit well into the theme of the book." That apart, it is convincingly and thoroughly done.

Naturally in a long and complex work such as this there are bound to be things to disagree about. Since statistics play such a large part, it

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should have been stated much more forcibly than it is that much of the data is approximate and unreliable. Over a short period, too, the greatest care has to be taken with the choice of years for comparative purposes. In the first chapter, for example, international growth trends are related back to 1913 but with a major war intervening, the results have an extremely limited value. It would have been more interesting to take the growth trends for, say, 1900 to 1913, project them forward and indicate how long it took for the actual line to cross the hypothetical one. It is also difficult to see the point of comparing growth over 1924-29 with that in 1929-37, for the depression of 1929-33 introduces an element into the second period which is absent from the first. No wonder that by this method it is easy to point up the progress made in the twenties.

Dr. Aldcroft is not always happy with international problems. He omits all discussion of the disruption of the pattern of multilateral trade which made external trade problems that much the worse the world over during the thirties. Apart from the questions of imperial preference and Ottawa, he fails to give any accurate idea of how important a role concern for the Empire played in shaping Britain's external economic policy. Sir Keith Hancock's splendid book on this, *Problems of Economic Policy*, does not appear in the otherwise very useful bibliography. With regard to the controversy over the return to gold in 1926, it surely misses the point to say that it is difficult to conceive a full employment rate of exchange for the twenties (p. 252) and rather wild to argue that a "ten per cent overvaluation was neither here nor there" without anything to substantiate it. An equilibrium rate would have made it easier to resolve the structural problems of certain sectors of the economy and avoided some of the fears of speculation which well nigh paralyzed policy at the end of the twenties.

It is not Dr. Aldcroft's fault that he is unable to discuss the effects of the First World War except in terms of scattered references to technology, balance of payments, and taxation. Perhaps it is the complexity of the problem but certainly something has inhibited scholars from making the kind of sharp analysis that is wanted, as distinct from vague social impressions. However, a future edition should draw attention to the late Professor Court's splendid essay on the years 1914-18 in his *Scarcity and Choice in History*, for there he saw the war as above all explaining how so much in the way of idle resources was consistent with much new development in the way of production and incomes after the war.

Students looking for a book which relates economic changes to the political background, which looks at the human problems of the period, which tells us of the turmoil that was British society in those days,

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must go elsewhere. But there is room for a dispassionate guide to the economics all the same and Dr. Aldcroft fulfills that need well enough.

S. B. SAUL
Edinburgh University

The Mackenzie King Record, Volume 3: 1945-1946; Volume 4: 1947-1948 *by J. W. Pickersgill and D. G. Forster. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970.—x, 424 pp; viii, 472 pp. $17.50 each; $30.00 the set.*

The appearance of these volumes completes a book based on Mackenzie King's diary. The review of the second volume in the *PSQ* (March 1971) told something of the provenance of the work. The third and fourth volumes contain the story of Mr. King's last years in power. He was in his seventy-first year at the end of World War II, tired from the strains undergone since 1939, frequently ailing, looking forward to retirement yet reluctant to relinquish office, apprehensive about the future of Canada and the world.

Postwar social unrest was one of the sources of his apprehensions, but what hit him hardest right after the war was the Gouzenko case with its revelations of widespread Soviet espionage, and to this case the authors devote a long, intensely interesting, and informative chapter. For some years it left the prime minister with the nightmare fears of social revolution and of the outbreak of a third world war in which Canada would be the battleground on which the superpowers would fight. That would mean the breakup of Canadian unity, he believed, since the western provinces would turn to Washington for protection against the Soviet Union. He saw himself as the agent divinely chosen to prevent these catastrophes of war, revolution, and national disruption.

So much has been written about Mackenzie King that this work can hardly be expected to contain exciting revelations. Nevertheless, Pickersgill and Forster have written a valuable book. Apart from the fact that it is engrossing to read, their frequent quotations from the King diary give it the freshness of an original source. We see the prime minister revealed in his own words—his view of events, his estimates of men, his hopes and vanities, his ultimate loneliness. Very impressive is the sharpness of his suspicion of the outside world: of Washington with its ultimate desire (in his opinion) to absorb its northern neighbor; of London with its apparent pressure toward a centralized foreign policy for the

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Commonwealth; of the UN, meriting contempt for its weakness but to be watched because of its far-ranging busybodiness.

What emerges constantly is Mr. King's fear lest Canada become too involved in world affairs, too outward looking. He thought that young officials like Lester Pearson (whom nevertheless he admired and regarded as a future prime minister) were too anxious for Canada to be prominent on the international scene, too ready to fall in with UN or American or British wishes. He was angry at the suggestion made shortly after the war that Canada should serve on a UN committee concerning the future of Korea. The acquisition of elaborate embassies abroad he opposed both on grounds of economy and because of possible political repercussions at home. For this consummate politician was always sensitive to what the people might say.

The story told by Mr. Pickersgill (whose close association with Mackenzie King gives him unique qualifications as its narrator) and Professor Forster is for the most part a melancholy one, a story of a world that was full of troubles and of a lonely man who was approaching his end. By the nature of its source material, it is not a complete history of Canada just after the Second World War although it makes a significant contribution to such a history. It gives a Canadian view of great events: it contains much information on Canadian politicians of the time, their strengths and weaknesses, their jockeying for place and power; and most of all, it conveys a sense of the personality of Mackenzie King. It has seemed excessive to some critics to print four volumes largely taken from King's public diary. Yet if the rank of a statesman depends on the magnitude of his achievement, Mackenzie King stands high among leaders of the first half of our century, and what he has to say for himself deserves to be set forth in detail.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College

Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey *by Ferenc A. Váli. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.—xiv, 410 pp. $12.50.*

The need for a general survey of Turkish foreign policy has existed for too long. Vere-Hodge's somewhat superficial work did not fill the gap; neither did various histories of modern Turkey. In this volume, Professor Váli successfully takes up the challenge of providing us with such a text.

The book is not simply a history of Turkish foreign relations but tries

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to look at Turkish foreign policy by examining a number of fundamental problems connected with it. It is more analytical than the usual fare. Thus, following a historical introduction, the author goes on to the foundations of Turkish foreign policy. Four of these, the geopolitical, the ethnic, the ideological, and the governmental, are taken up. Thereafter comes a chapter on "Political parties, public opinion and foreign policy," and three chapters on Turkish-U.S. relations, Turkish-Soviet relations, and the Cyprus question. Another chapter is devoted to Turkey's position in the Middle East. This, indeed, is the most useful way to approach the many facets of Turkish foreign-policy formation.

Throughout, the book is based on Turkish sources, a welcome attempt in a field where local Turkish perspectives are usually neglected. Here, the more general, antiquated approach of the policy of "European Cabinets" versus that of Turkey is jettisoned. Chapters on political parties, public opinion, and foreign policy are particularly valuable in this respect. There is, however, a certain mechanical reliance on Turkish newspapers which allows errors of detail to creep in. For example, allegations that the Unity party "was supported . . . by Kurdish nationalists" (p. 93) can only be placed in proper perspective in relation to the electoral strength of this party. This area happens to be Central Anatolia. Throughout, the more subtle undercurrents in party alignments regarding foreign policy do not emerge clearly. This may be requesting too much in an area that has been barely researched. The social origins of personnel of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs are also not what they used to be, and not what the author thinks they are. One of the outstanding recent developments is the opening up of the career to a much wider class spectrum.

The author has eschewed the more esoteric methodological tools provided by U.S. theoreticians of foreign relations. But this straightforward approach cannot be criticized at a time when no other book gives us a general overview of Turkish foreign relations. Others will take his materials and spin their own thin webs of theory.

Throughout, the author's interpretation of Turkish policies are characterized by informed cautiousness and sympathy to Turkey. His views, therefore, contain many received opinions about Turkey which might or might not turn out to be defensible when research in depth on Turkish foreign policy is undertaken. Altogether, however, everyone interested in Turkish foreign relation will want to have this book by his side.

There is a useful, selective bibliography appended at the end of the book.

ŞERIF MARDIN
Princeton University

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Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Popular Religion *by Morroe Berger. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.—vii, 138 pp. $6.95.*

The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies *by Elie Kedourie. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970.—488 pp. $12.50.*

Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914 *by Hisham Sharabi. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, published in cooperation with The Middle East Institute, 1970.—x, 139 pp. $7.95.*

Not often does a scholar of the Middle East have the good fortune to read three new books and feel that he has gained from each greater insight into the inner dynamics of the area, its history, and its politics. Each of these books has been written by a mature scholar who has obviously thought much about the region and whose research and viewpoint cannot be ignored. These books should be read by those seriously interested in the modern Middle East.

Professor Berger's book aims to describe aspects of Egypt's religious organizations and existing religious behavior as well as to stimulate scholarly interest in these subjects, which he feels have been neglected at both establishment and popular levels.

The data summarized in the tables make available for the first time in English information on the number of mosques—their sizes, ages, uses, state of repairs, public conveniences and their adequacy, electricity, microphones, libraries—and their personnel—their number, payment, and educational qualifications. Professor Berger then discusses government policy toward religious institutions of the establishment, indicating that since 1952 the revolutionary government has introduced a program meant to reduce whatever degree of independence the religious leadership still retains.

The most interesting section of the book deals with the sufi brotherhoods which still persist in Egypt. Professor Berger discusses the historical background of sufism in Islam, the role it has traditionally played in the spread of Islam, and the unorthodox, sometimes even subversive, nature of the sufi movement. He then describes the formal organizations of the movement as it exists at present. Professor Berger offers several hypotheses for its continued existence and concrete examples to support his ideas. The breakdown of traditional relationships, the disappointments and frustrations caused by events in recent years, the need for es-

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caping the government's all-pervasive influence, and the failure of the government to find substitute associations of a meaningful character have all kept alive the sufi fraternities that do meet a real need for their thousands of adherents. The government, in turn, finds useful certain sufi principles which condition the masses to accept the postponement of material goals the government has failed thus far to attain.

Professor Berger has for unspecified reasons chosen to publish a work that he admits is incomplete in its findings. Even so, the book clearly demonstrates the need to look very closely at contemporary Islamic institutions either to fix them for future historical reference before it is too late or to anticipate the role they may still be called upon to play.

Works of historical revisionism frequently make lively reading and Professor Kedourie's latest volume is no exception. The book includes twelve studies on modern Middle Eastern history, all but one of which have already appeared elsewhere. The last in the volume, entitled "The Chatham House Version," appears for the first time and will undoubtedly evoke cries of anguish. In this study, Professor Kedourie sets out to evaluate the impact of works published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs under the Chatham House imprint. He believes that despite disclaimers of subjectivity, a careful study of the Royal Institute publications on the Middle East show that they "have in common not only a publisher's imprint, but also assumptions, attitudes, and a whole intellectual style which makes it possible to speak of the Chatham House Version." This version of Middle Eastern history, the author maintains, gained credence in public and official circles and ultimately took on a life of its own and helped shape policy. For this reason the influence of Professor Arnold Toynbee, director of studies at Chatham House from 1925 to 1955, becomes significant and his attitudes require close analysis.

Reduced to its essential meaning, Professor Toynbee's doctrine, says Kedourie, becomes a cry of guilt for what the West has done to the rest of the world. "*Nostra culpa, nostra maxima culpa:* we have invaded, we have conquered, we have dominated, we have exploited"; this sense of guilt is the dominant theme of Toynbee's writings and the Chatham House Version, especially with regard to Britain's relationship with the Arabs. But was Toynbee correct in assuming Britain's guilt of double-dealing? Did Toynbee really have any understanding of the dynamics of Arab politics at any time since World War I? On what did he base his assumptions that Sunni Arab nationalism was preferable to the nationalism of other groupings in the Arab world? Did he really ever understand that Middle Eastern representative institutions represented no one but a small clique? These are the questions Professor Kedourie asks, and he

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concludes that Toynbee's inability to come to grips with Middle Eastern realities made scientific study of the area impossible and promoted "a superficial and eccentric view of its society and politics."

Professor Toynbee's misreadings of affairs in the Middle East rubbed off on others whose works were published by Chatham House, and the attitudes reflected in these works gave scholarly support to similar attitudes held by Britain's intellectual and official classes. By failing to differentiate between Western and Middle Eastern notions of government and society—by using Western categories to apply to the Middle Eastern situation—the creators of the Chatham House Version helped to promote basic misunderstandings of the true condition of the Middle East. Professor Kedourie suggests that another sort of language than that used in the Chatham House Version would more clearly describe the political realities of the region. In the case of Iraq, for example, one should not speak of liberals, reformists, conservatives, moderates, or extremists but rather: "Lack of scruple greater or lesser, cupidity more or less restrained, ability to plot more or less consummate, blood-lust more or less obsessive: these rather are the terms which the historian must use who surveys this unfortunate polity, and those in whose power it was delivered."

The Chatham House Version, Professor Kedourie maintains, gave primacy to Sunni Arab dominance and held that those who would not concede this primacy must suffer the consequence, be they Assyrians who were massacred or Shi'ites or Christians who sometimes even formed a majority in various areas. British attitudes toward Iraq and toward French policies in Lebanon and Syria reflected this viewpoint and were possibly molded by it. Similarly, the Chatham House Version fostered the notion that the British in proclaiming the Balfour Declaration were guilty of an immoral act. But, says Professor Kedourie, if the British were guilty of fostering Zionism, so were they also guilty of fostering Arabism. In any event, the Chatham House Version tended to oversimplify complex problems. Nor can Professor Kedourie accept the idea of the Chatham House Version that the Palestine problem is the most important issue and the one principally responsible for Britain's loss of power in the Middle East. Other problems would have served to undermine Britain's position with or without the Balfour Declaration. In confusing the issues and compounding the miscalculations, the Chatham House Version also played its role in Britain's decision to support the majority, i.e. the Arabs, in the post-World War II era. Thus, in the end, the Chatham House Version proved mischievous as well as bad history.

Whether or not one agrees with Professor Kedourie's assessment of the role of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and its publications,

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this study is most provocative and not to be taken lightly. It goes far in explaining the incongruities of British Middle Eastern policies. Furthermore, this so called Chatham House Version has dominated U.S. scholarly thinking for a very long time and has undoubtedly left its impact on American policy makers as well. Perhaps Professor Kedourie should have carried his analysis somewhat further to include the influence outside Great Britain.

The other studies in this volume tend to challenge conventional wisdom on a series of historical problems more or less along the lines of "The Chatham House Version." Professor Kedourie debunks, scolds, and challenges with zest and supporting documentation. He writes well and his jaundiced view of the Middle East is often refreshing. Although he may not be a totally disinterested party in the quarrel he has with modern Middle Eastern historiography, there are few people so well equipped to delve into materials, both Eastern and Western, and to interpret them with the special insight of one who has lived in both societies.

Like the work of Professor Kedourie, Professor Sharabi's book represents an attempt at historical revisionism. It also provides the other side of the coin on the question of Arab nationalism. Whereas Professor Kedourie stresses the artificiality of Arab nationalism and insists on its being largely a British creation, Professor Sharabi shows its intellectual roots and organic growth out of a specific historical situation. The significance of Professor Sharabi's book lies not so much in the presentation of new material as in a reconsideration of the various intellectual trends that have dominated Arab intellectuals for the past century. Professor Sharabi brings to his analysis a keen and, even more important, an open and critical mind. He is not carried away by the romanticism of some other writers and deals with unusual frankness with subjects often glossed over.

He first discusses the emergence of the Arab intelligentsia, a heterogeneous group from the start. Professor Sharabi has made an especially significant contribution in clarifying the true position of the Christian intellectuals. He does not disguise the fact that they were, "outsiders in Muslim society." He frankly admits the anti-Chrisian discrimination of the Ottoman Empire and the precarious position of Christians in the empire. Further, he points out that to practicing Muslims, the Christian intellectuals were not "simple innovators but corrupters of tradition and traditional values." He makes the interesting observation that the Christian intellectuals were basically uprooted men, many of whom moved into urban centers or left the region entirely and emigrated to Europe and America. They felt no bonds such as their Muslim counterparts felt. The very fluidity of their existence gave to the Christian intellectuals greater

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freedom to strike out in new directions. As the "natural vanguard of change" they left an important imprint on Arab literature. They finally also worked out the notion of secular nationalism by which "Arab" could be separated from "Turk" and differences in religion could be ignored, and they were persuaded that with the emergence of an "Arab" political structure, all "Arabs" might be accommodated. The Christian Arab's stake in the soundness of the idea of Arab nationalism cannot be gainsaid. Professor Sharabi works out the details of Christian intellectualism and its social ideology in two separate chapters (IV and V) in which he surveys among others the writings and ideas of several lesser known Christian intellectuals.

In the long run, the Muslim intellectuals played the more significant role. Professor Sharabi separates them into two main groups: the secular and nonsecular. The nonsecular group subdivides further into the traditionalists and the modernists. Between these two stood the reformists, who favored change but within well defined limits. Whatever their convictions, these Muslim intellectuals felt secure in their environment. All were the products of a similar system of values, upbringing, and education. Even when exposed to Western education, they still felt part of their society and remained unwilling to discard religious considerations totally. None, not even the Muslim secularists, considered the possibility of breaking with the Islamic world view.

Professor Sharabi goes over familiar ground when setting forth the theoretical foundations and ideology of Islamic reformism and the contributions made by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ʿAbdu and others. He traces the evolution of their ideas and the point they ultimately reached in their estimate of Western civilization. Although they spread their ideas to ever wider groups of persons in the Islamic world, Professor Sharabi concludes that they did too little and compromised too much. In the end they failed because they proved unable to create a political movement with which to carry out their program. They did, however, open the way for the activities of the secularists, both Christian and Muslim. The Christian intellectuals, as noted earlier, served as a vanguard, but they played a subsidiary role in what always remained a predominantly Muslim society. Thus, in chapter VI, Professor Sharabi turns his attention to a discussion of the Muslim secularists, men subject to many of the same impulses as the Christian intellectuals but remaining Islamic in their outlook and unable to break with religion. This group turned to politics and in the interwar years, they tended to rule the Arab countries. They placed their hopes on remaking society by the introduction of science and constitutional government but because they notably lacked profound ideas of their own, they never succeeded in translating

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aspirations into concrete programs.

Professor Sharabi discusses Islamism, Ottomanism, and nationalism as forms of political commitments to which the Arab intellectuals subscribed before 1914. The lack of conceptual unity detracted from the capacity of the Arabs to achieve coherence in political action. Effective political action would have to await a later period when power would be grasped by the petit bourgeoisie of the Arab world, a new social class that evolved after the period covered by this book.

In the last section of chapter VIII entitled "Western Imperialism and Arab Modernization," Professor Sharabi abandons his original and intellectually stimulating approach to his subject and reiterates the customary Arab position about the causes for the calamities that befell the Arab world after World War I. Here, the contrast with Professor Kedourie's viewpoint about this period is sharpest. Professor Sharabi will have to fill in the details based on concrete evidence instead of generalizations, in order to override Professor Kedourie's critique. Hopefully, that may be the subject of his next book. It should also be noted that Professor Sharabi makes no mention whatsoever of Jewish participation in the intellectual movements of the Arab world. This is surprising in view of the numbers of Jews who lived in the Fertile Crescent as a whole and their activity in the common cause. Naturally, the Palestine question intervened, but it is especially ironical that Professor Sharabi should have disregarded Jewish contributions while Professor Kedourie should have been the one to stress that as a consequence of the establishment of the State of Israel, there were two main victims—the Palestine Arabs and the oriental Jewries. In Kedourie's mind, if not in Sharabi's, the oriental Jews were part of the Fertile Crescent and undoubtedly participated in the intellectual movements of the region. Perhaps we may look forward to a future book by Professor Sharabi *or* Professor Kedourie that will fill this obvious gap.

HELEN ANNE B. RIVLIN
State University of New York at Binghamton

Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period *by Hamid Algar. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.—xviii, 286 pp. $9.50.*

This outstanding book reflects a careful study of Persian and Western sources to explain what positions were taken by the Persian ulama in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and why they took these positions. The doctrinal basis for an exalted role for the ulama in Twelver Shi'ism, which became Iran's state religion at the beginning of the

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sixteenth century, are first explored. The author then proceeds to a detailed study of the power and position of the ulama under successive Qajar shahs, from a position of friendship toward the ulama by the early Fatḥ ʿAlī Shāh to one of conflict under his successors. The role of the ulama in helping to bring on both the first and second wars with Russia early in the century through the declaration of *jihad* is brought out. There is also a fresh discussion of the Griboyedov episode, based largely on hitherto unutilized Persian sources, which explains how that author and ambassador helped bring on the massacre of himself and the Russian mission by violating the privacy of Muslim homes and giving sanctuary to a former employee of the shah.

The ulama were naturally opposed to efforts at modernization, since any centralization by the state of law, education, and power, particularly if accompanied by Western style reforms, would mean a lessening of ulama power. The ulama were also in touch with the masses, and represented their feelings against increasingly despotic governments. The ulama thus became a center for agitation against the government; the process is traced along with the ulama background of the constitutional revolution.

In addition to chapters on the ulama's relations with various shahs, Algar has included others on the relations with the most important governmental reformers. He also discusses the role of the ulama in relation to Babism and to Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī and Malkum Khan. The culminating major role of the ulama in a successful agitation against a British tobacco concession and in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 are shown as arising out of previously won power and position on the part of the ulama and their traditional hostility to the rulers of Iran.

Algar has considered a wide variety of sources in numerous languages and has utilized them to create a book that is both well documented and brilliant in its syntheses. It is a major contribution to the small body of soundly documented books about modern Iran.

NIKKI R. KEDDIE
University of California, Los Angeles

Elites in South Asia *edited by Edmund Leach and S. N. Mukherjee. London, Cambridge University Press, 1970.—xiv, 266 pp. $12.50.*

This stimulating and wide-ranging volume contains essays by eleven authors from a number of disciplines and a brief, pointed introduction by the editors. The field of vision moves from Mughal *mansabdars* and Surat merchants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to traditional and modernizing elites in the nationalist period, and finally to contem-

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porary Indian academics and Andhra politicians and landed gentry. As with most collections by many contributors, the essays vary in length, quality, originality, suggestiveness, and penetrability for the South Asian specialist or general reader.

As the editors note, perhaps with some chagrin, "in practice, for most of our authors, theory has been of minor relevance." This is generally accurate, but I would prefer to state it slightly differently: the authors vary in the extent to which they make their use of the elite concept explicit and to which they bring out the possible theoretical and general issues at stake in their own empirical studies. Dr. Mukherjee, one of the editors, tries bravely to come to grips with the problems of class, caste, and internal elite conflict in nineteenth-century Calcutta. His is one of the few contributions in which we see an author wrestling with real conceptual issues which continue to bedevil the field of Indian studies. One wonders why the editors did not force other authors to grapple more directly with some of the implicit general issues, perhaps by setting up some concepts and questions to which each might have been asked to address himself. This would surely have enriched the fine essays by Stokes on the differential appeals of rebellion and loyalism in 1857, Das Gupta on Surat merchants in the first half of the eighteenth century, Dobbin on Bombay city politics in the nineteenth century, Johnson on Chitpavan Brahmins in the early nationalist period, and Bagchi on European and Indian entrepreneurs, 1900-30.

Most of the essays have a specified geographical focus (village, city, district, or region) and a number of those with an all-Indian concern show a delicate sensitivity to local and regional differentiation, particularly that of Bagchi. The authors are usually quite successful and suggestive at these different levels which they have chosen. The collection is a mark of increasing skill generally in South Asian studies by sociologists, political scientists, historians, economists, and anthropologists in confronting and relating different geographical units of analysis. Some of the studies demonstrate serious flaws in global accounts of South Asian history and society and the necessity for scholars in this field to be continually aware of local and regional differentiation within a complex and changing society. For example, we must henceforth be suspicious of generalizations concerning the support for the revolt of 1857, the shortcomings of Indians as entrepreneurs, and the unity of new elites in nineteenth-century Maharashtra and Bengal.

One is thankful for the stimulation of many of the essays, but regretful that neither authors nor editors extracted the general issues in the

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study of elites in South Asia. This might have given the volume greater comparative relevance.

LEONARD A. GORDON
Columbia University

The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War *by Shumpei Okamoto. New York, Columbia University Press, Studies of the East Asian Institute, 1970.—xii, 358 pp. $12.00.*

This book is an excellent analysis of a singularly successful example of the formation and implementation of foreign policy under an oligarchy: that of Japan from 1903 to the suppression of the antipeace-treaty riots in September 1905. Following a brief description of some of the recent literature on foreign policy decisionmaking in an oligarchy, the author presents in lucid fashion the various components of the government, with short biographies of the fourteen key individuals involved in the decisions concerning formal negotiations with Russia, going to war, and the terms of the peace settlement. These include the Emperor Meiji, his five *genrō* or elder statesmen, the Diet, the Cabinet, the military leaders, the Privy Council, and the imperial conferences.

The study continues with the efforts of the key military leaders, Army Chief of Staff Yamagata, the service ministers, and the field commanders, to convince the other oligarchs that Japan should not only accept a negotiated peace but should reduce its original demands for an indemnity and the cession of all of Sakhalin. The author has also presented much interesting material on the activities and views of those outside the government, especially the political activists and the press. They urged early cancellation of the negotiations and immediate war on Russia. After war broke out, despite limited and inaccurate information available to them, they convinced the public at large that Japan was winning overwhelming victories and hence Russia should accept whatever terms Japan demanded of it. The final section is a fascinating account of the riots in early September 1905 after the people learned of the terms of the treaty. Even in the midst of such disturbances, which required the promulgation of martial law for over two months, Prime Minister Katsura felt so secure that he made no real attempt to keep outsiders informed of the reasons for the government's actions.

The author is to be commended for not assuming that the policymaking process during this period should be taken as a model for later pe-

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riods. While certain similar methods of operation continued, such as the use of imperial conferences, he correctly emphasizes that the *genrō* were central in the formulation of policy at this time. Henceforth, as their influence declined and the first generation of *genrō* died, the decisionmaking process became more complicated and less effective. He is also wise to avoid estimating the net effect on members of the oligarchy of the pressure from the activists. They merely threatened individual officials. Unlike twenty or thirty years later, they did not assassinate any of them. While it is correct that the Constitution "excluded the Diet from the foreign policy-making process" (p. 39), it possessed budgetary powers which might have been invoked (pp. 131-32). Why the political parties failed to use this budgetary power to enhance their position remains one of the mysteries of Japanese politics prior to World War II.

In conclusion, by extensive use of Japanese archival and primary sources, this work makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the Russo-Japanese War which complements Raymond A. Esthus's *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* and Andrew Malozemoff's *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1905, with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War*. At the same time, the subject is handled in such a way as to be of interest to all political scientists and diplomatic historians.

HUGH BORTON
Columbia University

Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty-Year Appraisal *edited by Frank N. Trager and William Henderson. New York, New York University Press for the American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1970.—xii, 356 pp. $7.95.*

Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China *edited by John Wilson Lewis. London, Cambridge University Press, 1970. —viii, 422 pp. $9.50.*

China's World: The Foreign Policy of a Developing State *by J. D. Simmonds. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.—ix, 260 pp. $10.00.*

Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation *by Peter Van Ness. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.—xii, 266 pp. $6.50.*

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Mao *by Philippe Devillers, translated by Tony White. New York, Schocken Books, 1969.—317 pp. $5.95.*

The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy *by Scott A. Boorman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1969.—xiii, 242 pp. $7.50.*

These books cover various aspects of China. The volume edited by Trager and Henderson is an appraisal of the twenty-year Communist rule, containing fourteen descriptive and analytical essays written by fifteen well known scholars. The contributors ably present one side of reality, but most of them tend to emphasize the negative aspects of the regime. The American image of Communist China, however, has been changing drastically since the "ping pong diplomacy" of April 1971. With regard to China's foreign policy and aspirations, President Nixon's decision to visit Peking has dramatized once again the need for reexamining the validity of many assumptions and arguments against the People's Republic of China in the last two decades.

It is impossible to discuss all the contributions to the volume and do justice to the authors in this brief review. Aside from well known drastic social and political changes, one fundamental question has often been raised: what has become of China's economy and the people's living standard after twenty years?

In an article on agrarian problems, E. Stuart Kirby states that in 1955 the urban worker enjoyed a total personal consumption equivalent to about $80 (U.S.) a year. The corresponding rural figure was about $45. By 1969, Kirby estimates that while the urban worker's level might have roughly doubled, the rural figure less than doubled. Since the price levels and living conditions in China are so different from those of the West, these figures are not true indicators for purposes of comparison. But there is little doubt that China remains, in Chairman Mao's phrase, "poor and blank."

As for China's economy, Yuan-li Wu's study shows that the annual growth rate of 6 per cent in 1952-57 was higher than the corresponding rates for the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Italy in the period 1950-58, but below the rates attained by Japan, the Soviet Union, and West Germany. If the 1952-65 period were taken for China, the annual growth rate of the Chinese GNP would be closer to 4.5 per cent, which would put Communist China in the lower half among the seven countries.

A much more unfavorable comparison would be obtained, however, if one took per capita personal consumption. According to Wu, there was

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little improvement in mainland China in this respect during the entire period, while per capita personal consumption rose at a high rate in both Japan and Taiwan. Judging by China's overall economic performance, and adding to it the tremendous human cost that has accompanied China's economic achievements, Wu concludes that "the whole effort could hardly be considered worthwhile."

The John Lewis book is also a collection of articles, which were originally written for a conference on the Chinese Communist party in July 1968; almost all of them have subsequently appeared in *The China Quarterly*. The eleven papers were contributed by prominent scholars from the United States and Britain, including some promising young scholars in the field. The lengthy introduction by the editor is not only a successful attempt to integrate the rather diverse topics covered by the book, but also throws some light on political behavior in China. For those interested in comparative studies of a "monolithic party under the totalitarian leader," the thoughtful article by Leonard Schapiro and John Lewis should be of particular value.

The foreign policy of China may be viewed as a response to external developments, but may also be studied from other vantage points. The theme of Simmonds's book is that the program of domestic development has had a significant impact on China's foreign policy. This is obvious; Chou En-lai once remarked, "a peaceful environment" abroad is needed in order to carry on the "gigantic and arduous tasks" of "socialist construction and socialist transformation" at home. The most interesting aspect of the book, but also the least satisfactory, is the author's attempt to link policy with institutional change, principally concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vice-ministerial appointments. His assertions are often made without sufficient evidence. Purely administrative reasons and personal factors might very well account for some of the cases mentioned in his book.

The book by Van Ness deals with Peking's use of revolution as an instrument of foreign policy. After analyzing Peking's support for wars of national liberation in theory and practice, the author concludes that the primary factor determining the Chinese decision whether to support an antigovernment armed struggle in the Afro-Asian world is the nature of the policy pursued by the government concerned with respect to China.

One of the "What They Really Said" series, Devillers's book, translated by Tony White, is intended for laymen who wish to understand some of Mao's writings within their historical context, which is sympathetically provided by the author. The quotation and the sources, however, do not always correspond to one another (e.g., pp. 213-14 and 303, note 1).

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The last book under review was written by an undergraduate at Harvard University. To use, in an informal sense, a term current in political science, the author is suggesting "the relevance of a simulation model of the processes of Chinese Communist-type revolution."

Commonly known in the West under its Japanese name *go*, *wei-ch'i* has been a favorite game of the Chinese for two thousand years. It is generally assumed that there is considerable interaction between *wei-ch'i* and military strategy. Boorman's book, which shows impressive scholarship, is probably the first systematic study on the game and Mao's strategy in any language.

"One unfortunate aspect of modern social science," observes the author, "is that theories and models are presented once in paper, article or book and then forgotten." The value and validity of analyses of Peking's political behavior are often handicapped by the different cultural background and preconceptions of the analyst. For this reason the author suggests, rightly perhaps, that *wei-ch'i* may be a more realistically useful analogic model of Mao's strategy than any purely theoretical structure generated by a Western social scientist. In order to appreciate the book, the reader should know the game first. Before reading the explanation of the game in the book, five minutes of instruction from a player would be extremely helpful.

CHÜN-TU HSÜEH
University of Maryland

Protest and Power in Black Africa *edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970.—xxx, 1274 pp. $25.00.*

This massive volume is not one for the newcomer to African history or politics. Thirty-three contributors, each with the detailed knowledge of a specialist, have tried to fit their knowledge into the framework of the book's title and the structured sections. The results are often valuable as case materials, though the authors' painstaking efforts to make relevant their special times and places in documented findings is evident. There is, however, no level between the very general theoretical level and the very particular, often narrative, one. Thus even moderately knowledgeable readers could be spared confusion by some few paragraphs of introduction to each essay, sketching in broad strokes the historical, geographical, and cultural setting.

The editors have divided their theme into eight sections, each organized around subordinate themes or chronology, or sometimes both: I.

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Resistance to Conquest; II. Rebellions against Alien Rule; III. The Religious Expression of Discontent; IV. The Emergence of Pressure Groups and Political Parties; V. The Economic Expression of Discontent; VI. The Literary Expression of Protest; VII. Revolutions, Coups, and Readjustments in the Post-Independence Era; VIII. Sovereignty and Diplomacy in Post-Independence Africa.

The chronology starts in the 1880s (in one case, just before), and the geographical distribution is wide, though of course dependent on the specialized knowledge of the contributors, a fact that can permit a description in Rotberg's introduction of Western-educated Africans after World War I as facing *new* problems and limitations, and dealing with them in familiar sterotypes and simplistic explanations even less valid for them than for their counterparts' actions some forty years earlier in the Gold Coast and what would be Nigeria.

Indeed, both the introduction and Mazrui's theoretical "postlude" raise the main problems of this book for the reader more familiar with the African past. They reflect a difficulty increasingly apparent in historical writing about Africa, a tendency aptly named "the Whig interpretation" by Herbert Butterfield when describing its appearance in English historical writing. It is the tendency to read the past in terms of the present; not just to ask important new questions as new problems arise in new times, but to see in the past an inevitable progress toward what the writer knows—or seeks—in the present, and more important, toward what he values.

Thus in this volume protest becomes, for reasons of the 1960s and 1970s, an organizing principle for earlier African history. Not only are genuine resistance and rebellion (the distinction being one the editors prefer to primary and secondary resistance) analyzed in those terms; so also, it seems, must everything Africans did after the 1880s. Not surprisingly, the most effective essays, whether about rebellion in Lesotho in 1879 or military coups in the 1960s, are those whose material lends itself more readily to such interpretation.

Many other essays provide important and stimulating materials and analyses. Yves Person's on Samori, Melson's on the Nigerian general strike of 1964, Mazrui's two on the Baganda in Uganda and on socialism in Tanzania are only a few examples. But close reading shows that not all authors are completely comfortable in the framework into which they, quite diligently, try to fit their data.

Mazrui concludes the book by saying:

> [The essays] were designed to illustrate protest as a social fact of wide impli-

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> cations. The theoretical inferences which constitute this conclusion are an attempt to assess the range of those implications. Yet, in the final analysis, the primary source of thought and illumination on protest . . . must lie for the time being in the case-studies. . . . Only against this background of the empirical data used here, and of the analysis of these specific cases, can protest as an area of social experience be expected to reveal itself in more concrete forms (p. 1196).

This is a sound appraisal of the problem, and, further, readers will find much material in this book illuminating different themes and hypotheses than the ones intended.

JEAN HERSKOVITS
State University of New York, College at Purchase

Miracle at Joaseiro *by Ralph Della Cava. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.—xiv, 324 pp. $9.95.*

In 1872 Padre Cícero Romão Batista, a 28-year-old Brazilian priest already known to friends for his "visions," took up a chaplaincy in Joaseiro, an impoverished interior village of the state of Ceará in northeastern Brazil. In 1889, one of the region's devastating drought years, a mulatto laundress in his household fell to the ground after communion, and the host she had taken appeared red with blood, an event which recurred frequently during the next months. Once Padre Cícero and other clerics had avowed the blood to be Christ's, the "miracle at Joaseiro" attracted pilgrims by the thousand to the town and catapulted Padre Cícero to national eminence which lasted till his death in 1934, and beyond.

Till now neither has Padre Cícero's story been fully and dispassionately pieced together nor have its social and political implications been clearly drawn. Professor Della Cava is admirably equipped for both tasks. He knows the society at first hand. He has the historical detective's skill and patience for sifting his small-town narrative from remote archives, flamboyant political tracts, and personal interviews. He has intimate, sympathetic knowledge of the workings of ecclesiastical minds and institutions. And he has the eye of a good political sociologist for the institutional context.

Several standard interpretations are proven inadequate by Della Cava's broad and probing analysis. First, Padre Cícero himself was not deviant, fanatic, or power hungry, and he continually tried to restrain and mediate the conflictive, sometimes violent factionalism which swirled about him. The picture that emerges here is of a pious, gentle, almost simple

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soul who was shielded or used, though not pushed around, by others, who accepted political leadership (as a local *coronel* or boss, regional "labor czar," town mayor, vice president of the state) primarily out of loyalty to his region and to the humble poor and who desired, above all, and was never granted, revocation of suspension from his orders. Second, although Padre Cícero seemed a messiah to his followers, the movement which attached itself to him was not simply a charismatic or psychoreligious phenomenon, nor was it a continuing source of radical protest. It attained longevity because it could "reintegrate itself into the traditional and conservative political structures of the Brazilian nation" (p. 6).

Finally, Della Cava challenges the view that backlands messianism is proof of a starkly dualistic society—a modern urban coast versus an archaic, impoverished interior—a view which received its classic statement seventy years ago in Euclides da Cunha's account of another famous Brazilian millenarian movement, *Rebellion in the Backlands*. Here the aggressive regionalism which seized on Padre Cícero as a leader is explained not by the isolation of his rural valley zone but by the impingement on it of political centralization and economic modernization. The most notable feature of the study is the skill with which the author relates Padre Cícero's movement to its many larger contexts, both national (social, political, economic) and international (ecclesiastical). So conscientiously does he pursue this task that the sociological explication of the priest's extraordinary career becomes more persuasive than the biographical rendering.

Though lucid, well organized, and readable, the book lacks the literary elegance of John Womack's recent biography of another Latin American rural protagonist, Emiliano Zapata. Della Cava, however, is at such greater pains than Womack to specify the significance of his story that, one suspects, his subject may be inherently more illuminating for an understanding of contemporary political change in rural and small-town Latin America.

RICHARD M. MORSE
Yale University

The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-1938 *by Robert M. Levine. New York, Columbia University Press, Institute of Latin American Studies, Columbia University, 1970.—x, 270 pp. $9.00.*

Catholic Radicals in Brazil *by Emanuel de Kadt. London, Oxford*

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University Press, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1970.—xii, 304 pp. $9.75.

Both these books, despite a markedly different emphasis and methodology, throw light on the process of political mobilization in Brazil. Both, indeed, strongly complement each other, since Levine's historical study provides detailed evidence on the formation and activities of the popular-front National Liberation Alliance (ANL) and the right-wing Integralista movement, but suffers, in the last analysis, from not being set in any overall interpretation of Brazilian political development, while de Kadt's study, in contrast, attempts to provide a coherent account of the socio-political structure of Brazil, but is notably weak in its historical sections, where it relies all too heavily on a single, rather partial source. In both cases, however, the strengths far outweigh the deficiencies.

Levine presents a meticulously researched analysis of the critical years between the São Paulo revolt and the Estado Novo, using new primary sources of great richness to explain the rise and subsequent failure of attempts at national political mobilization on both left and right. It is a first-class piece of archival research, a major contribution to the political historiography of modern Brazil. Of particular interest is his analysis of the membership of the ANL and of Integralism and of the way in which local interests and loyalties were so much more important in the 1935 revolts than were ideological or class commitments. He also has provocative comments on the role of the Comintern, providing new material of wider relevance for understanding the failure of Communism in Brazil to strike deeper roots than it has among the working classes. His material on Integralism also has further implications especially for understanding right-wing perceptions and fascist sympathies, which were to persist in some circles well after the formal demise of Salgado's movement in the 1930s. Perhaps, however, he makes too much of the rather untypical, and certainly not the most important, element of anti-Semitism in the Integralista philosophy.

De Kadt presents a case study of MEB (Movement for Basic Education), a program of radio instruction in backward areas started in 1961 by a group of bishops. He sets this first in the socio-political context of Brazil, explaining the strength of clientelistic structures, then in the wider growth of Catholic radicalism, examining its intellectual roots and the specific problems produced by the 1964 coup. Certainly his book is in no sense a narrow case study. It could have been strengthened by a more solid setting in political history, since it relies too heavily on Skidmore's interpretation of Brazilian politics at the national as opposed to the grass-roots level, but it does, in fact, especially contribute to an under-

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standing of the persisting importance of local factors, especially in the politics of the northeast and in the emergence of populist movements up to 1964. Here again, though dealing with a different phenomenon three decades later, he shows, like Levine, the difficulty of sustaining genuinely national political movements aiming at reform.

PETER FLYNN
University of Liverpool

Lord and Peasant in Peru: A Paradigm of Political and Social Change *by F. LaMond Tullis. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.—xviii, 302 pp. $10.50.*

This is a study of social, economic, and political change in the highlands of Peru. The focus is on reform movements affecting the peasants' way of life, and considerable importance is ascribed to the role of peasant communities in affecting change.

The theory and method of the study are at least as noteworthy as the substantive findings. Much theoretical emphasis is placed upon the dynamics of change in peasant communities, and the book seeks to interrelate these forces with development and other forms of change on regional and national levels. To carry this off, questionnaires were administered and interviews were conducted in each of the 44 villages comprising the Acolla and Chupaca systems of the Peruvian sierra. Respondents, in addition to peasants, included professionals, government bureaucrats, peasant federation and organization leaders, and village authorities throughout the entire central sierra.

The basic and well documented finding has to do, essentially, with impressive forces on the village level for development, modernization, and other forms of change. These forces are characterized as intense, rather than moderate, and as colliding on other—especially national—levels with systems unresponsive to change. Tullis holds that this unresponsiveness contributes significantly to the intensity of local and village pressures for change. Indeed, one of his hypotheses runs to the effect that "intense movements become possible . . . only where the larger society through coercion, real or perceived, has discouraged or prevented moderate ones" (p. 146). Peru thus appears to be ripe for revolutionary change in that a slow-moving and generally unresponsive national system functions to retard and deny realization to pent-up and intense local and village pressures for change. The emerging picture is thus the

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familiar one of the volcano expected to burst through its repressive lid.

Substantively, these findings do not conflict in any serious sense with assessments of the Peruvian situation arrived at by other methods. It should be pointed out that Tullis's research was conducted in 1967, before the Peruvian national "revolution" of October 1968. It is still not easy to determine whether the Velasco "revolution" has contributed to greater receptivity by the national system to fundamental change in Peru. In any case, it is clear that the chief contribution of this book lies not so much in its substantive findings as in its research theory and method. The study is pioneering in its statement of the interrelationships of social systems on the village and national levels and even in its use of questionnaires and interviews to document this interplay. These are more noteworthy than the findings, which are neither world shaking nor unexpected.

GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN
Northwestern University

Every War Must End *by Fred Charles Iklé. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.—viii, 160 pp. $8.00.*

One of the most encouraging features of the present era is that a great deal of important thinking and research about peace is coming not out of the peace movement, but out of those who are technically engaged in the study of the international system. Fred Iklé is one of this select band, which includes men like Tom Schelling, Richard Falk, and even Herman Kahn. This fact should not surprise anybody. Both war and peace are states of international system, and if we are to decrease the incidence of the first and increase the incidence of the second, we must understand the dynamics of the international system itself, and particularly what inputs are likely to produce what outputs.

Iklé's little volume is an important contribution to this intellectual search. It is well written, succinct, scholarly, well documented, and illuminated throughout by an important idea—that decisions involved in starting and fighting a war are apt to be made in the absence of any considerations about how to end it. One word which Iklé might have used to describe the processes he is studying is "suboptimization," that is, finding the best way of doing something which, in the light of the larger system, should not be done at all. Decision makers of the international system, statesmen, generals, and the like, are unusually subject

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to this complaint. Unfortunately there are good reasons for this: the total system is almost unbearably complicated and uncertain; hence the human mind takes refuge in subsystems and in a rhetoric which seeks to exorcise uncertainty by means of metaphor, such as "breaking the back of the enemy" or "the soft underbelly." No thought is usually given to the ultimate consequences of particular strategies, and it is not surprising, therefore, that the history of the international system is largely a record of decisions that turned out to be disastrous for those who made them.

Ikle's historical illustrations are drawn mainly from the First and Second World Wars and from the Korean War. The record is indeed a dismal one. What he calls the "treason of the hawks," which might be described as the pursuit of victory even at the cost of national survival, is amply documented. Both the British and the French come out rather badly in Iklé's interpretation, which is refreshing in the light of usual American prejudices. "War aims" are seldom thought through and never seem to be worth the sacrifice involved. Movement toward what an economist would think of as a "Paretian optimum," in which everybody would be better off, is prevented, however, because of the way in which the dynamics of the international system imposes itself on the internal decisionmaking process. One could almost put the problem in ecological terms and say that the hawks in one country encourage the hawks of another more than the doves in one country encourage the doves in another, and that in a war situation the hawks of each country are strongly competitive against their own doves, until the hawks multiply and destroy themselves for sheer lack of prey. I should add that this particular metaphor is mine and should not be blamed on Iklé.

The book is well arranged and follows an orderly progression through the chapters. The first chapter on the purpose of fighting states the problem, that the process of fighting destroys the purpose. Chapter two on "The Fog of Military Estimates" is an admirable documentation of the corruption of the information processes of the international system, in which the decisionmakers are frequently making decisions about an increasingly unreal world. Chapter three on "Peace Through Escalation" examines the choices which can prolong wars through desperation and through the absence of communication among the parties. Chapters four and five describe the struggle within, that is, the way in which the internal political power structure frequently has to change before those decisionmakers who are committed to the war and who therefore have to stand and fall by it actually fall. There is an excellent epilogue on ending wars before they start, in which very frightening

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comparisons are drawn between the present international system and that which preceded the outbreak of the First World War. Perhaps for good reasons of state, Iklé tends to avoid reference to American policy, particularly in recent years, and there is very little reference to the war in Vietnam, which could certainly provide some juicy examples of how metaphor leads to disastrous decisions. Nevertheless, the implication of the book is that the processes which led to disastrous decisions in the past continue into the present, so that there is certainly no guarantee that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated.

Iklé offers no grand solution to the problems which he raises. He makes no proposals for reform of the international system and seems to be content to let the dismal record stand. Nevertheless, a book of this kind may be in itself an important contribution to the better operation of the international system and to increasing the probability of peace and diminishing that of war. All decisions are made in the light of certain states of consciousness, that is, broad images of what the world in the mind of the decisionmaker is like. If stable peace is to be achieved, there has to be a change in the consciousness of the decisionmakers of the international system. This comes about slowly by education, by conversation, by discussion, and books of this kind make important contributions to this process. If President Nixon and other decisionmakers of the international system were to read this book, it might very well change their consciousness of the international system in a way which would make peace more probable. For all its limited scope and modest ambitions, therefore, this could turn out to be one of the important books of the century. The clear statement of one important idea which becomes obvious once it is stated, but which has not been obvious before, is often the greatest contribution which the intellectual can make. This reviewer for one is profoundly grateful to Iklé for his contribution and believes that if the book is widely read, the world can hardly help being changed for the better.

KENNETH E. BOULDING
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Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Family Life in a Federal Slum *by Lee Rainwater. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1970.—xi, 446 pp. $12.50.*

Some of the more perplexing problems in social science are centered around the interaction between the social, economic, and political forces

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of the larger American society and the more intimate aspects of life reflected in individual, family, and community functioning.

Lee Rainwater's new book, *Behind Ghetto Walls*, falls within the framework of this problem. It is therefore important, timely, and, as we say, relevant. Without a doubt, Lee Rainwater is among the finest social scientists in the American social science establishment. It is unfortunate, then, that with such an important subject and such a fine social scientist, the book is not a complete success. It is not a bad book and deserves to be read, but it is not a good book and deserves to be criticized. Its strengths are many and its weaknesses are many, and in the opinion of this reviewer the latter outweigh the former. The major strength of the book is that it grapples heroically with the larger questions facing our society.

This book is based on data gathered largely by graduate students of Washington University in St. Louis during the period 1963-66. It is a study of low-income black families living in a public housing project. The author views these families as deviants in relation to middle-class white American families, and he analyzes them and their situation from the sociological perspective which has grown out of his own cultural milieu. This is a major weakness of the book.

In a larger sense, the book is not really about the black families who live in Pruitt-Igoe, but about the larger society which encircles them and which crushes them. Toward the end of the book, Rainwater states, "Social scientists have been slow to provide detailed knowledge of what has become apparent as the central fact about the American underclass—that it is created by, and its existence is maintained by, the operation of what is in other ways the most successful economic system known to man" (p. 424). That, in many respects, is the heart of Rainwater's contribution in this book. The problem, however, is that the author does not see himself as a part of that economic system which crushes the underclass. Nor does he see the importance of racism as a central fact of life in America. He inclines to the view shared by many other white liberal social scientists that black people are essentially lower class or underclass, disadvantaged Americans. It is remarkable that a major sociologist could write a book in 1970 about black people without coming to grips with institutional racism, particularly after the Kerner Commission Report has defined it as the number one problem facing Americans.

The major deficiency of this book is that it did not grow out of the author's own work. It is based instead on the research of his graduate students and most particularly the doctoral dissertations of three of his students, Boone Hammond, Joyce Ladner, and David Schulz. As the au-

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thor tells us, each of these students has done his own analysis and each would no doubt differ with many of the interpretations given their data by their professor. Rainwater should be particularly commended for providing opportunities for black graduate students well before other white scholars saw the importance of doing so. This point deserves great emphasis because of the contribution these young scholars have made since. It is unfortunate, however, that Professor Rainwater should have used his access to his students' data to write a book on his own. It is unfortunate in three respects: first, because the data are not his own, which is evidenced in his often inept interpretation; second, because the data are about black people existing in urban public housing projects, they are foreign to his own personal and scholarly background; and, third, because these studies were done by different individuals with different interests, abilities, and world views, it is difficult to bring them together into one treatise. It is possible to surmount all of these difficulties, but the author does not succeed in doing so.

The organization of the book is a source of consternation. The author alternates between a data chapter drawn almost verbatim from the work of his students and a chapter of theoretical speculations drawn from his own ideas. This provides a disjointed presentation and obscures the major objective stated on page 1:

> We will be primarily concerned in this book with private life as it is lived from day to day in a federally built and supported slum. The questions which are treated here have to do with the kinds of interpersonal relationships that develop in nuclear families, the socialization processes that operate in families as children grow up in a slum environment, the informal relationships of children and adolescents and adults with each other, and, finally, the world views (the existential framework) arising from the life experiences of the Pruitt-Igoeans and the ways they make use of this framework to order their experiences and make sense out of them.

The data chapters are rich and engrossing reading. The data provided by Hammond and Ladner have the additional quality of ringing true to life. It must be said, however, that Joyce Ladner's treatment of her own data in her new book, *Tomorrow's Tomorrow: The Black Woman* (New York, 1971), makes a more important contribution to social science and to the general literature on black families than does Rainwater's second-hand treatment of her data. The cultural sensitivity which she brings to her data enables her to understand and explain them in a richer and much more true-to-life fashion. The same talents are reflected in Boone's unpublished work.

Perhaps it is not surprising that Dr. Rainwater's students have done a better job than their professor in this study. This is not an uncommon development and is perhaps to be both expected and commended for the

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social science community; however, we must regret that the enormous talents and sensitivity of the man who gave us *And The Poor Get Children* and *Working Man's Wife* have been misplaced in *Behind Ghetto Walls*. It is heartening to know that Rainwater is currently engaged in research that brings him in closer contact with the white community, for in this milieu he has already demonstrated that he is a superior analyst. As for the study of black family and community life from the inside, this will be better left to the black students that he trained at a time when other white social scientists were still locked in to their own lily-white ivory towers and color-blind sociological theories.

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